心理不安全状态下决策者的风险偏好

心理不安全感是指人们对可能遭受的伤害与威胁的担忧与焦虑。当下, 许多个体都是在心理不安全的状态下进行决策。对于心理不安全状态下的风险偏好规律, 现有研究得到了矛盾的结果。此外, 心理安全感对风险偏好的作用机制尚不明确。本研究聚焦心理安全感对风险偏好的影响, 考察心理安全感的补偿机制在其中的中介作用, 并探讨选项分布情况在其中的调节作用, 以此揭示心理安全感为何及如何作用于风险偏好。研究结果将有助于明确决策者在心理不安全状态下的风险偏好规律, 从而完善现有的风险决策理论。同时, 为公共管理政策制定提供科学依据。     

Aristotle’s dilemma

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to use an elegant short argument to attack Plato’s doctrine of the good, which argument equally appears to attack Aristotle’s own doctrine of the good. I consider these two questions: First: Why does Aristotle reverse the judgment of Socrates/Plato on the issue: Which is better – things that are (only) good in themselves, or things that are both good in themselves and good for their consequences? Second: Why does Aristotle attack Plato’s doctrine that the Form of the Good is the chief good, with an argument that appears to threaten his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good? I think the answers to these two questions are related. The elegant short argument in question I call “Aristotle’s Fast Argument.”After apologizing for criticizing views held by friends of his, Aristotle deploys the Fast Argument as a clincher to cap off his refutation of Plato’s view that the Form of the Good is the chief good: “And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself’, if in man himself and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will there be a difference in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day.” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1096 a34–b4). I explore this sketchily presented Fast Argument. I consider why Aristotle may think it is valid and why he does not seem to realize that, on readings that make it effective against Plato’s view, his Fast Argument also seems to apply to his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good. This is what I will call “Aristotle’s Dilemma.” If the Fast Argument is interpreted too narrowly, its point about the whiteness of a white thing being independent of its duration will not apply to the goodness of the Form of the Good. If it is interpreted broadly enough to undermine the claim of the Form of the Good to be the chief good, it will equally undermine that claim for eudaimonia. Finally, I discuss some of the things Plato and Aristotle say about the chief good, and comparable things Immanuel Kant says about the good will. I draw some speculative conclusions that focus on the importance for Aristotle of the goodness of the chief good not being at risk.     

Living on a Slippery Slope

Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their most common usage, it would be prudent to avoid them in moral and political debate. They are often fallacious and have often been used for ill. They are normally used to defend the moral status quo. Even when they are cogent, we can always find an alternate way to capture their insights. Finally, by accepting that the moral roads on which we travel are slippery, we become better able to successfully navigate them.     

Reducing Consumers’ Perceived Risk through Banking Service Quality Cues in Taiwan

This study not only elucidates how service quality cues and perceived risk are related, but also explores the internal composition of this relationship. Financial and psychological risks found to be affected mainly by reliability and empathy of service quality, whereas functional and social risks are influenced by tangibles cues of service quality. Finally, exactly how demographic variables affect the relationship between service quality and perceived risk is considered, and the family life cycle notably modulates this relationship. People in various stages may perceive different levels of service quality, according to their age, which is a variable in the family life cycle.     

How probable is probably? It depends on whom you're talking about

Two studies tested whether people interpreted verbal chance terms in a self‐serving manner. Participants read statements describing the likelihood of events in their own future and in the future of a randomly chosen other. They interpreted the chance terms numerically. Chance terms were interpreted as denoting a higher probability when they were used to describe the likelihood of pleasant events in one's own future than when they were used to describe the likelihood of pleasant events in someone else's future (Study 1). Similarly, chance terms were interpreted as denoting a lower probability when they were used to describe the likelihood of unpleasant events in one's own future than when they were used to describe the likelihood of unpleasant events in someone else's future (Studies 1 and 2). These differences occurred primarily when the risk statements were threatening. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

建立风险管理机制防范医疗纠纷的探讨

"医疗风险无处不在".针对医疗纠纷的起因及医疗风险管理的办法阐述了国内外医疗风险管理的现状,提出医疗风险管理的建议,使医疗风险管理规范化、制度化、社会化.     

危机情境中的期望差异效应

本文提出了期望差异效应的概念并细致阐述了期望差异效应可能是导致风险沟通障碍的原因。期望差异效应是指处于同一情境中的一方对另一方的期望与另一方自我期望之间的差异。围绕上述问题,研究者在阐述了期望差异效应的含义以及期望差异效应可能的心理表征和认知根源之后,细致分析了期望差异效应的强化因素及其可能导致的风险沟通障碍。有关期望差异效应的研究尚处于起步阶段,界定期望差异效应的心理表征,确定期望差异效应的测量工具,探索期望差异效应的影响因素以及分析期望差异效应与风险沟通障碍的关系等都可以作为未来的研究方向。