Verbal Sexual Coercion and Perceived Victim Responsibility: Mediating Effects of Perceived Control

Verbal coercion involves unwanted sexual penetration compelled by psychological pressure. It was hypothesized that, to the degree that verbal coercion is seen as controllable, victims may be held more responsible. Two samples of US undergraduates rated perceptions of hypothetical sexual coercion scenarios. In Study 1, participants (N = 120) read scenarios of either verbal coercion or rape by a male dating partner. Participants perceived verbal coercion as more controllable than rape, which accounted for the greater responsibility attributed to verbal coercion victims. In Study 2, participants (N = 275) read scenarios involving either male-to-female or female-to-male verbal coercion. Participants perceived female-to-male coercion as more controllable, which accounted for the greater responsibility attributed to a verbally coerced man.     

Looking before you leap: A theory of motivated control of action

The acquisition of volitional control depends, in part, on developing the ability to countermand a planned action. Many tasks have been used to tap the efficiency of this process, but few studies have investigated how it may be modulated by participants’ motivation. Multiple mechanisms may be involved in the deliberate exercise of caution when incentives are provided. For example, control may involve modulation of the efficiency of the countermanding process, and/or inhibitory modulation of the impulse to go. One of the most commonly used paradigms to assess control of action is the Stop Signal Task, in which a primary Go stimulus is occasionally followed by a countermanding Stop signal, allowing a Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) to be inferred as the outcome of a “horse race” between the go and countermanding processes. Here, we present a computational model in which high task motivation modulates proactive pre-stimulus inhibition of the go response. This allows responses to be calibrated so as to fall within a time-window that maximizes the probability of success, regardless of trial type, but does not decrease the observed SSRT. We report empirical support for the model from a sample of typically developing children, and discuss the broader implications for operationalizing measures of volitional control.     

Intergroup anxiety effects on the control of racial stereotypes: A psychoneuroendocrine analysis

Anxiety associated with an intergroup interaction is often thought to interfere with the cognitive control of automatic racial stereotypes. However, this link remains elusive, as self-reported anxiety is not typically associated with assessments of control. The present research tested a neuroendocrine model for how intergroup anxiety may affect controlled processing. White participants met with a Black or White interviewer to discuss their racial attitudes and to complete a measure of stereotype inhibition. Baseline and post-interaction assessments of self-reported anxiety and salivary cortisol were obtained. Although self-reported anxiety was heightened for participants in the Black interviewer condition, it was not associated with control on the stereotyping task. Rather, greater cortisol reactivity to the interracial interaction predicted reduced controlled processing. This pattern was not observed in the White interviewer condition. Implications for theories of intergroup anxiety, self-regulation, and resource depletion are discussed.     

价值计算决定何时与如何努力

优化努力的分配,最小化努力成本和最大化收益是各个领域的关键问题。本文梳理了基于努力的决策(effort-based decision-making)的理论与实证研究,讨论了努力的两面性：固有成本和潜在价值。通过拓展控制期望价值理论(Expected Value of Control, EVC),本研究探讨了影响努力的非社会与社会因素。探索人们何时以及如何付出努力的计算神经机制,有利于理解与促进社会互动中的努力行为,以及为干预精神疾病中动机缺失症状提供参考。     

Optimum examinee samples for item parameter estimation in item response theory: A multi-objective programming approach

This paper proposes a multi-objective programming method for determining samples of examinees needed for estimating the parameters of a group of items. In the numerical experiments, optimum samples are compared to uniformly and normally distributed samples. The results show that the samples usually recommended in the literature are well suited for estimating the difficulty parameters. Furthermore, they are also adequate for estimating the discrimination parameters in the three-parameter model, butnot for the guessing parameters.     

Specifying optimum examinees for item parameter estimation in item response theory

Information functions are used to find the optimum ability levels and maximum contributions to information for estimating item parameters in three commonly used logistic item response models. For the three and two parameter logistic models, examinees who contribute maximally to the estimation of item difficulty contribute little to the estimation of item discrimination. This suggests that in applications that depend heavily upon the veracity of individual item parameter estimates (e.g. adaptive testing or text construction), better item calibration results may be obtained (for fixed sample sizes) from examinee calibration samples in which ability is widely dispersed.This work was supported by Contract No. N00014-83-C-0457, project designation NR 150-520, from Cognitive Science Program, Cognitive and Neural Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research and Educational Testing Service through the Program Research Planning Council. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Maxine B. Kingston in carrying out this study, and to thank Charles Lewis for his many insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Mistaking randomness for free will

Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents’ behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior—one’s own or another’s—can be mistaken for free will.     

Attentional control adjustments in Eriksen and Stroop task performance can be independent of response conflict

In the Eriksen flanker and colour-word Stroop tasks, the response time (RT) difference between incongruent and congruent trials is smaller following incongruent trials than following congruent trials: the “Gratton effect” (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). According to the prevailing conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), the Gratton effect reflects attentional control adjustment following response conflict on incongruent trials. However, because previous studies compared incongruent and congruent trials, it remains unclear to what extent the Gratton effect is driven by incongruent rather than congruent trials. To resolve this issue, we included neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent trials in the Eriksen (Experiment 1) and Stroop (Experiment 2) tasks. Participants responded manually and vocally in both tasks. Moreover, we assessed responding to Stroop stimuli that were preceded by neutral cues or by incongruent- or congruent-predicting cues (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials. These findings suggest that control adjustments can be independent of response conflict, challenging conflict-monitoring theory.     

Reactive and proactive control adjustments under increased depressive symptoms: Insights from the classic and emotional-face Stroop task

The current research investigated differences in reactive and proactive cognitive control as a function of depressive symptomatology. Three participant groups with varying symptom levels (Beck Depression Inventory–II, BDI–II score) completed both the classic and an emotional-face Stroop task separately under speed and accuracy instructions. All groups made equivalent speed–accuracy trade-offs independent of task, suggesting that proactive adjustments are unaffected by depressive symptoms. Additionally, groups made equivalent reactive control adjustments (Stroop effects, congruency sequence effects) in the classic Stroop task, suggesting that these reactive control adjustments are spared across a wide range of BDI–II scorers. In contrast, the high BDI–II group displayed a selective impairment in the resolution of conflict in the emotional-face Stroop task. Thus, while proactive control and many aspects of reactive control were unaffected by the level of depressive symptoms, specific impairments occurred when current task demands required the trial-to-trial regulation of emotional processing.     

Experience and appraisal of worry among high worriers with and without generalized anxiety disorder

Recent research has revealed that a large number of highly worried individuals do not qualify for a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). This raises the intriguing question of why some high worriers are more impaired and distressed by their worrying than others, particularly when the severity of their worry is the same. The present investigation sought to address this question by examining whether GAD and non-GAD high worriers differ in their actual worry experiences, their subjective appraisals of worry experiences, or both experiences and appraisals of worry. GAD and non-GAD worriers, selected for matching levels of trait worry severity, completed an attention-focus task with thought sampling before and after a brief worry induction. They also completed questionnaires assessing their experiences during and after the worry induction, as well as their general beliefs about worry. GAD worriers experienced less control over negative intrusive thoughts immediately after worrying, reported greater somatic hyperarousal following worry, and endorsed several negative beliefs about worry more strongly than their worry-matched controls. Results suggest that GAD is associated with unique experiences and appraisals that distinguish it from other forms of severe worry.