Pragmatism Regained

This article views the confrontation between pragmatism and Kant’s Critical undertaking as very possibly the single most consequential agon of contemporary philosophy, given the utter irreconcilability of their respective ways of addressing the concerns of First Philosophy, with regard to the enabling conditions of cognitive realism. Pragmatism favors an informal, fluxive, “instrumentalist” form of empiricism, impossible to complete, opposed to any and all the ontic and epistemic fixities of Kant’s Rationalism. Reason (Vernunft) cannot be more than a fiction. Kant has no supporting criterion of realism. The article proposes an empirical criterion of the distinctive (given) “duality” of sensory “appearings” and “appeareds” (that is, objects) as yielding a plausible “cognitive faculty” (involving “reasoning”—inference, for instance—but not Vernunft) that, in accord with the drift of evolutionism and Aristotle, readily extends to languageless animals as well as humans. It serves as the linchpin of the paper.     

Number concepts for the concept empiricist

Dove (2009) and Machery (2007) both argue that recent findings about the nature of numerical representation present problems for Concept Empiricism (CE). I shall argue that, whilst this evidence does challenge certain versions of CE, such as Prinz (2002), it needn’t be seen as problematic to the general CE approach. Recent research can arguably be seen to support a CE account of number concepts. Neurological and behavioral evidence suggests that systems involved in the perception of numerical properties are also implicated in numerical cognition. Furthermore, the discovery of associations between spatial and numerical representations also lends independent support to a CE approach. Although these findings support CE in general, certain versions of the theory may need revising in order to accommodate them. In particular, it may be necessary to either jettison Prinz's (2002) Modal Specificity Hypothesis or to revise one’s method for individuating modal representational formats.     

A JANUS FACE UPON RELIGION FROM SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM

Abstract. Bjørn Grinde's article is a Janus face from a scientific insider looking out toward religion and from a religious outsider looking in. His scientific story of the evolutionary and present advantages of religion is laudable but incomplete, as the logic of commitment strategies might provide a fuller account of what produces the value of religious faith. His scientific presuppositions nevertheless might be taken as exhibiting some hubris, particularly in the limits of his instrumental ethics. Finally, the variety and potential incommensurability of both theistic and nontheistic religious views render his distinction between “minimal” and “elaborated” views of God problematic as a route to finding a scientifically credible view by which science might move to optimize the value of religion. Nevertheless, the goal of doing so might be supported by several structural features of religious views, of individual transformation and of hopes for the future, which may be supported by the evolutionary logic of commitment strategies at both individual and group levels.     

Mainstreams and Perspectives in Research on Learning (Mathematics) From Instruction

Le domaine de l’enseignement et de l’apprentissage des mathématiques est un exemple des plus représentatives de l’orientation des recherches sur l’apprentissage et l’instruction dans les différentes matières. Au cours du dernier quart de siècle écoulé, ce champ de questionnement a produit nombre d’investigations qui résultent d’une conception de l’apprentissage des mathématiques comme construction sociale de la signification et de la comprehension basée sur la modélisation de la réalité. Dans cet article, quelques tendances majeures et perspectives de recherche s.0s principalement aux Etats‐Unis et en Europe. Il y sera montré que d’une part, les investigations empiriques ont déjà produit des blocs de construction pour l’élaboration d’une théorie de l’apprentissage des mathématiques à partir d’instructions mais que, d’autre part, des questions et des problèmes majeurs requièrent d’être démêlés par la poursuite d’investigations. Ceci y sera documenté de façon exemplaire en utilisant comme cadre de référence quatre composants principaux d’une théorie de l’apprentissage des mathématiques à partir d’instructions: une théorie de l’expertise visant à analyser des compétences dans un domaine; une théorie de l’acquisition tendant à comprendre et expliquer les processus d’apprentissage qui conduisent à la réalisation de compétences; une théorie de l’intervention, focalisée sur la conception d’environnements enseignement‐apprentissage puissants pour provoquer ces processus d’acquisition; et une théorie de l’évaluation s’adressant au développement de méthodes et techniques pour la construction et l’application d’outils et instruments d’évaluation. The domain of mathematics learning and teaching is one of the most representative examples of the subject‐matter orientation in research on learning and instruction. During the last quarter of the past century this field of inquiry has produced a vast body of investigations, resulting in an enriched conception of mathematics learning as involving the (social) construction of meaning and understanding based on modeling of reality. In this article some of the main trends and perspectives in the field of research on mathematics learning and instruction are discussed, and illustrated with examples of empirical research, mainly carried out in Europe and the United States. It will be shown that, on the one hand, the available empirical investigations have already yielded substantial building blocks for the elaboration of a theory of mathematics learning from instruction, but that, on the other hand, major issues and problems need to be unravelled by continued inquiry. This will be documented in an exemplary way, using as a frame of reference four main components of a theory of learning mathematics from instruction: a theory of expertise, aiming at analysing competence in a domain; a theory of acquisition, attempting to understand and explain the processes of learning that are conducive to the attainment of competence; a theory of intervention, focusing on the design of powerful teaching–learning environments for eliciting those acquisition processes; and a theory of assessment, addressing the development of methods and techniques for the construction and application of assessment tools and instruments.     

