Why epistemologists are so down on their luck

It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from luck in the first place. I argue that the best explanation for the consensus that luck undermines knowledge is that knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing. To make this case, I develop both the notions of luck and credit, and sketch a theory of knowledge in those terms. Furthermore, this account also holds promise for being able to solve the “value problem” for knowledge, and it explains why both internal and external conditions are necessary to turn true belief into knowledge. The arguments and ideas in this paper have been in development for a while, and I would like to thank a number of people for their contribution to that development. For many helpful discussions on these topics, In d’like to thank Steve Ellis, Linda Zagzebski and the students in my graduate epistemology seminar—Mary Gwin, Ben Hagy, Matthew Hodge, Robert Johnson and Shyam Patwardhan. And thanks to Karen Antell for her comments on an earlier draft     

论信用的道德限度

社会诚信的研究和建设是当前伦理学研究和道德建设的重点,且很多学者都把信用制度的建设作为主要途径和突破口,但这是否抓出了问题的要害,却是需要慎思的。我们通过对这两个概念的反思和比较,发现诚信比信用有更高的立意和更丰富的内涵,而信用有其内在的道德限度,表现为:信用主体是抽象的人,诚信主体是现实的人;信用要实现的是外在利益,诚信则立足于人的内在价值;信用体现的是工具理性,诚信体现一种实践智慧。通过两者的比较,我们就能合理地确定信用制度起作用的性质、范围和程度,认识到它的必要性和局限性,从而摆正它在社会诚信建设中的地位。     

Do Community Characteristics Relate to Young Adult College Students’ Credit Card Debt? The Hypothesized Role of Collective Institutional Efficacy

This study examines the extent of emergent, outstanding credit card debt among young adult college students and investigates whether any associations existed between this credit card debt and the characteristics of the communities in which these students grew up or lived. Using data (N = 748) from a longitudinal survey and merging community characteristics measured at the zip code level, we confirmed that a community's unemployment rate, average total debt, average credit score, and number of bank branch offices were associated with a young adult college student's acquisition and accumulation of credit card debt. For example, a community's higher unemployment rate and lower number of bank branches were associated with a young adult college student's greater accumulated debt. Community characteristics had the strongest associations with credit card debt, especially after controlling for individual characteristics (i.e., a young adult college student's race and financial independence) and familial characteristics (i.e., their parents’ income and parents’ discussions of financial matters while growing up at home). The findings may help to understand the unique roles that communities play in shaping children and young adults’ financial capability, and how communities can be better capacitated to support the financial goals of their residents.     

Knowledge and credit

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.