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71.
Henrik Bohlin 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):189-203
Recent theories of critical thinking have stressed the importance of taking into consideration in critical enquiry the perspectives, or presuppositions, of both the speaker whose statements are under scrutiny and the critic himself. The purpose of the paper
is to explore this idea from an epistemological (rather than a pedagogical or psychological) point of view. The problem is
first placed within the general context of critical thinking theory. Three types of perspective-dependence are then described,
and the consequences of each for the possibility of critical discussion discussed. It is concluded that although it is essential
in critical discussion to take the other’s perspective into consideration, perspective-dependence does not exclude the possibility
of criticism. 相似文献
72.
Derek Henry Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):377-394
I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
相似文献
Derek Henry BrownEmail: |
73.
REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM 下载免费PDF全文
Timothy D. Hackenberg 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2009,91(3):391-402
An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science. 相似文献
74.
Previous research has shown that playing violent video game exposure can increase aggressive thoughts, aggressive feelings, and physiological arousal. This study compared the effects that playing a realistic violent, unrealistic violent, or nonviolent video game for 45 min has on such variables. For the purpose of this study, realism was defined as the probability of seeing an event in real life. Participants (N=74; 39 male, 35 female) played either a realistic violent, unrealistic violent, or nonviolent video game for 45 min. Aggressive thoughts and aggressive feelings were measured four times (every 15 min), whereas arousal was measured continuously. The results showed that, though playing any violent game stimulated aggressive thoughts, playing a more realistic violent game stimulated significantly more aggressive feelings and arousal over the course of play. Aggr. Behav. 35:213–224, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc. 相似文献
75.
76.
Feng Ye 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(4):614-628
The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics.
The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several
serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly:
first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but
our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create
in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions.
__________
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2006, (8): 74–83 相似文献
77.
Jan Woleński 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):479-497
This paper proposes a formal framework for the cognitive relation understood as an ordered pair with the cognitive subject
and object of cognition as its members. The cognitive subject is represented as consisting of a language, conequence relation
and a stock of accepted theories, and the object as a model of those theories. This language allows a simple formulation of
the realism/anti-realism controversy. In particular, Tarski’s undefinability theorem gives a philosophical argument for realism
in epistemology.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson 相似文献
78.
Brian Findsen 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(6):545-559
Central tenets of Freirean philosophy and pedagogy are explored and applied to the emerging field of older adults’ learning
(educational gerontology), a sub-field of adult education. I argue that many of Freire’s concepts and principles have direct
applicability to the tasks of adult educators working alongside marginalized older adults. In particular, Freire’s ideas fit
comfortably within a critical educational gerontology approach as they challenge prevailing orthodoxies and provide a robust
analytical framework from which radical adult educators can work effectively in promoting social transformation.
相似文献
Brian FindsenEmail: |
79.
Matthias Adam 《Synthese》2007,158(1):93-108
Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical
arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality
of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are
well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion.
By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification
employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest
on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for
their interrelation are explored. 相似文献
80.
Edmund N. Santurri 《The Journal of religious ethics》2005,33(4):783-814
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work. 相似文献