The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science

There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current ‘paradigm’ is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new ‘paradigm’ over the current one. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A New Task for Philosophy of Science

This paper argues that we philosophers of science have before us an important new task that we urgently need to take up. It is to convince the scientific community to adopt and implement a new philosophy of science that does better justice to the deeply problematic basic intellectual aims of science than that which we have at present. Problematic aims evolve with evolving knowledge, that part of philosophy of science concerned with aims and methods thus becoming an integral part of science itself. The outcome of putting this new philosophy into scientific practice would be a new kind of science, both more intellectually rigorous and one that does better justice to the best interests of humanity.     

心理学经验主义、理性主义与解释学认识论比较研究

虽然现代心理学一直想摆脱哲学的束缚与羁绊,但心理学的发展中总是自觉不自觉地表露出不同的认识论取向。经验主义、理性主义和解释学哲学对现代心理学的发展产生了重要影响。三种取向的心理学在心理学研究对象本质的理解、知识形成的途径、研究结果的表现形式以及研究方法的选择上各执己见,由此展现出三种不同的心理学风景。经验主义认识论注重事物各种特征的描述,经验材料的收集,主张采用自然科学研究方法以揭示现象的规律与法则。理性主义认识论关注现象背后的深层次结构,主张用信息加工、记忆检索、图式与结构、感觉输入等方式获得对现象本质的认识,并以形式结构的方式呈现研究结果。解释学认识论则注重对人类实践活动的理解,重视人与环境的相互作用,主张以语义的言说阐明研究结果。在未来,心理学仍需寻求完善的认识论基础,真正确立适于人性的心理学研究方式,以期展示人的完整本质。     

Donald C. Williams’s defence of real metaphysics

In the middle of last century metaphysics was widely criticized, ridiculed, and committed to the flames. During this period a handful of philosophers, against several anti-metaphysical trends, defended metaphysics and articulated novel metaphysical doctrines. Donald C. Williams was one of these philosophers. But while his contributions to metaphysics are well known his defence of metaphysics is not and yet it played a key part in the development and revival of metaphysics. In this paper I present his defence of metaphysics in its historical context. I also show how his defence is relevant in response to recent attacks on metaphysics.     

SOME CORRELATIONS BETWEEN METHODS OF KNOWING AND THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN ARTHUR PEACOCKE'S PERSONALISTIC PANENTHEISM AND NONPERSONAL NATURALISTIC THEISM

Differences in methods of knowing correlate with differences in concepts about what is known. This is an underlying issue in science and religion. It is seen, first, in Arthur Peacocke's reasoning about God as transcendent and personal, is based on an assumption of correlative thinking that like causes like. This contrasts with a notion of causation in empirical science, which explains the emergence of new phenomena as originating from temporally prior phenomena quite unlike that which emerges. The scientific understanding of causation is compatible with a naturalistic theism that holds a nonpersonal model of God as the creative process. However, focusing on the immanence of God, there is a second correlation between methods of knowing and concepts of God. Classical empiricism, used by science, correlates with God understood nonpersonally as the creative process. Radical empiricism, in which feelings and not only sense perceptions have cognitive import, opens up the possibility that one can experience Peacocke's personal, panentheistic God as pattern‐forming influence. I illustrate this second method‐concept correlation with a personal experience.     

Advancing the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism: A comment on O’Nualláin

In a recent contribution to New Ideas in Psychology, Seán O’Nualláin draws out a distinction between inner and outer empiricism, and suggests that consciousness research can benefit from analysis in both directions, that is, via the exploration of facts and relations that facilitate a third-person understanding of consciousness (by reference to an analysis of the structures, processes, and functions of the brain) and via the direct exploration of conscious experience itself, both in terms of its computational (content filled) and non-computational (content empty) aspects. In positing a substrate of subjectivity independent of the contents of consciousness (and, more specifically, a state of “nothingness”), Ò’Nualláin follows a long tradition deeply rooted in mythical, religious, and esoteric schools of belief and practice. Although there is considerable debate amongst philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists as to whether or not a non-computational view of consciousness is viable, O’Nualláin accepts that such a possibility does exist. Further, he suggests that a dialogue between the inner and outer empiricists will be fruitful. In this comment I, critique Ò’Nualláin's initial thoughts on the subject and draw out a series of useful distinctions that will help to advance the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism. Critical amongst these distinctions is explicit reference to (1) ontological and epistemological interdependencies in consciousness research, and (2) states of consciousness that describe the transition from “mindfulness” through “nothingness” to “no-mind”.