The Long‐Term Impact of Natural Mentoring Relationships: A Counterfactual Analysis

Previous research suggests that youth's natural mentoring relationships are associated with better academic, vocational, and psychosocial functioning. However, little is known about the extent to which the impact of mentoring endures beyond adolescence and early adulthood. Furthermore, most natural mentoring research is confounded by selection bias. In this study, we examined the long‐term impact of mentoring using the nationally representative, longitudinal Add Health dataset. We conducted counterfactual analysis, a more stringent test of causality than regression‐based approaches. Compared to their unmentored counterparts, adults (ages 33–42) who had a natural mentor during adolescence or emerging adulthood reported higher educational attainment, more time spent volunteering, and more close friends, after controlling for a range of confounding factors. However, outcomes differed when mentors were classified as “strong ties” (e.g., grandparents, friends) or “weak ties” (e.g., teachers, coaches, employers). Having a strong‐tie mentor was associated with having more close friends and a lower income. In contrast, having a weak‐tie mentor was associated with higher educational attainment, higher income, and more time spent volunteering. These findings suggest that natural mentoring relationships can exert lasting influence on young people's developmental trajectories, providing strong rationale for efforts to expand their availability and scope.     

Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past,future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and older adults

Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological characteristics associated with these mental simulations change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The current study employs adapted versions of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics associated with both positive and negative episodic past, future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults generate more external details and report higher ratings of vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults. Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely future events as more likely than did older adults. Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors during episodic memories relative to future and counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and future simulations. Implications for the psychology of mental simulation and ageing are discussed.     

反事实思维与内疚和羞耻的关系——以大学生和青少年罪犯为例

运用自我报告法从反事实思维的角度验证内疚与羞耻差异的"自我和行为"假设,探讨大学生和青少年罪犯在反事实思维与内疚和羞耻关系方面的特点。结果表明:1)研究结果不支持Lewis提出的内疚与羞耻差异的"自我和行为"假设,甚至与该假设相反;2)在真实的情境中,大学生和青少年罪犯内疚感和羞耻感与反事实思维的特点具有一致性。     

An investigation into the online processing of counterfactual and indicative conditionals

The ability to represent conditional information is central to human cognition. In two self-paced reading experiments we investigated how readers process counterfactual conditionals (e.g., If Darren had been athletic, he could probably have played on the rugby team) and indicative conditionals (e.g., If Darren is athletic, he probably plays on the rugby team). In Experiment 1 we focused on how readers process counterfactual conditional sentences. We found that processing of the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals was rapidly constrained by prior context (i.e., knowing whether Darren was or was not athletic). A reading-time penalty was observed for the critical region of text comprising the last word of the antecedent and the first word of the consequent when the information in the antecedent did not fit with prior context. In Experiment 2 we contrasted counterfactual conditionals with indicative conditionals. For counterfactual conditionals we found the same effect on the critical region as we found in Experiment 1. In contrast, however, we found no evidence that processing of the antecedent of indicative conditionals was constrained by prior context. For indicative conditionals (but not for counterfactual conditionals), the results we report are consistent with the suppositional account of conditionals. We propose that current theories of conditionals need to be able to account for online processing differences between indicative and counterfactual conditionals.     

When the alternative would have been better: Counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning—asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got—creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that—when controlling for false positives—regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

Fantasy proneness and counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thinking (CFT; mentally simulating alternatives to reality) is central to learning and motivation. Two studies explored the relationship between CFT and fantasy proneness, a personality trait typified by excessive fantasies hard to distinguish from reality. In study1, participants completed a fictional diary entry which was used to measure spontaneous CFT and the Creative Experiences Questionnaire measure of fantasy proneness. Fantasy proneness was significantly correlated with the generation of counterfactual thoughts. Both CFT and fantasy proneness have been independently associated with low mood and study2 included a measure of negative emotional state (the Depression, Anxiety and Stress scale) in addition to the CEQ and CFT. Fantasy proneness and negative emotion both predicted CFT, but no interaction between them was observed. The results suggest that individuals high in fantasy proneness have a general tendency to think counterfactually.     

Supporting children’s counterfactual thinking with alternative modes of responding

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N = 39), children’s performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.     

Coping with disappointing outcomes: Retroactive pessimism and motivated inhibition of counterfactuals

Having failed to achieve a desired goal, people may use retroactive pessimism as a defense mechanism, concluding that chances of success were not too good to begin with. To make this judgment, one must block counterfactual alternatives suggesting that success was, in fact, quite likely. Facing a bitter disappointment, the perceiver is highly motivated to inhibit upward counterfactuals, thus increasing the perceived inevitability of failure and finding solace in the acceptance of inescapable fate. Two experiments explored the hypothesized link between counterfactuals inhibition and retroactive pessimism. In the first experiment, it was found that participants experiencing grave disappointment, following a near miss, judged their chances of achieving their goal less favorably, compared to participants who had missed their goal by far. An analysis on participants’ counterfactual judgments suggested that this effect was mediated by participants’ perceptions of counterfactual events. The second experiment demonstrated that retroactive pessimism and counterfactual inhibition seem to be unique to situations in which the negative outcome resulted from uncontrollable rather than controllable events, thus corroborating the functional characterization of counterfactual thinking as well as the link between retroactive pessimism and disappointment.     

The psychology and philosophy of luck

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.     

Missed opportunities: Psychological ramifications of counterfactual thought in midlife women

Counterfactual thinking entails the process of imagining alternatives to reality—what might have been. The present study examines the frequency, content, and emotional and cognitive concomitants of counterfactual thinking about past missed opportunities in midlife women. At age 43, nearly two-thirds of the sample of educated adult women reported having missed certain opportunities at some time in their lives. Most of the counterfactual thoughts concerned missed opportunities for greater challenge in work. Emotional distress at age 33 did not predict later counterfactual thought. Instead, counterfactual thinking at age 43 was associated with concurrent emotional distress. However, acknowledging counterfactual thinking about the past was also associated with envisioning ways to change things for the better in the future. This suggests the possibility that the negative appraisal often entailed in counterfactual thinking may be associated with emotional distress in the short run but with motivational benefits in the long run, at least for middle-aged women.