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11.
Paul Dicken 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):189-201
Abstract Constructive empiricism – as formulated by Bas van Fraassen – makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen’s broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may have various advantages in defending the epistemic relevance of constructive empiricism, I show how it also has various disadvantages in maintaining its internal coherence. 相似文献
12.
A. Polikarov 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1998,29(2):225-244
The basic (negative and positive) methodological maxims of three currents of philosophy of science (logical empiricism, falsificationism,
and postpositivism) are formulated. Many of these maxims (stratagems) are controversial, e.g., the stance about the nonsense
of metaphysics, and that of its indispensability. The restricted validity of these maxims allows for their unification. Within
the framework of most of them there may be a relationship of (synchronic, or diachronic) subordination of the contradicting
desiderata. In this vein ten stratagems are formulated.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
13.
Joseph Rouse 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1998,29(1):71-122
This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary
synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These
developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies
of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science,
studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the
survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in
the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that
have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality
and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and
the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical
rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new
directions.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
14.
15.
F. A. Muller 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):131-156
Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell’s reasoning will make it clear that neither is the case. This dissection includes an analysis of Maxwell’s ‘aberrance–argument’ (omnipresent in his many writings) for the claim that science implicitly and permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the universe, which then paves the way for his own metaphysical-realist hierarchy-view of science. This aberrance-claim, which Maxwell directs against a widely shared and harmful ideology of science called ‘Standard Empiricism’, generally has been ignored too, for more than a quarter of a century. Our conclusions will be that (i) Maxwell’s attacks on CE can be beaten off, and (ii) his ‘aberrance–arguments’ do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish, but (iii) we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertarian nature of CE. 相似文献
16.
Thomas Mormann 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):127-146
Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well
known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930,
however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict
emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning
values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension
between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American
pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason
why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and
empiricist scientific philosophy. 相似文献
17.
PIERRE CRUSE 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):489-508
Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth‐evaluable doctrine than as a stance. 相似文献
18.
本文在阐明詹姆斯心理学的出发点、并考察其心理学思想的探索和突破的基础上指出,詹姆斯关于心理学的思想历程无疑经历了一个根本的转向;又结合与胡塞尔现象学的比较认为,转向之后的詹姆斯的心理学思想的潜在意义,只有借用胡塞尔现象学的思想框架和概念工具,才能得到有效的表达和进一步的发展。文章最后还暗示了詹姆斯心理学思想的现象学转向对于理解并构建心理学的学科同一性的潜在意义。 相似文献
19.
20.
The concept of the artes liberales originates in antiquity and was, especially in the Anglo-Saxon area and during the 17th and 18th centuries, remodelled into a socially, educationally, and politically modern educational concept. In this process, the progress within the empirical sciences and the formation of an early civil public are of the utmost importance. In the course of these transformations, the absolute force of church and state is called into question; educational concepts which have to be called modern emerge from it. 相似文献