Scientific Realism and the Meanings of Theoretical Terms

In contemporary philosophy of science, there are many interesting arguments for and against scientific realism with regard to the meaningfulness and truthfulness of theoretical statements. Some anti-realists hold that since many important concepts in scientific theories have no specific referents, the relevant theoretical statements are therefore either false or meaningless. In this essay, I join the debates concerning the plausibility of scientific realism by focusing on two intertwined issues： first, that of how we can we explicate the meaningfulness of theoretical statements, especially statements pertaining to unobservable objects, and second, that of the meaningfulness of theoretical statements for our acceptance of scientific realism.     

Global government or global governance? Realism and idealism in Kant's legal theory

Did Kant believe we need a world government? It has been a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship whether Kant endorsed the creation of a world state or merely a voluntary federation of states with no coercive power. I argue that Kant's main concern was with a global juridical condition, which he regarded as a rational requirement given the equal freedom and equality of individuals. However, he recognized that implementing this rational ideal requires sensitivity to contingent aspects of world politics. I will argue that Kant offers an ideal theory not disentangled from realist considerations and that he adopts what I will call methodological realism: the attempt to realize the requirements of Right (Recht) in a world governed by its own laws and mechanisms. I will illustrate this interpretation with Kant's discussion of the right of nations (Völkerrecht). The confusion in regard to Kant's actual position on the matter, I will argue, is a direct consequence of Kant's methodological realism. The article concludes by showing how Kant’'s ideas and methods can inspire us to rethink global institutions for our current global challenges.     

Scanlon’s modal metaphysics

In Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2014) T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary only in a weaker sense.     

Trying on and Trying Out: Participatory Action Research as a Tool for Literacy and Identity Work in Middle Grades Classrooms

This article explores the role of collaborative, ethnographic, participatory action research (PAR) with eighth grade students as a set of possible literacy practices for involving students with issues connected to their lives, resources, language(s), and communities. Findings are based on a year of fieldwork conducted as part of shared inquiry into one public school community’s experiences with gentrification and meeting the complex needs of diverse learners. Findings bring to life the ways in which PAR facilitates the redefining of reading, writing, and research; the reconsideration of languages; the rethinking of literacy practices; and the repositioning of participants within and beyond given research endeavors.     

WHAT KIND OF PERSON COULD BE A TORTURER?

What kind of persons could engage in political torture? Not only the morally impaired who lack empathy or compassion, or even the merely obedient, but also the righteous who struggle with conscience, and the realists who set morality aside.     

MARTIN LUTHER'S EXPERIENTIAL THEOLOGY AS A MODEL FOR FAITH-SCIENCE RELATIONSHIPS

The approach of experiential realism could indicate where science and faith deal with the same reality, where science questions faith assumptions, and where faith goes beyond the mandate and method of science. Although prescientific, Martin Luther's theology is the classical prototype of an experiential theology. We experience God's creative power in all of reality. We discern its regularities through observation and reason. So faith opens up all the space needed by science. However, experienced reality is highly ambiguous. It obscures God's intentions. God's intentions are revealed in the proclamation of the gospel: God is unconditionally for us and with us and not against us. This proclamation is a promise, appropriated in faith, and geared to a vision of what ought to become. It is based on the interpretation of a catastrophe—the cross of Christ—as God's pivotal redemptive act in human history. It goes beyond the mandate and method of science, yet it is capable of giving the latter a sense of purpose, criteria of acceptability, and authority to act in the interests of humanity and the earth. Theology challenges science to acknowledge the necessity of a transcendent frame of reference and moral accountability. Scientific insight challenges theology to reconceptualize its assumptions on God, creation, and eschatology to integrate best science.     

消极偏差还是积极缺乏:抑郁的积极心理学解释

抑郁的认知理论被认为是当代最具影响的抑郁理论之一,其中贝克抑郁理论与无望抑郁理论是两大主要的认知理论。认知理论主张消极认知偏差是导致抑郁的易感因素。然而,"抑郁现实主义"及"积极错觉"等研究却证实抑郁个体并不存在消极认知偏差。以往研究的矛盾实际上反映了当代心理学过分关注消极的病理化倾向。新兴的积极心理学则试图从全新视角解释抑郁,导致抑郁的原因不是个体身上积极因素的缺位,而是积极力量未被充分发挥。     

Spirituality, morality, and criticism in education: a response to Kevin Gary

In this short essay I respond to Kevin Gary’s generous review of my book Reclaiming Goodness by considering his two main concerns, that I tend to conflate spirituality and morality and that I am not sufficiently sensitive to tensions between spirituality and critical thinking. I respond by noting that Gary has not taken adequate account of the distinction between deontological morality and aretaic ethics in the first instance and between the Aristotelian notions of Sophia and Phronesis, or pure reason and practical wisdom, in the second.Hanan A. Alexander chairs the Department of Education at the University of Haifa and is a research fellow of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.     

To Believe in Belief

Summary  Take the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did not believe in belief. According to Van Fraassen, the empiricist, one may yet have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief. In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Popper’s rejection of the rationality of belief and Van Fraassen’s reformulation of the rationality of belief, points towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the ‘problem of scientific realism’.     

Affective small stories – Witnessing an ‘ideal’ instance of knowledge mobilization

In this short reflective intervention, I utilize an innovative narrative format to document my account of being an invited academic witness for the Canadian House of Commons as a graduate student. Drawing upon layered forms of critical witnessing, I utilize five small stories to consider this seemingly ideal instance of sexual health knowledge mobilization that spanned academic, government, media, and social-profit sectors. I braid complex, messy threads to capture my affective wayfinding through the complicated institutional processes involved in the generation, representation, critique and control of sexual knowledge. Highlighting how this work can be more broadly applicable to graduate students and emerging scholars in related disciplines, I note how my critical witnessing is intertwined with social, economic and political conditions present in Canada and elsewhere. This work additionally illustrates experimental self-inquiry that disrupts distinctions between researcher/subject/seer and participant/object/seen.