Is analytical psychology a religion? In statu nascendi

This paper elucidates and discusses Jung's conceptions of the relation between psychology, psychotherapy and religion.     

The learning benefits of teaching: A retrieval practice hypothesis

Teaching educational materials to others enhances the teacher's own learning of those to‐be‐taught materials, although the underlying mechanisms remain largely unknown. Here, we show that the learning‐by‐teaching benefit is possibly a retrieval benefit. Learners (a) solved arithmetic problems (i.e., they neither taught nor retrieved; control group), (b) taught without relying on teaching notes (i.e., they had to retrieve the materials while teaching; teaching group), (c) taught with teaching notes (i.e., they did not retrieve the materials while teaching; teaching without retrieval practice [TnRP] group), or (d) retrieved (i.e., they did not teach but only practised retrieving; retrieval practice group). In a final comprehension test 1 week later, learners in the teaching group, as did those in the retrieval practice group, outperformed learners in the TnRP and control groups. Retrieval practice possibly causes the learning benefits of teaching.     

Joining and leaving a new religious movement: A study of ex-members’ mental health

The impact of membership in new, often socially contested, religious movements (NRMs) on mental health of members and ex-members is still a controversial question in the psychological literature. In the present study, we interviewed 20 ex-members of various NRMs who also completed questionnaires measuring several cognitive (need for closure, world assumptions) and affective-emotional (parental and adult attachment, social relationships, depression) constructs. Ex-members were then compared with current NRM members and with individuals not involved in NRMs. It appeared that NRM membership compensated for some previously existing vulnerabilities reported by members (insecure attachment in childhood, few social relationships, negative life events). However, this supportive effect did not persist after the destabilizing experience of disaffiliation. Yet, ex-members remained strong believers and were very inclined to spirituality.     

The just world hypothesis as an argumentative resource in debates about unemployment benefits

The concept of the “just world” is established as a key explanation for how people make sense of inequality so that those deemed to score high in belief in a just world are more likely to hold prejudicial beliefs and to blame people in poverty for their situations. However, this is an inadequate explanation for such complicated and controversial issues. To better understand talk about the just world and the controversial issue of the distribution of unemployment benefits (an issue of inequality), a discursive psychological approach to the just world is used. Therefore, a discourse analysis focusses on 2 feature length British televised discussions about benefit claimants called “The Big Benefit Row: Live” (Channel 5 3/2/2014) and “Benefits Britain: the Debate” (Channel 4 17/2/2014). The analysis demonstrates that people draw on both just and unjust world arguments simultaneously and also topicalise what counts as just so as to support their positions on unemployment benefits, rather than in the consistent way that just world theory would predict. It is therefore argued that the just world should be recast as a cultural value that facilitates arguments about benefits, rather than an internally held belief.     

Contributors to this issue

Frances Bower
Pauline Everest
Donald E. Kalsched
Jean Knox
Joseph Redfearn
Joy Schaverien
Robert A. Segal
Sonu Shamdasani
Anthony Storr     

The Stories We Tell: Introduction to the Special Issue on Ethical Challenges in Community Psychology Research and Practice

This Special Issue examines ethical challenges in community psychology research and practice. The literature on ethics in community psychology has remained largely abstract and aspirational, with few concrete examples and case studies, so the goal of this Special Issue was to expand our written discourse about ethical dilemmas in our field. In these articles, researchers and practitioners share stories of specific ethical challenges they faced and how they sought to resolve them. These first‐person narratives examine how ethical challenges come about, how community psychology values inform ethical decision making, and how lessons learned from these experiences can inform an ethical framework for community psychology.     

Approaching Complex Cases With a Crisis Intervention Model and Teamwork

Patients referred for genetic counseling may be in a state of crisis, feeling as though they are incapable of making decisions about the management of their pregnancy, genetic testing options and/or life planning issues. The role of the genetic counselor is to assist a patient through this crisis state by increasing the patient's understanding and by helping to facilitate decision making and adjustment to those decisions. In this paper we present a clinical genetic counseling case that was complicated by numerous medical and psychosocial issues. The wide scope of this case required the involvement of both a prenatal and a medical genetic counselor. Working as a team we utilized a crisis intervention model. Our counseling focused on identifying and isolating the issues, providing factual information, setting a time frame for decisions to be made, and encouraging social support and emotion-focused coping strategies.     

To(o) Queer the Analyst: Lesbiana,Junguiana and Sudamericana. Towards Woven Onto-Epistemologies1

This is a two-part paper: in the first one, a personal story serves as a conceptual prism through which I address the issue of how a queer analyst can be a problem for analytical psychology; in the second, I present some readings and images—mostly from decolonial feminisms—that have been of interest to me lately in my path to queer Jungian psychology, that is, to de-essentialize and de-individualize its theory and practice. By borrowing (and altering) the title from Gloria Anzaldúa's (1991/2009a) essay “To(o) queer the writer”, this paper explores some themes she has elaborated there on solidarity, theorization and ways of writing and reading from othered points of view. In dialogue with Donna Haraway's (2016) Staying with the Trouble and Ursula K. Le Guin's (1989/2000) The Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction, together with the imagery of bags, weaving and string figures game, this paper aims to explore the potential of what I have called “woven onto-epistemologies”. By imagining and developing this new condition of knowledge, other stories and theories in analytical psychology may have an opportunity to be told.     

Adapting the Unique Minds Program: Exploring the Feasibility of a Multiple Family Intervention for Children with Learning Disabilities in the Context of Spain

The Unique Minds Program (Stern, Unique Minds Program, 1999) addresses the socio‐emotional needs of children with learning disabilities (LD) and their families. Children and their parents work together in a multiple family group to learn more about LD and themselves as people with the capacity to solve problems in a collaborative way, including problems in family school relationships. This article reports the cultural adaptation of the program for use in Spain and findings from a feasibility study involving three multiple family groups and a total of 15 children and 15 mothers, using a pre‐post design. This Spanish adaptation of the program is called “Mentes Únicas”. Standardized outcome measures indicated an overall statistically significant decrease in children's self‐rated maladjustment and relationship difficulties by the end of the program. Improvements were endorsed by most mothers, although they were not always recognized by the children's teachers. The program had a high level of acceptability: Mothers and children felt safe, understood, and helped throughout the sessions. The efficacy of the adapted intervention for the context of Spain remains to be tested in a more rigorous study.     

IS MY FEELING YOUR PAIN BAD FOR OTHERS? EMPATHY AS VIRTUE VERSUS EMPATHY AS FIXED TRAIT

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly.