价值计算决定何时与如何努力

优化努力的分配,最小化努力成本和最大化收益是各个领域的关键问题。本文梳理了基于努力的决策(effort-based decision-making)的理论与实证研究,讨论了努力的两面性：固有成本和潜在价值。通过拓展控制期望价值理论(Expected Value of Control, EVC),本研究探讨了影响努力的非社会与社会因素。探索人们何时以及如何付出努力的计算神经机制,有利于理解与促进社会互动中的努力行为,以及为干预精神疾病中动机缺失症状提供参考。     

Mistaking randomness for free will

Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents’ behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior—one’s own or another’s—can be mistaken for free will.     

Attentional control adjustments in Eriksen and Stroop task performance can be independent of response conflict

In the Eriksen flanker and colour-word Stroop tasks, the response time (RT) difference between incongruent and congruent trials is smaller following incongruent trials than following congruent trials: the “Gratton effect” (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). According to the prevailing conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), the Gratton effect reflects attentional control adjustment following response conflict on incongruent trials. However, because previous studies compared incongruent and congruent trials, it remains unclear to what extent the Gratton effect is driven by incongruent rather than congruent trials. To resolve this issue, we included neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent trials in the Eriksen (Experiment 1) and Stroop (Experiment 2) tasks. Participants responded manually and vocally in both tasks. Moreover, we assessed responding to Stroop stimuli that were preceded by neutral cues or by incongruent- or congruent-predicting cues (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials. These findings suggest that control adjustments can be independent of response conflict, challenging conflict-monitoring theory.     

Reactive and proactive control adjustments under increased depressive symptoms: Insights from the classic and emotional-face Stroop task

The current research investigated differences in reactive and proactive cognitive control as a function of depressive symptomatology. Three participant groups with varying symptom levels (Beck Depression Inventory–II, BDI–II score) completed both the classic and an emotional-face Stroop task separately under speed and accuracy instructions. All groups made equivalent speed–accuracy trade-offs independent of task, suggesting that proactive adjustments are unaffected by depressive symptoms. Additionally, groups made equivalent reactive control adjustments (Stroop effects, congruency sequence effects) in the classic Stroop task, suggesting that these reactive control adjustments are spared across a wide range of BDI–II scorers. In contrast, the high BDI–II group displayed a selective impairment in the resolution of conflict in the emotional-face Stroop task. Thus, while proactive control and many aspects of reactive control were unaffected by the level of depressive symptoms, specific impairments occurred when current task demands required the trial-to-trial regulation of emotional processing.     

Experience and appraisal of worry among high worriers with and without generalized anxiety disorder

Recent research has revealed that a large number of highly worried individuals do not qualify for a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). This raises the intriguing question of why some high worriers are more impaired and distressed by their worrying than others, particularly when the severity of their worry is the same. The present investigation sought to address this question by examining whether GAD and non-GAD high worriers differ in their actual worry experiences, their subjective appraisals of worry experiences, or both experiences and appraisals of worry. GAD and non-GAD worriers, selected for matching levels of trait worry severity, completed an attention-focus task with thought sampling before and after a brief worry induction. They also completed questionnaires assessing their experiences during and after the worry induction, as well as their general beliefs about worry. GAD worriers experienced less control over negative intrusive thoughts immediately after worrying, reported greater somatic hyperarousal following worry, and endorsed several negative beliefs about worry more strongly than their worry-matched controls. Results suggest that GAD is associated with unique experiences and appraisals that distinguish it from other forms of severe worry.     

Visual illusions affect both movement planning and on-line control: a multiple cue position on bias and goal-directed action

Over the last decade, there has been an interest in the impact of visual illusions on the control of action. Much of this work has been motivated by Milner and Goodale's two visual system model of visual processing. This model is based on a hypothesized dissociation between cognitive judgments and the visual control of action. It holds that action is immune to the visual context that provides the basis for the illusion-induced bias associated with cognitive judgments. Recently, Glover has challenged this position and has suggested that movement planning, but not movement execution is susceptible to visual illusions. Research from our lab is inconsistent with both models of visual-motor processing. With respect to the planning and control model, kinematic evidence shows that the impact of an illusion on manual aiming increases as the limb approaches the target. For the Ebbinghaus illusion, this involved a decrease in the time after peak velocity to accommodate the 'perceived' size of the target. For the Müller-Lyer illusion, the influence of the figure's tails increased from peak velocity to the end of the movement. Although our findings contradict a strong version of the two visual systems hypothesis, we did find dissociations between perception and action in another experiment. In this Müller-Lyer study, perceptual decisions were influenced by misjudgment of extent, while action was influenced by misjudgment of target position. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that it is often necessary to use visual context to make adjustments to ongoing movements.     

The effects of prior expectations and outcome knowledge on polygraph examiners' decisions

The present study deals with the question of whether judgments made by experts working in familiar contexts are affected by prior expectations and beliefs. Two experiments in which prior expectations were manipulated were designed to determine whether and to what extent polygraph examiners are affected by their prior expectations when analyzing and interpreting polygraph charts. Prior expectations affected the examiners' judgments when the polygraph charts did not include clear indications of guilt or innocence, but when the objective physiological evidence included strong indications which clearly contradicted the examiner's expectations, judgments were not affected by these expectations. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

The equilibrium-point hypothesis is still doing fine

Within the present paper we provide the arguments that contradict Gottlieb's conclusions regarding the theoretical implications of kinematics of movements performed with unexpectedly changed inertial loads. First, the load associated changes in movement velocity presented by Gottlieb may be caused by apparent methodological differences, when compared to our earlier results. Moreover, the present data can be interpreted by the equilibrium-point hypothesis as well as by Gottlieb's hypothesis. Second, Gottlieb remains silent on findings related to the movement time and symmetry ratio that contradict predictions based on either torque control or Gottlieb's hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that the data obtained on rapid movements performed with unexpected changes in inertial load support equilibrium-point hypothesis, rather that any of the torque control based models.     

Hope,optimism, and affect as predictors and consequences of expectancies: The potential moderating roles of perceived control and success

Hope and optimism may be differentially influential depending on the situational context. This study sought to (1) experimentally test whether hope and optimism differentially predict specific expectancies in controllable versus uncontrollable situations and (2) examine the relative impact of specific expectancies on affect when desired outcomes are (or are not) achieved. A 2 × 2 independent samples design was used to experimentally manipulate perceived control and situational outcome (i.e., success or failure). Online participants (N = 571) completed self-report measures of hope and optimism before being randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Results showed that hope, but not optimism, predicted specific expectancies in the perceived control condition. Conversely, optimism, but not hope, predicted specific expectancies in the no perceived control condition. More optimistic specific expectancies of success predicted greater positive affect regardless of success or failure outcome.     

控制感与老年人生命意义：自我认同和政策支持的作用

本研究探讨了控制感、自我认同、对政策支持的感知等因素如何影响老年人的生命意义感。通过对300多名来自北京、香港和台北的老年人的调查,发现控制感和政策支持对老年人生命意义感的影响显着,二者不仅主效应显着,同时存在交互作用。进一步的分析还发现：政策支持在控制感与生命意义感的关系中起调节作用——高政策支持感增强了控制对生命意义感的正向作用;自我认同在控制感与生命意义感的关系中起部分中介作用。结果对积极应对老龄化问题与增进老年人身心健康有重要的理论和现实意义。