Suffering Injustice: Misrecognition as Moral Injury in Critical Theory

Abstract

It is the persistence of social suffering in a world in which it could be eliminated that for Adorno is the source of the need for critical reflection, for philosophy. Philosophy continues and gains its cultural place because an as yet unbridgeable abyss separates the social potential for the relief of unnecessary human suffering and its emphatic continuance. Philosophy now is the culturally bound repository for the systematic acknowledgement and articulation of the meaning of the expanse of human suffering within technologically advanced societies that are already committed to liberal ideals of freedom and equality.     

Transformative Learning: A Case for Using Grounded Theory as an Assessment Analytic

Transformative Learning Theory and pedagogies leverage disruptive experiences as catalysts for learning and teaching. By facilitating processes of critical analysis and reflection that challenge assumptions, transformative learning reframes what counts as knowledge and the sources and processes for gaining and producing it. Students develop a broader range of perspectives on and entry points for learning and behavior change engaging cognition, embodiment, aesthetics, emotions, and ethics (see Mezirow 1991 and Figures 1 and 2). The open‐inquiry, multi‐modal nature of transformative learning defies most traditional assessment strategies. This article demonstrates that grounded theory offers the rigorous qualitative analysis needed to document and track transformative learning outcomes in practice. By applying a grounded theory approach to data from over eighty student portfolios across several iterations of a Religion and Ecology course at Emory University, this article demonstrates a successful and replicable assessment of transformative learning pedagogies.     

The double-edged sword of pedagogy: Instruction limits spontaneous exploration and discovery

Motivated by computational analyses, we look at how teaching affects exploration and discovery. In Experiment 1, we investigated children’s exploratory play after an adult pedagogically demonstrated a function of a toy, after an interrupted pedagogical demonstration, after a naïve adult demonstrated the function, and at baseline. Preschoolers in the pedagogical condition focused almost exclusively on the target function; by contrast, children in the other conditions explored broadly. In Experiment 2, we show that children restrict their exploration both after direct instruction to themselves and after overhearing direct instruction given to another child; they do not show this constraint after observing direct instruction given to an adult or after observing a non-pedagogical intentional action. We discuss these findings as the result of rational inductive biases. In pedagogical contexts, a teacher’s failure to provide evidence for additional functions provides evidence for their absence; such contexts generalize from child to child (because children are likely to have comparable states of knowledge) but not from adult to child. Thus, pedagogy promotes efficient learning but at a cost: children are less likely to perform potentially irrelevant actions but also less likely to discover novel information.     

(De)colonizing Culture in Community Psychology: Reflections from Critical Social Science

Since its inception, community psychology has been interested in cultural matters relating to issues of diversity and marginalization. However, the field has tended to understand culture as static social markers or as the background for understanding group differences. In this article the authors contend that culture is inseparable from who we are and what we do as social beings. Moreover, culture is continually shaped by socio-historical and political processes intertwined within the globalized history of power. The authors propose a decolonizing standpoint grounded in critical social science to disrupt understandings of cultural matters that marginalize others. This standpoint would move the field toward deeper critical thinking, reflexivity and emancipatory action. The authors present their work to illustrate how they integrate a decolonizing standpoint to community psychology research and teaching. They conclude that community psychology must aim towards intercultural work engaging its political nature from a place of ontological/epistemological/methodological parity.     

Embodied Critical Realism

Christian Smith's What Is a Person? provides an account of the person from the perceptive of critical realism. As a fellow critical realist, I support that philosophical position and in this response I seek to support it by connecting it to the embodied realism developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. In order to bring the two forms of realism together, I critique both the relativism of embodied realism and the idea, found in Smith, that the person's awareness of the world is mediated by her experience. The goal of this paper, then, is an embodied critical realism, a more coherent realist position that combines the best parts of each.     

On the importance of critical thinking: A response to Wulf's (2015) commentary

In a recent paper (Toner & Moran, 2015), we argued that continued improvement among elite athletes requires alternation between external and internal foci of attention. In her commentary on this paper, Wulf (2015) claims that we have misunderstood the ‘attentional focus’ effect. Our rejoinder has three objectives. Firstly, we critically evaluate Wulf's arguments and counter her false allegations and spurious reasoning. Secondly, we explain our concerns about certain aspects of attentional focusing research. Finally, we propose that in order to explore the dynamic nature of attentional focusing, we need to go beyond restrictive theoretical dichotomies (e.g., “internal” versus “external” processes) using new approaches.     

马克思的意识形态批判理论

马克思的意识形态批判理论是历史唯物主义的重要组成部分，也是国内外学术界争论的热点问题，本文探讨的是马克思的意识形态概念，意识形态批判理论的内容：哲学向度和政治经济学向度，以及马克思意识形态批判理论的问题领域。     

Travel and residual emotional well-being

This study addresses the question of how work commutes change positive versus negative and active versus passive mood experienced after the commutes. Analyses are presented for 230 time-sampled morning commutes to work, made by 146 randomly sampled people in three different Swedish cities, asking them to use smartphones to report mood before, directly after, and later in the work place after the commute. The results show that self-reported positive emotional responses evoked by critical incidents are related to mood changes directly after the commute but not later in the day. It is also shown that satisfaction with the commute, measured retrospectively, is related to travel mode, travel time, as well as both positive and negative emotional responses to critical incidents.     

Applying Deutsch’s concept of good explanations to artificial intelligence and neuroscience – An initial exploration

Artificial intelligence has made great strides since the deep learning revolution, but AI systems remain incapable of learning principles and rules which allow them to extrapolate outside of their training data to new situations. For inspiration we look to the domain of science, where scientists have been able to develop theories which show remarkable ability to extrapolate and sometimes even predict the existence of phenomena which have never been observed before. According to David Deutsch, this type of extrapolation, which he calls “reach”, is due to scientific theories being hard to vary. In this work we investigate Deutsch’s hard-to-vary principle and how it relates to more formalized principles in deep learning such as the bias-variance trade-off and Occam’s razor. We distinguish internal variability, how much a model/theory can be varied internally while still yielding the same predictions, with external variability, which is how much a model must be varied to predict new, out-of-distribution data. We discuss how to measure internal variability using the notion of the Rashomon set and how to measure external variability using Kolmogorov complexity. We explore what role hard-to-vary explanations play in intelligence by looking at the human brain, the only example of highly general purpose intelligence known. We distinguish two learning systems in the brain – the first operates similar to deep learning and likely underlies most of perception while the second is a more creative system capable of generating hard-to-vary models and explanations of the world. We make contact with Popperian epistemology which suggests that the generation of scientific theories is a not an inductive process but rather an evolutionary process which proceeds through conjecture and refutation. We argue that figuring out how replicate this second system, which is capable of generating hard-to-vary explanations, is a key challenge which needs to be solved in order to realize artificial general intelligence.