Effectiveness of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Anxiety and Depression Among Orthodox Jews

Several clinical papers have provided clinical recommendations for how to provide cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for obsessive-compulsive symptoms among Orthodox Jewish individuals. However, no published studies have described culturally adapted CBT for anxiety or depression in this population or quantified the effectiveness of such approaches. We evaluated the effectiveness of CBT for symptoms of generalized anxiety and depression in a sample of Orthodox Jews (n = 65) and a comparison sample (n = 42) presenting to the Center for Anxiety, a private outpatient clinic with three offices in the New York area (www.centerforanxiety.org). A chart review revealed that all patients received CBT-based interventions with appropriate religious-cultural adaptations of treatment, which we present in two case studies. We observed statistically and clinically significant treatment gains from pretreatment to midtreatment (anxiety: t = 8.56, p < .001; depression: t = 8.01, p < .001), and again from midtreatment through termination (anxiety: t = 3.68, p < .001; depression: t = 3.62, p < .001). No significant differences in anxiety or depression were observed between Orthodox Jewish patients and controls at any time point or for treatment effects (anxiety: Wilks’ Lambda = .950, F = 2.65, p = .076, η_p² = .050; depression: Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 2.00,p = .49, η_p² = .014). This paper offers clinical insight into delivery of CBT to Orthodox Jewish patients, as well as preliminary support for the effectiveness of CBT in treating symptoms of generalized anxiety and depression within this population.     

GLOCALIZATION: RELIGION AND SCIENCE AROUND THE WORLD

This essay explains the rationale behind a series of reviews on interactions between knowledge and values, science and religion, in different countries or regions around the world. The series will run in Zygon for the whole of 2015 and beyond. In the literature, it may seem that discussions in the United States and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom are typical of the issues, but they need not be. David Livingstone showed that the reception of evolution differed, even among Calvinists in different countries. Thus, rather than an export model, we should take time to learn from scholars rooted in different contexts how in their situation issues on knowledge and values arise and are dealt with. In this interplay of global processes and local contexts, indicated with the term glocalization, we should be alert to the migration of concepts and the transformations that ideas undergo.     

Debunking,supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

ABSTRACT

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.     

From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment

This paper argues that the Cambridge Platonists had stronger philosophical links to Scottish moral philosophy than the received history allows. Building on the work of Michael Gill who has demonstrated links between ethical thought of More, Cudworth and Smith and moral sentimentalism, I outline some links between the Cambridge Platonists and Scottish thinkers in both the seventeenth century (e.g., James Nairn, Henry Scougal) and the eighteenth century (e.g., Smith, Blair, Stewart). I then discuss Hume's knowledge of Cudworth, in Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, The Natural History of Religion and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.     

Motivating Hume's natural virtues

Many commentators propose that Hume thinks that we are not or should not be motivated to perform naturally virtuous actions from moral sentiments. I take issue with this interpretation in this paper, arguing that Hume fully incorporates the moral sentiments into his understanding of how human beings act when it comes to the natural virtues and that he does not see the moral sentiments as a problematic kind of motivation that threatens or weakens the virtuous status of the action.     

Hume,Locke and consciousness

This is a reply to Donald Ainslie's discussion of Terence Penelhum's work on Hume, Locke and the nature of consciousness; although agree on many points about the differences between Locke and Hume, I take issue with Ainslie's views about the epistemic status Hume accords to introspective acts.     

The simple duality: Humean passions

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).     

HUMANS CREATED ACCORDING TO THE IMAGO DEI: AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

Classical approaches to the idea of the imago Dei in the theology of creation have tended to postulate a distinctive element of the human being not found in other creatures, with the possible exception of angels. This is often combined with attempts to use the imago concept as an organizing principle within Christian theology. Such approaches are now problematic not merely on account of their exegetical findings, but for methodological reasons. In light of recent exegesis, the imago Dei in Genesis 1:26–27 should be seen as a signifier of human life under God, rather than a single determining characteristic or essential attribute. Following the wisdom literature, the imago Dei can be understood, in a more diffused manner, as represented by human persons over long periods of evolutionary history in their characteristic quotidian forms of life, thus signifying the providential ordering of human life everywhere. The recent work of David Kelsey on theological anthropology is engaged in this context.