Believing in Miracles

Classical Christian definitions of miracle speak of events transcending the natural powers of objects. A personal creator, I argue, might well cause such events in order to achieve a supernatural purpose—bringing creatures to eternal life. Miracles—events transcending natural powers, disclosing and realizing the divine purpose—would then be integral to the rational order of nature. David Hume' arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context–dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science.     

Constructivism and the Limits of Reason: Revisiting the Kantian Problematic

The main focus of this paper ison ways in which Kantian philosophy can informproponents and opponents of constructivismalike. Kant was primarily concerned withreconciling natural and moral law. His approachto this general problematic was to limit andseparate what we can know about things(phenomena) from things as they are inthemselves (noumena), and to identify moralagency with the latter. Revisiting the Kantianproblematic helps to address and resolve longstanding epistemological concerns regardingconstructivism as an educational philosophy inrelation to issues of objectivity andsubjectivity, the limits of theoretical andpractical reason, and the relation betweenhuman experience and the world. It also servesto address ethical concerns regardingliberation from limited self-interests andcontexts conditioned by localised beliefs andinclinations. In light of revisiting theKantian problematic, both Glasersfeld's radicalview of constructivism and Jardine's socialcritique of constructivism are found wanting.Beyond constructivism, Kant's distinctionbetween phenomena and noumena and the limits ofreason that follow from it are brieflyconsidered in terms of Merleau-Ponty's noveldouble-embodied notion of flesh as anontological primitive – as a matter of beingboth in, and of, the world – with an aim tomore intimate connections between epistemologyand ethics.     

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Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.

The World Council of Churches and Pentecostals

This article recalls the history of the relationships between the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Pentecostal churches from the early years of the WCC until today. One of the greatest challenges currently facing the WCC is the shift in focus of Christianity to the South and the East, a phenomenon to which emerging Pentecostal and charismatic churches and communities are contributing. Alongside global cultural trends in the context of globalization, Pentecostal and charismatic piety and spirituality are increasingly affecting the older churches as well. While some see this negatively, many see it as an expression of adaptation to new challenges necessary for the survival of these churches. The article shows how the changing ecclesial context led to the WCC to explore new avenues for building relationships such as a Joint Consultative Group and the Global Christian Forum.     

MORAL ORTHOSES: A NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN AND MACHINE ETHICS

Machines are increasingly involved in decisions with ethical implications, which require ethical explanations. Current machine learning algorithms are ethically inscrutable, but not in a way very different from human behavior. This article looks at the role of rationality and reasoning in traditional ethical thought and in artificial intelligence, emphasizing the need for some explainability of actions. It then explores Neil Lawrence's embodiment factor as an insightful way of looking at the differences between human and machine intelligence, connecting it to the theological understanding of embodiment, relationality, and personhood. Finally, it proposes the notion of artificial moral orthoses, which could provide ethical explanations for both artificial and human agents, as a more promising unifying approach to human and machine ethics.     

CHARLES LYELL,UNIFORMITARIANISM, AND INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES

I examine the development of Charles Lyell's principle of uniformity and its influence on the development of modern geology and biology and argue that distinguishing between philosophical starting points and empirical findings is essential for clarity in the discussion between science and religion. First, I explore Lyell's arguments against catastrophism and how these were both empirically and religiously motivated. I then consider how David Hume's empiricism, theory of causation, and rejection of miracles influenced Lyell. Using these insights, Lyell formulated his principle of uniformity, which he believed was based on current empirical findings, and rejected explanatory hypotheses that used the biblical Flood or other catastrophist accounts as violations of uniform causation and introductions of theological concepts into empirical science. I next examine the influence of Lyell's principle on Charles Darwin. Although Lyell opposed Darwinism for most of his life, Darwin relied heavily on Lyell, as is evidenced by references throughout The Origin of Species. I contend that the most important aspect of Lyell's principle for Darwin is that it makes natural evil (the struggle for survival) a process that has always been occurring rather than something introduced after the Fall as recorded in Genesis. Finally, I discuss the role that uniformity plays for Lyell, Darwin, and modern science as an interpretive principle rather than as an inference from empirical data, and I conclude by noting that keeping the distinction in mind between interpretive principles and empirical findings will help clarify debates between science and religion.     

Paul,Luther, and the Cross: In Dialog with Karl Donfried

In response to the articles appearing in Dialog 46:1 (Spring 2007), David Brondos defends his position that in Paul's thought Christ's death did not “effect” human salvation, over against Karl Donfried's critique of that position. While Brondos and Donfried agree that Luther got the essence of Paul's gospel right and that Paul did not understand Jesus' death in terms of satisfaction or penal substitution, Brondos argues that the idea of “inclusive substitution” defended by Donfried and characteristic of the “new perspective on Paul” is foreign to the thought of both Paul and Luther.     

THE DEFENCE OF THE MYSTERIES OF THE TRINITY AND THE INCARNATION: AN EXAMPLE OF LEIBNIZ'S 'OTHER' REASON

In this paper I will discuss certain aspects of Leibniz's theory and practice of ‘soft reasoning’ as exemplified by his defence of two central mysteries of the Christian revelation: the Trinity and the Incarnation. By theory and practice of ‘soft’ or ‘broad’ reasoning, I mean the development of rational strategies which can successefully be applied to the many areas of human understanding which escape strict demonstration, that is, the ‘hard’ or ‘narrow’ reasoning typical of mathematical argumentation.¹ These strategies disclose an ‘other’ reason, i.e. a complementary set of arguments and methods developed by Leibniz in order to deal with crucial issues such as the ‘weighting’ of probabilities and truths of fact. I will argue that one of the most compelling examples of the importance and fertility of Leibniz's ‘other’ reason is provided by his solution to the problems posed by the unique epistemological status of theological mysteries.