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81.
Errol Lord 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):365-377
Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for conciliationism appeal to a principle Christensen [2011] dubs Independence. Independence says that evaluations of the beliefs of those with whom one disagrees should not be made on the basis of one's initial reasoning about p. In this paper, I show that this principle is false. I also show that two weaker principles that vindicate conciliationism are either false, unmotivated, or both. 相似文献
82.
Dominic K. Dimech 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):637-650
Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the quasi-realist reading of Hume on causation by showing how quasi-realism does not speak to inductive scepticism. I also offer evidence that Hume takes inductive scepticism to result from his theory of causation, and that his scepticism is tied to his rejection of metaphysical causal realism. 相似文献
83.
Claudia May 《文化与宗教》2013,14(3):247-276
The connection between religion and football is not lost on film-maker Gurinder Chadha, who, in her film Bend it Like Beckham , charts the passions of a young woman called Jesminder (Jess), whose devotion to the game of football, and in particular David Beckham, and her determination not to cut herself off from her Sikh faith, culture and family, feature prominently in this cinematic depiction charting a young woman's quest to become a professional footballer. When applied to the study of identity formation, Gurinder Chadha transforms the bend-it-like-Beckham technique into a theoretical premise through which a critical examination into the complex trajectories and contesting traditions underscoring culture, race, gender and religious formation(s) can be examined on and off the football field. 相似文献
84.
Ethics and Intuitions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Peter Singer 《The Journal of Ethics》2005,9(3-4):331-352
For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the
neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing
against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to
our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it
is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead
us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics. 相似文献
85.
Kirsten Birkett 《Zygon》2006,41(2):249-266
Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field. 相似文献
86.
Eugene Heath 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(3):250-267
This essay offers cautionary considerations on what has come to be called “public philosophy.” A conception of philosophy is set forth using Socrates as the paradigm of relentless philosophical questioning. The essay then outlines three types of public philosophy: a philosophy situated in a public setting, a philosophy whose content is modified for a varied public, and a philosophy that functions as normative consensus. The most important of these three is the philosophy modified for the public. The discussion notes examples of public philosophy from the history of philosophy, and examines the contribution of eighteenth‐century philosophers (such as David Hume) to a version of public philosophy. The risks of public philosophy are noted—in particular, that a modified philosophy may substitute the inculcation of belief over the modeling of philosophy. The essay concludes by noting that the university classroom remains an important but forgotten venue of public philosophy. 相似文献
87.
Daniel Kolak 《Synthese》2008,162(3):341-372
Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians”
such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that
abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake
on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity.
Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either
completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that
relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity,
leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications,
is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity
of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic
way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness
clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism
with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal
identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry,
provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,”
“self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself. 相似文献
88.
Regularity Theories Reassessed 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Michael Baumgartner 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):327-354
For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene. Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced authors working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (Kausales Schliessen. Eine Untersuchung über kausale Erklärungen und Theorienbildung. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1999), Ragin (Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Graßhoff and May (Causal regularities. In W. Spohn, M. Ledwig, &; M. Esfeld (Eds.), Current issues in causation (pp. 85–114). Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), Swartz (The concept of physical law (2nd ed.). http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/, 2003), Halpin (Erkenntnis, 58, 137–168, 2003) – to direct their attention back to regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity theories, the paper at hand therefore reassesses the criticism raised against regularity accounts since the INUS theory of causation of Mackie (The cement of the universe. A study of causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). It is shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches. By outlining ways to refute these objections it is argued that the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty. 相似文献
89.
Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
90.
Burleigh Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(1):105-122
In this essay, I first evaluate the conceptual analysis of human rights by Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians. Next I criticize
Allen Buchanan’s claim that Rawls did not address basic human interests/capabilities theories of human nature. I argue Buchanan
is doubly mistaken when he claims that John Rawls sought to avoid such theories because they are comprehensive doctrines.
Then I evaluate David Reidy’s defense of Rawls, while questioning his efforts to show how Rawls’s list of human rights could
be expanded. Finally, I accept James Nickel’s argument that Rawls has tied human rights too closely to intervention on their
behalf. However, I reject his, and by implication Rawls’s, refusal to accept a two-tiered approach to human rights. 相似文献