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41.
    
ObjectivesTo conduct the first examination of neuroticism as a predictor of (1) the incidence of what Wegner (1989, 2009) terms ironic processes of mental control and (2) the precision of ironic performance errors under high- and low-anxiety conditions.DesignAcross two studies we employed a repeated-measures design.MethodIn a football penalty-shooting task (Study 1) and a dart-throwing (Study 2) task, under high-anxiety and low-anxiety conditions, participants gained maximum points for hitting a target zone and fewer points for hitting a designated non-ironic error zone. Additionally, we instructed participants to be particularly careful not to hit a designated ironic error zone, because such hits would score minimum points.ResultsAcross both studies within-subjects moderation analyses revealed a consistent moderating effect of neuroticism on the incidence of ironic errors in the high-anxiety condition. Specifically, when anxious, neurotics displayed a significant increase in ironic performance error and a significant decrease in target hits. Importantly, non-ironic error did not differ across anxiety conditions. Additionally, Study 2 results revealed that neuroticism moderated the precision of ironic errors when anxious. Specifically, when anxious, neurotics' ironic error zone hits were significantly farther from the target zone and significantly farther into the ironic error zone than their relatively emotionally stable counterparts’ errors.ConclusionWe provide the first evidence that neuroticism moderates both the incidence and precision of ironic performance errors. These results will enable practitioners in coaching environments to make evidence-based predictions and interventions regarding which individuals are most prone to ironic performance breakdown when anxious.  相似文献   
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In prediction, subset relations require that the probability of conjoined events is never higher than that of constituent events. However, people's judgments regularly violate this principle, producing conjunction errors. In diagnosis, the probability of a hypothesis normatively is often higher for conjoined cues. An online survey used a within‐subjects design to explore the degree to which participants (n = 347) differentiated diagnosis and prediction using matched scenarios and both choice and estimation responses. Conjunctions were judged more probable than a constituent in diagnosis (76%) more often than prediction (64%) and in choice (84%) more often than direct estimation (57%), with no interaction of type of task and response mode. Correlation, regression, and path analyses were used to determine the relationships among individual difference variables and the diagnosis and prediction tasks. Among the correlation findings was that time spent on the task predicted higher conjunction probabilities in diagnosis but not prediction and that class inclusion errors predicted increased conjunction errors in choice but not estimation. Need for cognition and numeracy were only minimally related to reasoning about conjunctions. Results are consistent with the idea that people may misapply diagnostic reasoning to the prediction task and consequently commit the conjunction error. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.  相似文献   
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Prior research shows that learners have idiosyncratic responses to error‐correction procedures during instruction. Thus, assessments that identify error‐correction strategies to include in instruction can aid practitioners in selecting individualized, efficacious, and efficient interventions. The current investigation conducted an assessment to compare 5 error‐correction procedures that have been evaluated in the extant literature and are common in instructional practice for children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Results showed that the assessment identified efficacious and efficient error‐correction procedures for all participants, and 1 procedure was efficient for 4 of the 5 participants. To examine the social validity of error‐correction procedures, participants selected among efficacious and efficient interventions in a concurrent‐chains assessment. We discuss the results in relation to prior research on error‐correction procedures and current instructional practices for learners with ASD.  相似文献   
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Ingmar Persson 《Theoria》2016,82(2):148-165
This article examines Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in non‐branching psychological continuity with the right kind of cause. It argues that such psychological accounts of our identity fail, but that their main rivals, biological or animalist accounts do not fare better. Instead it proposes an error‐theory to the effect that common sense takes us to be identical to our bodies on the erroneous assumption that our minds belong non‐derivatively to them, whereas they in fact belong to them derivatively in virtue of belonging to some proper parts of them, namely certain features of their brains. However, these features do not meet another necessary condition of being the subject or owner of our minds: the condition of being “accessible” so that we can attribute our mental states to them in everyday life. There is also the problem of specifying these features more precisely. Nothing meets these two conditions, so we are not identical to anything. This conclusion fits well with Parfit's claim that personal identity is not what matters. But although this negative claim is true, it is suggested that Parfit's positive account of what matters is mistaken: it is rather psychological similarity than psychological continuity/connectedness that matters.  相似文献   
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运动视觉中计时行为的控制操作理论   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
运动视觉中的计时行为分为两类 :拦截行为和制动行为。“环境—活动者系统”(EAS)中的信息决定着计量行为的控制操作。本文阐明了信息和EAS的特性 ,通过对 tau-margin在拦截行为中的作用以及视觉变量τ对于制动操作重要性的分析 ,论述了运动视觉中计时行为的控制操作理论。  相似文献   
48.
    
This study compared the effects of immediate self-correction, delayed self-correction, and no correction on the acquisition and maintenance of multiplication facts by a fourth-grade student with learning disabilities. Data from daily and maintenance tests indicated that both correct response rate and accuracy were higher when self-correction was immediate rather than delayed or absent.  相似文献   
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Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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