Assertive training versus rehearsal and the importance of making an assertive response

This study dealt with whether mere practice would enhance assertion, and whether assertive training would reduce negative effect in simulated target situations, even when subjects (Ss) made no overt response. Males reporting difficulty with authority figures received either rehearsal alone or the complete assertive training package; in a subsequent behavioral test half in each group were told to make a response, with the remainder instructed to remain silent. Objective ratings revealed marked improvement following assertive training, while the effects of practice alone were negligible. For Ss receiving assertive training, reduction in selfreported negative affect in the target situations appeared to be independent of whether or not they engaged in overt verbalization, suggesting that assertive training, per se may enhance feelings of well-being.     

Cognitive and behavioral self-control strategies: Applications for the clinical management of adult stutterers

A model of therapy for adult stutterers which emphasizes the role of cognition in mediating the conditions for behavioral change is described. The philosophy of the program along with the specific forms and effects of several self-control strategies are discussed in relation to: (1) expectancy formation and the attainment of goals; (2) speech modification procedures; (3) transference of clinical gains; and (4) assessment of results. The use of cognitive restructuring procedures, self-instructional strategies, imagery and other coping skills for the management of speech-related stress is outlined. The importance of developing self-management and self-monitoring programs that clients may use in ongoing confrontations with real-life problems is emphasized in defining responsible behavior and the responsibility for change.     

Patterns of desynchrony in agoraphobia: A preliminary report

Changes in heart rate in three moderate to severe agoraphobic women were monitored by a Holter Recorder, used for obtaining portable EKGs. These data were collected before, half-way through, and at the end of a 12 session, group therapy program consisting of exposure and cognitive restructuring while subjects walked, or in one case, were driven along a standard 1.2 km course leading away from the treatment setting. Self-reports of anxiety were collected simultaneously. Despite substantial behavioral improvement in all cases, markedly different patterns of synchrony or desynchrony were noted between heart rate and self-reports of anxiety and substantial increases in heart rate were noted in one subject.     

A note on the analysis of designs in which subjects receive each stimulus only once

In social psychological experiments, the manipulations of interest are often presented to subjects along with, or as part of, some stimulus. An example would be a manipulation of the verbal label associated with a stimulus photograph, in a person perception study. Ordinarily it is not possible for stimuli to be completely crossed with treatments because subjects cannot be exposed to any stimulus more than once. In such designs it is wise to counterbalance the assignment of stimuli to treatment conditions, but this gives rise to difficulties in the analysis of the experimental data. Data from such designs have frequently been misanalyzed in the published literature. This paper presents a method of constructing a counter-balancing scheme to simplify the analysis, and appropriate methods of analysis for both the simplified and the general case. It is emphasized that stimuli are generally best treated as a random factor in such designs, permitting increased generalizability, but the case where the stimulus factor is fixed is also considered.     

Language performance on visual processing tasks in right hemisphere lesion cases

Seven language tests were constructed or adapted to assess the performance of three groups of 10 right-handed adult subjects: a right hemisphere lesion (RHL) group, a left hemisphere lesion (LHL) group, and a neurologically normal (NN) control group. Both the LHL and RHL groups produced poorer scores than the NN group on six of the seven tests. On two of the six significant tests, the RHL performed more poorly than the NN group. Analyses of words uttered during an oral story telling test indicated that the RHL group told significantly fewer complete stories using significantly more nouns, adjectives, and conjunctions than the NN group. On a 7-point scale, three judges rated the overall communication abilities of the RHL group as having “mild problems,” a significantly different rating than the ratings of the LHL and NN groups. The findings suggest that underlying visual spatial and perceptual deficits may be accompanied by clearly recognizable language differences in certain subjects.     

CONSCIOUS OBJECTIONS: GOD AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS DEBATES

Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field.     

Reasoning to what is true in fiction

The paper discusses the principle by which we reason to what is true in fiction. The focus is David Lewis's article Truth in Fiction (1978) which proposes an analysis in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds. It is argued thatLewis's account is inadequate in detail and also in principle in that it conflicts radically with basic and familiar tenets of literary criticism. Literary critical reasoning about fiction concerns not the discovery of facts in possible worlds but the recovery of meanings in interpretative frameworks. The model theoretic approach fails to account for common literary or rhetorical devices like unreliable narration, connotation and point of view. And in explaining indeterminacy of content in terms of truth-value gaps it gives too simplistic an account of critical reasoning about character motivation and thematic development. A more adequate account of content-indeterminacy can be provided through a comparison of the interpretation of fiction with the interpretation of human action. A broader motif in the paper is the underlying tension between what is required for the logic of fiction and what is required for the aesthetics of fiction.     

Trumping the causal influence account of causation

Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example

Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition

There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two: on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue, two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching a different way to think of that link.

Hume as a trope nominalist

In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading Hume as a trope nominalist sheds light on his account of general ideas, perceptions, relations and nominalism.