Evidence for Opportunity Cost Neglect in the Poor

People often neglect opportunity costs: They do not fully take into account forgone alternatives outside of a particular choice set. Several scholars have suggested that poor people should be more likely to spontaneously consider opportunity costs, because budget constraints should lead to an increased focus on trade‐offs. We did not find support for this hypothesis in five high‐powered experiments (total N = 2325). The experiments used different products (both material and experiential) with both high and low prices (from $8.50 to $249.99) and different methods of reminding participants of opportunity costs. High‐income and low‐income participants showed an equally strong decrease in willingness to buy when reminded of opportunity costs, implying that both the rich and the poor neglect opportunity costs. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Observer judgmental accuracy of personality: Benefits related to being a good (normative) judge

The current study tested the hypothesis that accuracy of personality judgment would be positively related to beneficial life outcomes. 189 participants observed targets across 5 dyadic interactions and made judgments of the 10 targets on the Big Five traits. Self and acquaintance ratings were used as the accuracy criteria. Normative accuracy for all traits was related to agreeableness, and normative accuracy for some traits was positively related to interpersonal control, interpersonal support, positive affect, and life satisfaction. Distinctive accuracy was not related to beneficial outcomes. These results imply that normative accuracy based on observation is associated with beneficial outcomes, whereas distinctive accuracy is not.     

MLK Day and Racial Attitudes: Liking the Group More but Its Members Less

Intuition suggests that the Martin Luther King holiday (MLK Day) should improve racial attitudes toward African Americans. However, its influence may depend on whether African Americans are evaluated as a group or individually. In two studies, we assessed racial attitudes either on MLK Day or on a control day. As might be expected, participants had more sympathetic attitudes towards African Americans as a group on MLK Day compared to control days; however, they evaluated individual African American exemplars more negatively on MLK Day compared to control days, who presumably seemed worse by comparison to the eminent political figure.     

Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward Animals

Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of separating retributive and general deterrence motives when studying human offenders (Study 1). We isolate retribution by investigating judgments about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence from consideration. Studies 2 and 3 document a “victim identity” effect, such that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack, the greater the belief that the culprit deserves to be killed. Study 3 documents a “targeted punishment” effect, such that the responsive killing of the actual “guilty” culprit is seen as more deserved than the killing of an almost identical yet “innocent” animal from the same species. Studies 4 and 5 extend both effects to participants' acceptance of inflicting pain and suffering on the offending animal at the time of its death, and show that both effects are mediated by measures of retributive sentiment, and not by consequentialist concerns.     

Non‐Bayesian Noun Generalization in 3‐ to 5‐Year‐Old Children: Probing the Role of Prior Knowledge in the Suspicious Coincidence Effect

It is unclear how children learn labels for multiple overlapping categories such as “Labrador,” “dog,” and “animal.” Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a) suggested that learners infer correct meanings with the help of Bayesian inference. They instantiated these claims in a Bayesian model, which they tested with preschoolers and adults. Here, we report data testing a developmental prediction of the Bayesian model—that more knowledge should lead to narrower category inferences when presented with multiple subordinate exemplars. Two experiments did not support this prediction. Children with more category knowledge showed broader generalization when presented with multiple subordinate exemplars, compared to less knowledgeable children and adults. This implies a U‐shaped developmental trend. The Bayesian model was not able to account for these data, even with inputs that reflected the similarity judgments of children. We discuss implications for the Bayesian model, including a combined Bayesian/morphological knowledge account that could explain the demonstrated U‐shaped trend.     

The Situational Test of Emotional Management – Brief (STEM-B): Development and validation using item response theory and latent class analysis

This study uses a 3-Parameter Logistic item response theory (IRT) model to develop an 18-item short-form of the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM). In a sample of 900 people, the short form showed acceptable reliability (reliability index = .87; Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and a meaningful correlation with another indicator of emotional intelligence (i.e., r = .30 with the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding). Latent class analysis of the short-form detected two classes. For all items, participants in Class 2 had a higher probability of selecting the best option than Class 1. When response options were coded to represent different emotion regulation strategies, Class 2 had a higher probability of endorsing “situation modification” and Class 1 had a higher probability of endorsing “no regulation”. These results provide validity evidence for the STEM-B as an assessment of emotion regulation.     

Affect in Ethical Decision Making: Mood Matters

Ethical decision-making research has centered on Rest’s (1986) framework that represents a rational, nonaffective model for ethical decision making. However, research in human cognition suggesting a “dual-processing” framework, composed of both rational and affective components, has been relatively ignored in the ethical decision-making literature. Examining dual-processing literature, it seems affect might be an important factor in decision making when a person’s mood is congruent with the task or situational context frame. Given that ethical decisions are serious and complex tasks, it is proposed here that inducing a negative affective state might produce mood congruence, reinforce the salience of emotion for ethical decision makers, and lead to differences in decision processing. Evidence is presented documenting differences in the decisions made by ethical decision makers in a negative affective state as compared to those in either a positive or neutral affective state.     

The Moral Judgment of Juvenile Delinquents: A Meta-Analysis

A meta-analysis of 50 studies was conducted to investigate whether juvenile delinquents use lower levels of moral judgment than their nondelinquent age-mates and, if so, what factors may influence or moderate the developmental delay. The results show a lower stage of moral judgment for juvenile delinquents (d=.76). Effect sizes were large for comparisons involving male offenders, late adolescents, delinquents with low intelligence, and incarcerated delinquents. The largest effect sizes were found for period of incarceration and comparisons involving juvenile delinquents with psychopathic disorder. Production instead of recognition measures, dilemma-free assessment methods, and non-blind scoring procedures yielded relatively large effect sizes, whereas effect sizes were medium for comparisons involving delinquents with average intelligence, non-incarcerated delinquents, female offenders, as well as early and middle adolescents. Psychopathic disorder and institutionalization were identified as unique moderators of the link between moral judgment and juvenile delinquency. It is concluded that developmentally delayed moral judgment is strongly associated with juvenile delinquency, even after controlling for socioeconomic status, gender, age and intelligence.This article stems from a paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Moral Education, July 2006, Fribourg, Switzerland.