Representation and rationality

David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis's project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We pose a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made.     

Advanced theory of mind in children with mild intellectual disability and deaf or hard of hearing children: A two-year longitudinal study in middle childhood

The present study investigates the development of advanced theory of mind (AToM) among typically developing (TD) children, children with mild intellectual disability (MID), and deaf or hard of hearing (DHH) children. The 2-year longitudinal study comprised three waves and included a large sample of children from Poland in middle childhood aged around 7.5–9.5 years (N = 779; M = 7.7, SD = 0.92 at wave 1). The analysis of children’s understanding of second-order false belief and the Faux-Pas Recognition Test showed that TD children outperformed children with MID and DHH children on both measures. At 7.5 years, almost 60% of the TD children correctly solved the second-order false belief task; correct performance at 7.5 years in children with MID and DHH children was 27 and 38% respectively. Two years later, correct performance rose to 80% (TD children), 45% (children with MID), and 63% (DHH children). Despite these differences, the speed of AToM development did not differ across the groups. The development of faux-pas recognition followed a non-linear pattern, with TD children showing no further significant development after mid-elementary school. Our findings show differences in AToM development between TD children, children with MID, and DHH children, and they suggest that children’s development of AToM may follow different developmental pathways, depending on the aspect of AToM under study.     

Theory of mind selectively predicts preschoolers’ knowledge‐based selective word learning

Children can selectively attend to various attributes of a model, such as past accuracy or physical strength, to guide their social learning. There is a debate regarding whether a relation exists between theory‐of‐mind skills and selective learning. We hypothesized that high performance on theory‐of‐mind tasks would predict preference for learning new words from accurate informants (an epistemic attribute), but not from physically strong informants (a non‐epistemic attribute). Three‐ and 4‐year‐olds (N = 65) completed two selective learning tasks, and their theory‐of‐mind abilities were assessed. As expected, performance on a theory‐of‐mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants. Results thus suggest that preschoolers with more advanced theory of mind have a better understanding of knowledge and apply that understanding to guide their selection of informants. This work has important implications for research on children's developing social cognition and early learning.     

Analytic attitude – focus or embodiment? Subtle communications in the transference/countertransference relationship

The paper considers a ‘befallment’ that occurred in the course of analysis at a time when the focus of work was too much at a conscious level, dissociated from the patient’s embodied and visceral depths. A rigidly held attitude of focal attention is considered as potentially a defence against embodied experiences of overwhelm and vulnerability that may haunt shadowy realms which remain unlit by the narrow beam of conscious awareness. Rather as a dream drifts in from the unconscious, an enactment by the analyst brought neglected aspects of the transference and countertransference relationship into the room. Later, the patient’s own dreaming mind offered images that suggested an underlying dynamic. These subtle communications, alongside the patient’s attitude toward the analyst’s lapse, are considered as factors in the achievement of greater embodied integration. The analyst’s difficulty in arriving at a formulation of such events is discussed, along with the necessity of holding such ‘befallments’ in mind over long periods of time before any explanation can be adumbrated.     

Oliva Sabuco de Nantes and her Nueva Filosofia: a new philosophy of human nature and the interaction between mind and body

ABSTRACT

The main objective of the New Philosophy was to ‘improve the lives of people and nations in part by improving medical practice’. To this end, Oliva Sabuco sought to improve humankind's knowledge of the philosophical underpinnings of medicine while taking experiential practices into account. She suggested that a variety of procedures (pharmaceutical, emotional and therapeutic) should be adopted to maintain and restore harmony between the mind and body. Oliva Sabuco sought to promote health and prevent disease by expanding our knowledge of the interrelationship between mind and body; the ultimate goal was to understand the body's function and form in order to promote inner harmony and thus health. The influence of classical traditions in moral and natural philosophy, medicine, and cosmography is unmistakable in Oliva Sabuco's text, yet she synthesized these traditions, disagreed with fundamental aspects of them, and transformed them in a holistic philosophy of human nature that is part of a larger view of the cosmos and mankind's place in it.     

Plans or Outcomes: How Do We Attribute Intelligence to Others?

Humans routinely make inferences about both the contents and the workings of other minds based on observed actions. People consider what others want or know, but also how intelligent, rational, or attentive they might be. Here, we introduce a new methodology for quantitatively studying the mechanisms people use to attribute intelligence to others based on their behavior. We focus on two key judgments previously proposed in the literature: judgments based on observed outcomes (you're smart if you won the game) and judgments based on evaluating the quality of an agent's planning that led to their outcomes (you're smart if you made the right choice, even if you didn't succeed). We present a novel task, the maze search task (MST), in which participants rate the intelligence of agents searching a maze for a hidden goal. We model outcome-based attributions based on the observed utility of the agent upon achieving a goal, with higher utilities indicating higher intelligence, and model planning-based attributions by measuring the proximity of the observed actions to an ideal planner, such that agents who produce closer approximations of optimal plans are seen as more intelligent. We examine human attributions of intelligence in three experiments that use MST and find that participants used both outcome and planning as indicators of intelligence. However, observing the outcome was not necessary, and participants still made planning-based attributions of intelligence when the outcome was not observed. We also found that the weights individuals placed on plans and on outcome correlated with an individual's ability to engage in cognitive reflection. Our results suggest that people attribute intelligence based on plans given sufficient context and cognitive resources and rely on the outcome when computational resources or context are limited.     

A developmental shift in processes underlying successful belief-desire reasoning

Young children's failures in reasoning about beliefs and desires, and especially about false beliefs, have been much studied. However, there are few accounts of successful belief-desire reasoning in older children or adults. An exception to this is a model in which belief attribution is treated as a process wherein an inhibitory system selects the most likely content for the belief to be attributed from amongst several competing contents [Leslie, A. M., & Polizzi, P. (1998). Developmental Science, 1, 247-254]. We tested this model with an ‘avoidance false belief task’ in which subjects predict the behavior of a character, who wants to avoid an object but who is mistaken about which of three locations it is in. The task has two equally correct answers—in seeking to avoid the location where she mistakenly believes the object to be, the character might equally go to the location where the object actually is, or to the remaining empty location. However, the model predicts that subjects will prefer one of these answers, selecting the object's actual location over the empty location. This bias was confirmed in a series of five experiments with children aged between 4 and 8 years of age. A sixth experiment ruled out two rival explanations for children's biased responding. Two further experiments found the opposite bias in adults. These findings support one selection model as an account of belief-desire reasoning in children, and suggest that a different model is needed for adults. The process of selecting contents for mental state attributions shows a developmental shift between 8 years of age and adulthood.     

Alter Egos: Notes on the basic Processes of specular Identification

Although identity is always dependant on observing minds, identification in physics and biology remains merely external, avoiding therefore the more serious problems of identity which arise in the presence of observed minds. Minds are defined in this paper as specular machines, i.e. systems capable of crossed self‐representations. Specularity is introduced as the primary condition of any objective identification, and self‐identification is presented as the core of specularity. Elementary illustrations are given of the role of specularity in both sociology and psychopathology.     

Children’s attributions of beliefs to humans and God: cross-cultural evidence

The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents. In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a sample of Maya children aged 4-7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways to humans and God. The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development of folk-psychological reasoning.