“IF I WERE GOD”: EINSTEIN AND RELIGION

Designed as an introductory lecture for the conference “Einstein, God and Time,” this essay provides a brief survey of three sets of relations—between Einstein and time, God and time, and Einstein and God. The question is raised whether Einstein's rejection of absolute time held any implications for theology. It is argued that, despite Einstein's denial and his exemplary caution, the fact that Isaac Newton had associated absolute space and absolute time with a deity who constituted them meant that a revisitation of theological questions was inevitable. Consideration is then given to the time‐lessness and changelessness of God, with a brief reference to eschatological issues. The question whether there might be parallels between the renunciation of Newtonian time by physicists and by Christian theologians is discussed with reference to recent commentary on the eschatological thinking of Jürgen Moltmann. Whether Einstein himself would have sympathized with these theologies is to be doubted, given his antipathy to anthropomorphic and anthropopathic concepts of deity. Finally, in exploring Einstein's sometimes whimsical use of theological language, it becomes necessary to acknowledge that his well‐known affirmation of the complementarity of science and religion rested on a distinctive construction of religion that allowed him to say he was a “deeply religious unbeliever.” Attempts to categorize his convictions, or to appropriate them for conventional theistic purposes, miss their subtlety and their apophatic resonances.     

A RELATIVISTIC ESCHATOLOGY: TIME,ETERNITY, AND ESCHATOLOGY IN LIGHT OF THE PHYSICS OF RELATIVITY

Unique epistemological challenges arise whenever one embarks on the critical and self‐critical reflection of the nature of time and the end of time. I attempt to construct my preference for an eschatological distinction between time and eternity from within a middle way, avoiding both the hubris that claims complete comprehension and the resignation that concedes readily to know nothing. Surveying the history of reflection on this multifaceted question of time, with its ephemeral and everlasting dimensions, I argue that the eschatological interplay between the “already” and the “not yet” has much to offer: promise for the religion‐science dialogue as well as hope for humanity, especially for those on society's bleakest edges. But understandings of time, to be authentically theological, must be also informed by cosmology and the physics of relativity. My proposal seeks to respect the theological and scientific interpretations of the nature of time, serving the ongoing, creative interaction of these disciplines. Between physics and theology I identify four formal differences in analyzing eschatology, all grounded in the one fundamental difference between extrapolation and promise. Discussion of what I term deficits in both the scientific and theological approaches leads to further examination of the complex relationship between time and eternity. I distinguish three models of such relationships, which I label the ontological, the quantitative, and the eschatological distinction between time and eternity. Because of the way it embraces a multiplicity of times, especially relating to the culmination and the consummation of creation, I opt for the eschatological model. The eschatological disruption of linear chronology relates well to relativ‐istic physics: This model is open, dynamic, and relational, and it may add a new aspect to the debate over the block universe.     

心理学研究本土文化取向的理论与实践

经由本地化研究建立本土心理学的呼声,自20世纪80年代以来,在两岸三地即已时有所闻．惟对“本土”或“本地化”的概念并不明确。到90年代末期台湾部分心理学家提出三地论的概念^[3],认为港、台、大陆三地因长期隔离,社会形态各异,故而主张三地华人社会的心理学者应各自建立自己的本土心理学(台湾本土心理学、大陆本土心理学、香港本土心理学)。此种纯以地区为前提的心理学研究取向有待商榷．原因是如将心理学视为研究人性特质的科学。并将心理与行为视为人性特质的表徽。显而易见的是,影响心理与行为的文化因素大于地区因素。基于此义．本文提出采用心理学研究本土文化取向的建议．并试从心理学思想的演变中分析探讨此一建议的合理性。一得之愚尚请学界先进批评指教。     

TOWARD A SOUND PERSPECTIVE ON MODERN PHYSICS: CAPRA'S POPULARIZATION OF MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGICAL APPROACHES REEXAMINED

Abstract. Fritjof Capra's The Tao of Physics , one of several popularizations paralleling Eastern mysticism and modern physics, is critiqued, demonstrating that Capra gives little attention to the differing philosophies of physics he employs, utilizing whatever interpretation suits his purposes, without prior justification. The same critique is applied and similar conclusions drawn, about some recent attempts at relating theology and physics. In contrast, we propose the possibility of maintaining a cogent relationship between these disciplines by employing theological hypotheses to account for aspects of physics that are free from interpretive difficulties, such as the ability to create mathematical structures with extraordinary predictive success.     

