Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis

This research tests the idea that repeatedly generating counterfactual thoughts in response to recurring events can lead to impairments in memory for actual outcomes (i.e., counterfactual inflation hypothesis). Participants (N = 56) played 40 games of blackjack and listed their thoughts after each win. They were instructed to list evaluative counterfactuals, reflective counterfactuals, or any thoughts that came to mind following each loss. Because reflective counterfactuals focus only on the alternatives to reality, and not in addition to reality (like evaluative counterfactuals), they were expected to lead to the greatest degree of overestimations of performance and confidence for future blackjack playing. The results confirmed this hypothesis, and also demonstrated that the relationship between thought-listing instructions and confidence for the future was mediated by overestimations of performance. Thus, repeatedly generating reflective counterfactual thoughts appears to lead to a special case of imagination inflation with dysfunctional implications for future confidence and risk-taking.     

Counterfactual thinking facilitates behavioral intentions

People often ponder what might have been, and these counterfactual inferences have been linked to behavior regulation. Counterfactuals may enhance performance by either a content-specific pathway (via shift in behavioral intentions) and/or a content-neutral pathway (via mindsets or motivation). Three experiments provided new specification of the content-specific pathway. A sequential priming paradigm revealed that counterfactual judgments facilitated RTs to complete behavioral intention judgments relative to control judgments and to a no-judgment baseline (Experiment 1). This facilitation effect was found only for intention judgments that matched the information content of the counterfactual (Experiment 2) and only for intention judgments as opposed to a different judgment that nevertheless focused on the same information content (Experiment 3). These findings clarify the content-specific pathway by which counterfactuals influence behavior.     

“If only I had” versus “If only I had not”: Mental deletions,mental additions,and perceptions of meaning in life events

ABSTRACT

The present research investigated the relationship between meaning perceptions and the structure of counterfactual thoughts. In Study 1, participants reflected on how turning points in their lives could have turned out otherwise. Those who were instructed to engage in subtractive (e.g. If only I had not done X…”) counterfactual thinking (SCT) about those turning points subsequently reported higher meaning perceptions than did those who engaged in additive (e.g. ‘If only I had done X…’) counterfactual thinking (ACT). In Study 2, participants who reflected upon life events from the perspective of understanding the past (versus preparing for the future) tended to engage in more SCT than ACT. Finally, in Study 3, participants engaged in more SCT than ACT about life events whose meaning was perceived as certain (as opposed to uncertain) – presumably to maintain their pre-existing sense of meaning. Implications for the study of counterfactual thinking and meaning are discussed.     

The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual Conditionals

What is the relation between factual conditionals: If A happened then B happened, and counterfactual conditionals: If A had happened then B would have happened? Some theorists propose quite different semantics for the two. In contrast, the theory of mental models and its computer implementation interrelates them. It postulates that both can have a priori truth values, and that the semantic bases of both are possibilities: states that are possible for factual conditionals, and that were once possible but that did not happen for counterfactual conditionals. Two experiments supported these relations. Experiment 1 showed that, like factual conditionals, certain counterfactuals are true a priori, and others are false a priori. Experiment 2 replicated this result and showed that participants selected appropriate paraphrases, referring, respectively, to real and to counterfactual possibilities, for the two sorts of conditional. These results are contrary to alternative accounts of conditionals.     

The development of children's regret and relief

Previous research found that children first experience regret at 5 years and relief at 7. In two experiments, we explored three possibilities for this lag: (1) relief genuinely develops later than regret; (2) tests of relief have previously been artefactually difficult; or (3) evidence for regret resulted from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N=162 4- to 7-year-olds) children chose one of two cards that led to winning or losing tokens. Children rated their happiness then saw a better (regret) or worse (relief) alternative. Children re-rated their happiness. Regret after winning was first experienced at 4, regret after losing and relief after winning were experienced at 5 years and relief after losing at 7 years. Experiment 2 (N=297 5- to 8-year-olds) used a similar task but manipulated children's responsibility for the outcome. Greater responsibility for the outcome resulted in a greater likelihood of an experience of regret and relief. Results support that previous tests of relief were artefactually difficult and regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously thought.     

Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior

Employing a die-under-cup paradigm, we study the extent to which people lie when it is transparently clear they cannot be caught. We asked participants to report the outcome of a private die roll and gain money according to their reports. Results suggest that the degree of lying depends on the extent to which self-justifications are available. Specifically, when people are allowed to roll the die three times to ensure its legitimacy, but only the first roll is supposed to “count,” we find evidence that the highest outcome of the three rolls is reported. Eliminating the ability to observe more than one roll reduces lying. Additional results suggest that observing desired counterfactuals, in the form of additional rolls not meant to determine pay, attenuates the degree to which people perceive lies as unethical. People seem to derive value from self-justifications allowing them to lie for money while feeling honest.     

The effects of managerial regulatory fit priming on reactions to explanations

We investigated the interactive effects of regulatory focus priming and message framing on the perceived fairness of unfavorable events. We hypothesized that individuals’ perceptions of fairness are higher when they receive a regulatory focus prime (promotion versus prevention) that is congruent with the framing of an explanation (gain versus loss), as opposed to one that is incongruent. We also hypothesized that these effects are mediated by counterfactual thinking. Three studies revealed that primed regulatory fit (promotion/gain or prevention/loss) led to higher levels of justice perceptions than regulatory misfit (promotion/loss or prevention/gain). Additionally, “could” and “should” counterfactuals partially mediated the relationship between regulatory fit and interactional justice (Study 3).     

“What I did” versus “what I might have done”: Effect of factual versus counterfactual thinking on blame, guilt, and shame in prisoners

The present study tested the prediction that counterfactual thinking would have a stronger amplificatory effect on guilt than on shame and that the effect would be mediated by self-blame. Ninety sentenced prisoners were instructed to think either counterfactually or factually about the role they played in the events leading to their capture, conviction, and sentencing prior to reporting on their level of self-blame, guilt, and shame. Compared to factual-focused prisoners, counterfactual-focused prisoners reported feeling more blameworthy and guiltier but not more shameful. The effect of thought focus on guilt was fully mediated by blame. The findings support an emotion-specific account of the emotional consequences of counterfactual thinking that implicate attributional judgment as an important mediating process.     

What if there were no God? Politically conservative and liberal Christians imagine their lives without faith

A sample of devout Christian adults, ranging widely in political orientation, described what their lives (and the world) might be like had they never embraced faith. Politically conservative Christians (also scoring high on right-wing authoritarianism) tended to imagine a life deficient in impulse control, wherein unrestrained sexual and aggressive urges, addictive behaviors, and human selfishness undermined the social good. By contrast, politically liberal Christians (also scoring low on right-wing authoritarianism) imagined an empty and barren world, devoid of the emotional intensity that makes life worth living. Gender differences were also observed, but they did not interfere with the relation between political orientation and the narrative themes. In accord with theoretical writings regarding normative and humanistic ideologies, the findings suggest that, at least among American Christians, political conservatism may entail a fear of, or strong sensitivity to, the prospects of conflict and chaos, whereas political liberalism may entail an equally strong fear of, or sensitivity to, emptiness.     

不同调控方式个体反事实思维上的差异：来自ERP的证据

利用事件相关电位技术(ERP), 采用简单赌博任务范式, 考察具有“评估倾向”和“行动倾向”的两类个体在反事实思维上的差异及其神经电生理证据。行为结果表明：评估倾向的个体比行动倾向的个体产生更强的反事实思维, 两者差异极其显著; 脑电结果表明：(1)在反映结果快速评价的FRN上, 组别主效应显著, 评估倾向的个体所产生的FRN波幅显著大于行动倾向的个体, (2)在P300上, 组别主效应显著, 评估倾向的个体所产生的P300波幅显著大于行动倾向的个体。简而言之, 两种不同调控方式的个体在反事实思维强度上存在着显著差异, 这在FRN和P300上得到了反映, 评估倾向的个体所产生的反事实思维更强, 情绪体验也更加强烈。不同调控方式的个体, 其反事实思维具有不同的特点和不同的大脑活动。