The Development of Cognitive Reflection in China

Cognitive reflection is the tendency to override an intuitive response so as to engage in the reflection necessary to derive a correct response. Here, we examine the emergence of cognitive reflection in a culture that values nonanalytic thinking styles, Chinese culture. We administered a child-friendly version of the cognitive reflection test, the CRT-D, to 130 adults and 111 school-age children in China and compared performance on the CRT-D to several measures of rational thinking (belief bias syllogisms, base rate sensitivity, denominator neglect, and other-side thinking) and normative thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition). The CRT-D was a significant predictor of rational thinking and normative thinking dispositions in both children and adults, as previously found in American samples. Adults’ performance on the CRT-D correlated with their performance on the original CRT, and children's performance on the CRT-D predicted rational thinking and normative thinking dispositions even after adjusting for age. These results demonstrate that cognitive reflection, rational thinking, and normative thinking dispositions converge even in a culture that emphasizes holistic, nonanalytic reasoning.     

Thinking styles in relation to personality traits: an investigation of the Thinking Styles Inventory and NEO-PI-R

This study is an investigation of the Sternberg-Wagner Thinking Style Inventory (TSI), with regard to cross-cultural replication and relation to the five-factor personality model (FFM). TSI and NEO-PI-R were administered to 107 participants from USA and 114 participants from Norway. Inter-correlations between NEO-PI-R dimensions and TSI-scales and factors were not very strong, few exceeding 0.40, and the correlations were in predicted directions. Joint factor analyses of TSI and NEO-PI-R showed that TSI covers variance that NEO-PI-R does not explain. Thus, it is argued that the thinking styles give an independent contribution beyond FFM dimensions. However, TSI did not relate to FFM in the same manner in the two samples. Finally, the TSI-scales and factors were replicable across samples by Procrustes rotation. The question whether thinking style may be regarded as a valid and reliable construct is discussed.     

Individual differences in epistemic style: A dual-process perspective

This article reports the results of using a specially designed scaled questionnaire to investigate the dualistic properties of epistemic style. The scale is introduced as a measure of individual difference in epistemic style, conceptualized within the framework of dual-process notions of cognitive function. The study examined several psychometric components of the measure, including dimensional structure, distributional characteristics, and indications of construct validity. The instrument, called the Epistemic Preference Indicator, was found to be a reliable and valid measure of two dimensions that are negatively related—each reflecting incompatible epistemic assumptions and approaches to solving knowledge-dependent problems. Theoretical speculations are made concerning the nature of epistemic dualism and the dimension of cognitive processing that may underlie the two proposed epistemic preferences or styles.     

模糊容忍性与发散性思维的关系：不同认识兴趣的作用

有理论认为,模糊容忍性有助于个体发散性思维的发展,但部分实证研究却呈现出不一致的结论。本文考察了不同认识兴趣在模糊容忍性与发散性思维关系之间的中介和调节作用。结果发现：（1）I型认识兴趣在模糊容忍性和独创性、灵活性、流畅性间起完全中介作用;（2）模糊容忍性与独创性、灵活性的关系受到D型认识兴趣的调节,模糊容忍性与流畅性的关系不受D型认识兴趣的调节。     

The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual Conditionals

What is the relation between factual conditionals: If A happened then B happened, and counterfactual conditionals: If A had happened then B would have happened? Some theorists propose quite different semantics for the two. In contrast, the theory of mental models and its computer implementation interrelates them. It postulates that both can have a priori truth values, and that the semantic bases of both are possibilities: states that are possible for factual conditionals, and that were once possible but that did not happen for counterfactual conditionals. Two experiments supported these relations. Experiment 1 showed that, like factual conditionals, certain counterfactuals are true a priori, and others are false a priori. Experiment 2 replicated this result and showed that participants selected appropriate paraphrases, referring, respectively, to real and to counterfactual possibilities, for the two sorts of conditional. These results are contrary to alternative accounts of conditionals.     

The development of children's regret and relief

Previous research found that children first experience regret at 5 years and relief at 7. In two experiments, we explored three possibilities for this lag: (1) relief genuinely develops later than regret; (2) tests of relief have previously been artefactually difficult; or (3) evidence for regret resulted from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N=162 4- to 7-year-olds) children chose one of two cards that led to winning or losing tokens. Children rated their happiness then saw a better (regret) or worse (relief) alternative. Children re-rated their happiness. Regret after winning was first experienced at 4, regret after losing and relief after winning were experienced at 5 years and relief after losing at 7 years. Experiment 2 (N=297 5- to 8-year-olds) used a similar task but manipulated children's responsibility for the outcome. Greater responsibility for the outcome resulted in a greater likelihood of an experience of regret and relief. Results support that previous tests of relief were artefactually difficult and regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously thought.     

Differences in the use of autobiographical memory across the adult lifespan

Current research distinguishes between self, directive and social function of autobiographical memories (AMs). To date, only few studies have investigated these functions across adulthood. The comparison of different age groups requires that the functions of AM are measured in the same way across groups (measurement invariance, MI). Additionally to the average use of AM, the factor variances and factor covariances among the three functions were examined across adulthood. In the present study, 1290 adults (aged between 17 and 93 years) completed the Thinking about Life Experiences Questionnaire (TALE), which measures the overall use of AMs for self, directive and social purposes. The sample was divided into five age groups and partial strong MI was established using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. The results showed an increase in the factor associations as well as a decrease in the factor mean levels of all three functions across age groups. Both findings could be adequately described by linear functions of age. The factor variances were on most parts equal across age groups. These results strengthen the assumption that—from a lifespan developmental perspective—the use of AM may be aligned with relatively normative developmental tasks in a given society.     

工作记忆容量对创造性思维的预测

创造性思维(CT)是人类高级认知的重要组成部分,而工作记忆容量(WMC)是个体认知功能的重要指标,对于WMC能否预测CT存在不同的观点。本文先从正向预测、负向预测和不能预测的角度分类总结了相关研究证据,然后用游乐园模型(APT)、双通道模型(DPCM)和注意控制理论(CAT)对不同结果进行解释,分析了以往研究可能存在的问题,包括测量WMC和测量CT的任务类型不匹配、测量CT的领域特殊性问题、忽略其他认知能力差异以及未考虑智力、人格等因素对二者关系的影响等。最后,结合已有问题与当前的研究重点对未来研究进行了相应的展望。     

Non‐Cognitive Constructs and Self‐Reported Creativity by Domain

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which non‐cognitive constructs (personality, thinking styles, motivation, and psychological well‐being) would predict self‐reported creativity across different domains among 266 college students. Consistent with hypotheses, openness, legislative thinking styles, and intrinsic motivation were significant predictors of overall self‐reported creativity and across several domains. Extraversion was also a key predictor. Some other relationships consistent with past research (such as disagreeableness and math/science creativity) were also noted.     

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.