RELIGION AND THE THEORIES OF SCIENCE: A RESPONSE TO BARBOUR

Abstract. This paper offers a detailed response to “Religion and the Theories of Science” in Barbour's Gifford Lectures I. Topics include: complementarity, indeterminacy, parts and wholes, and Bell's theorem in quantum theory; metaphysical issues raised by relativity theory and thermodynamics, principally the problem of temporality and “top-down” versus “bottom—up” causality; design arguments and the origins of the universe in astronomy and creation; and God's action in the context of evolution and continuing creation. Areas of agreement and disagreement between Barbour and myself over philosophical and theological implications are presented, and endnotes indicate further areas of conversation.     

HAWKING ON GOD AND CREATION

Abstract. Although full of talk about God, Stephen Hawking's recent best seller, A Brief History of Time , apparently has little use for the traditional notion of God as cosmic creator. More precisely, Hawking seems to reject the idea that we need appeal, any longer, to the notion of creatio originans (originating creation). The reason is that he has developed, over the last decade, a cosmological model that avoids any beginning to spacetime and the universe, and so eliminates the need for a cosmic beginner. I criticize Hawking's model in this essay, arguing that either it is not intended to be construed realistically or that, if it is, the model is highly implausible.     

Science and Theology in the Twenty-First Century

The current interaction of science and theology is surveyed. Modern physics describes a world of intrinsic unpredictability and deep relationality. Theology provides answers to the metaquestions of why that world is rationally transparent and rationally beautiful and why it is so finely tuned for carbon-based life. Biology's fundamental insight of evolutionary process is to be understood theologically as creation "making itself." In the twenty-first century, biology may be expected to move beyond the merely mechanical. Neuroscience will not have much useful interaction with theology until it attains theories of wide explanatory scope. Computer models of the brain do not meet this requirement. A theological style of bottom-up thinking comes closest to scientific habits of thought. Complexity theory suggests that information will prove to be an increasingly important scientific concept, encouraging theology to revive the Thomistic notion of the soul as the form of the body. Another gift of science to theology will lie in providing a meeting point for the encounter of the world faith traditions.     

Do the laws of physics forbid the operation of time machines?

We address the question of whether it is possible to operate a time machine by manipulating matter and energy so as to manufacture closed timelike curves. This question has received a great deal of attention in the physics literature, with attempts to prove no-go theorems based on classical general relativity and various hybrid theories serving as steps along the way towards quantum gravity. Despite the effort put into these no-go theorems, there is no widely accepted definition of a time machine. We explain the conundrum that must be faced in providing a satisfactory definition and propose a resolution. Roughly, we require that all extensions of the time machine region contain closed timelike curves; the actions of the time machine operator are then sufficiently “potent” to guarantee that closed timelike curves appear. We then review no-go theorems based on classical general relativity, semi-classical quantum gravity, quantum field theory on curved spacetime, and Euclidean quantum gravity. Our verdict on the question of our title is that no result of sufficient generality to underwrite a confident “yes” has been proven. Our review of the no-go results does, however, highlight several foundational problems at the intersection of general relativity and quantum physics that lend substance to the search for an answer.     

Free Will in the Block Universe

Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions. I suggest that what Hoefer may have shown us is that causation, not determinism, was the threat to free will all along. Additionally, Hoefer might avoid the problem of the asymmetry of macroscopic efficacy by noting we have a very small region of space-time completely determined by our choices. However, this move implies our freedom to act is freedom to do very little, given that the region is trivial. I suggest that Hoefer should instead claim that we do have pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the past, though I am unsure of how well this thesis works. Regardless, there remains a problem that the inside-out perspective requires us to see our choices as brute facts or random occurrences. Attempts to resolve this problem seem to require either a theory of agent causation or a traditional compatibilist argument, making Hoefer’s thesis extraneous, unless he can show us that these require the inside-out perspective. However, Hoefer has not yet shown us this, so there is work to be done.

Do Chinese and English speakers think about time differently? Failure of replicating Boroditsky (2001)

English uses the horizontal spatial metaphors to express time (e.g., the good days ahead of us). Chinese also uses the vertical metaphors (e.g., 'the month above' to mean last month). Do Chinese speakers, then, think about time in a different way than English speakers? Boroditsky [Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43(1), 1-22] claimed that they do, and went on to conclude that 'language is a powerful tool in shaping habitual thought about abstract domains' (such as time). By estimating the frequency of usage, we found that Chinese speakers actually use the horizontal spatial metaphors more often than the vertical metaphors. This offered no logical ground for Boroditsky's claim. We were also unable to replicate her experiments in four different attempts. We conclude that Chinese speakers do not think about time in a different way than English speakers just because Chinese also uses the vertical spatial metaphors to express time.