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81.
Seven language tests were constructed or adapted to assess the performance of three groups of 10 right-handed adult subjects: a right hemisphere lesion (RHL) group, a left hemisphere lesion (LHL) group, and a neurologically normal (NN) control group. Both the LHL and RHL groups produced poorer scores than the NN group on six of the seven tests. On two of the six significant tests, the RHL performed more poorly than the NN group. Analyses of words uttered during an oral story telling test indicated that the RHL group told significantly fewer complete stories using significantly more nouns, adjectives, and conjunctions than the NN group. On a 7-point scale, three judges rated the overall communication abilities of the RHL group as having “mild problems,” a significantly different rating than the ratings of the LHL and NN groups. The findings suggest that underlying visual spatial and perceptual deficits may be accompanied by clearly recognizable language differences in certain subjects. 相似文献
82.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3):303-321
If practical reasoning deserves its name, its form must be different from that of ordinary (theoretical) reasoning. A few have thought that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, rather than a mental state. I argue here that if the conclusion is an action, then so too is one of the premises. You might reason your way from doing one thing to doing another: from browsing journal abstracts to reading a particular journal article. I motivate this by sympathetically re-examining Hume's claim that a conclusion about what ought to be done follows only from an argument one of whose premises is likewise about what ought to be done. 相似文献
83.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3-4):117-133
Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading puts Hume at odds with Humeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation. 相似文献
84.
Kirsten Birkett 《Zygon》2006,41(2):249-266
Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field. 相似文献
85.
Peter Lamarque 《Argumentation》1990,4(3):333-346
The paper discusses the principle by which we reason to what is true in fiction. The focus is David Lewis's article Truth in Fiction (1978) which proposes an analysis in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds. It is argued thatLewis's account is inadequate in detail and also in principle in that it conflicts radically with basic and familiar tenets of literary criticism. Literary critical reasoning about fiction concerns not the discovery of facts in possible worlds but the recovery of meanings in interpretative frameworks. The model theoretic approach fails to account for common literary or rhetorical devices like unreliable narration, connotation and point of view. And in explaining indeterminacy of content in terms of truth-value gaps it gives too simplistic an account of critical reasoning about character motivation and thematic development. A more adequate account of content-indeterminacy can be provided through a comparison of the interpretation of fiction with the interpretation of human action. A broader motif in the paper is the underlying tension between what is required for the logic of fiction and what is required for the aesthetics of fiction. 相似文献
86.
Jim Stone 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):153-160
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating
due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example
相似文献
Jim StoneEmail: |
87.
William Edward Morris 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):441-454
Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,”
which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an
analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism”
reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his
naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program
for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses
the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or
positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas. 相似文献
88.
Markos Valaris 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):427-445
There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual
thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two:
on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of
concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist
conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the
exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue,
two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori
knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching
a different way to think of that link.
相似文献
Markos ValarisEmail: |
89.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3-4):55-66
In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading Hume as a trope nominalist sheds light on his account of general ideas, perceptions, relations and nominalism. 相似文献
90.
In this paper, the author derives the Dedekind–Peano axioms for number theory from a consistent and general metaphysical theory of abstract objects. The derivation makes no appeal to primitive mathematical notions, implicit definitions, or a principle of infinity. The theorems proved constitute an important subset of the numbered propositions found in Frege"s Grundgesetze. The proofs of the theorems reconstruct Frege"s derivations, with the exception of the claim that every number has a successor, which is derived from a modal axiom that (philosophical) logicians implicitly accept. In the final section of the paper, there is a brief philosophical discussion of how the present theory relates to the work of other philosophers attempting to reconstruct Frege"s conception of numbers and logical objects. 相似文献