MORE ABOUT JUDGMENT AND REASON

Abstract: This paper is a response to Siegel 2004 . I take Siegel's remarks as a basis for clarifying, defending, and further developing my account of the role of judgment in a theory of rationality.     

Metacognitive Experiences and Human Judgment: The Case of Hindsight Bias and Its Debiasing

ABSTRACT— Theories of judgment have emphasized the influence of what comes to mind—the content of people's thoughts. But recent research shows that metacognitive experiences accompanying thinking, like a sense of the ease or difficulty with which information comes to mind, qualify the conclusions that people derive from thought content. The case of hindsight bias and attempts to remove that bias (debiasing) illustrate this. After an event outcome is known, people display hindsight bias by exaggerating its inevitability, believing they "knew it all along." The magnitude of hindsight bias varies with the ease or difficulty that known or alternative outcomes come to mind; the usually observed hindsight bias may even reverse when outcomes are difficult to bring to mind or increase when alternatives are difficult to bring to mind. Implications of metacognitive experiences can extend to other biases and their debiasing, as well as to how people make sense of the past more generally.     

注意分散对类比推理内隐加工的影响

通过两个实验分别考察在类比推理的检索阶段和评价阶段的注意分散对类比推理内隐加工的影响。实验一以83名大学生为被试,采用喜好判断范式探讨检索阶段注意分散对类比推理过程中直觉加工效应和逻辑加工效应的不同影响。实验二以80名大学生为被试,探讨评价阶段注意分散对类比推理过程中直觉加工效应和逻辑加工效应的不同影响。结果显示:检索阶段的注意分散对类比推理的内隐加工的影响不显著,评价阶段的注意分散对类比推理的内隐加工和外显加工均有显著影响。     

The Effect of Information Quantity on Distinctive Accuracy and Normativity of Personality Trait Judgments

Information quantity is an important moderator of personality judgment accuracy. Some evidence suggests that the amount of available information is positively related to accuracy. The current study utilized the social accuracy model to investigate the effects of differences in thin slices of information quantity on the distinctive accuracy and normativity of personality trait judgments. It was hypothesized that distinctive accuracy and normativity would increase as information quantity increased. Participants were 431 individuals who participated in an online study that varied the length of stimulus target observations (30 seconds, 1 minute, 3 minutes, and 5 minutes), after which judges rated targets using other‐report measures of the Big Five personality traits. For all traits combined, significant levels of accuracy were found for all observation lengths, but distinctive accuracy and normativity did not increase as video length increased. Findings varied for individual traits. For distinctive accuracy, there was a linear increase with information quantity for Extraversion and a non‐linear relationship for Conscientiousness, while there was a linear decrease for Openness. For normativity, there was a linear increase with information quantity for Agreeableness and a non‐linear relationship for Conscientiousness. There are important differences in how observation length affects distinctive accuracy and normativity for different personality traits. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The loss‐bet paradox: Actuaries,accountants, and other numerate people rate numerically inferior gambles as superior

Psychologists have convincingly demonstrated that preferences are not always stable and, instead, are often “constructed” based on information available in the judgment or decision context. In 4 studies with experts (accountants and actuaries in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) and a diverse lay population (Studies 3 and 4), the evidence was consistent with the highly numerate being more likely than the less numerate to construct their preferences by rating a numerically inferior bet as superior (i.e., the bets effect). Thus, the effect generalizes beyond a college student sample, and preference construction differs by numeracy. Contrary to prior thinking about preference construction, however, high expertise and high ability (rather than low) consistently related to the paradoxical phenomenon. Results across studies including Study 3's experimental modifications of the task supported the hypothesized number comparison process (and not a lack of expertise with monetary outcomes and probabilities or numeracy‐related differences in attention to numbers) as the effect's underlying cause. The bets effect was not attenuated by Study 4's instructions to think about what would be purchased with bet winnings. Task results combined with free‐response coding supported the notion that highly numerate participants have a systematic and persistent inclination for doing simple and complex number operations that drive their judgments (even after controlling for nonnumeric intelligence). Implications for 3 types of dual‐process theories are discussed. The results were inconsistent with default‐interventionist theories, consistent or unclear with respect to fuzzy trace theory, and consistent with interactive theories.     

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.     

直觉还是推理,道德判断如何形成?

道德判断形成的机制一直存在争议,许多研究者通过实证研究来探索诸因素对道德判断的影响,这有助于理清不同因素的作用,但却难以构建道德判断形成的理论框架。文章系统性地回顾和总结了道德判断形成的五个经典理论模型及其相关理论,并结合实证研究的成果梳理了道德判断形成中理性、情绪、认知、直觉和推理之间的关系。基于此,构建了以直觉和推理为基本路径,基于规则的认知和情绪为调节因素的道德判断形成的理论框架。现有的理论模型和实证研究在该框架下均可以的得到较好的解释。同时,根据该框架,建议未来的实证研究中应当注重对影响因素的分类以及对实验情景的控制。     

Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertainty-monitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with non-human animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities.     

Behaviors speak louder than explicit reports: Implicit metacognition in 2.5‐year‐old children

Recent research has shown that children as young as age 3.5 show behavioral responses to uncertainty although they are not able to report it explicitly. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that some form of metacognition is already available to guide children's decisions before the age of 3. Two groups of 2.5‐ and 3.5‐year‐old children were asked to complete a forced‐choice perceptual identification test and to explicitly rate their confidence in each decision. Moreover, participants had the opportunity to ask for a cue to help them decide if their response was correct. Our results revealed that all children asked for a cue more often after an incorrect response than after a correct response in the forced‐choice identification test, indicating a good ability to implicitly introspect on the results of their cognitive operations. On the contrary, none of these children displayed metacognitive sensitivity when making explicit confidence judgments, consistent with previous evidence of later development of explicit metacognition. Critically, our findings suggest that implicit metacognition exists much earlier than typically assumed, as early as 2.5 years of age.     

多项式加工树模型在社会心理学中的应用

多项式加工树（multinomial processing tree, MPT）从理论模型出发,使用多项式模型来拟合行为数据并估计理论模型中各个加工过程发生的可能性。该模型能够有效分离和量化不同心理过程,被广泛应用于社会认知研究之中,如态度、刻板印象等。本文首先介绍该模型的基本原理及其实现,并以道德判断为例说明其在社会心理学中的最新应用。最后,总结其对社会心理学研究的意义,即可以作为一种方法提高研究的效度和精度,具有较高的实用价值,并指出其潜在不足。