算术策略运用能力的年龄差异：元认知监测与算术知识的作用

采用选择/无选法,以估算与精确心算为研究任务,考察了元认知监测与算术知识影响个体算术计算策略选择与执行的年龄相关差异。129名不同年龄儿童与成人被试参加实验。结果发现：（1）算术知识对儿童及成人的估算复杂策略有促进作用,并对提升他们心算策略运用的速度和减少错误有作用;（2）元认知监测显著影响儿童的估算策略选择,能够促进使用最佳策略;（3）算术知识在估算及心算策略执行的年龄差异方面起完全中介作用,元认知监测则在估算策略选择的年龄发展中起部分中介作用;（4）算术知识对元认知监测在估算及心算策略执行上的作用起完全中介作用,而对估算的策略选择则不存在中介作用,这表明元认知监测在估算策略选择上具有举足轻重的地位。     

The Individualised Patient‐Progress System: A decade of international collaborative networking

Background: The backstage of research projects is seldom presented to the general audience, in particular, how the research questions emerged, how the team interacted and how the methods and design were decided upon. Aim: In this paper we will recount the story behind an international practice‐based research network for personalising health assessment, the joint journey of researchers and therapists from three different countries in creating the Individualised Patient‐Progress System (IPPS). Results: We first describe how the idea of the IPPS emerged; then we show how IPPS is being piloted and integrated into clinical practice. Next, we present the views of therapists and researchers who have been part of this project. Conclusions: We discuss some lessons learned from this 14‐year collaborative research programme.     

Investigating the cost to ongoing tasks not associated with prospective memory task requirements

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the relationship between prospective memory (PM) and consciousness by examining cost to ongoing activities, with cost assumed to reflect a direction of conscious resources away from the ongoing task in service of the PM task. Ongoing task blocks in which the PM task was relevant or irrelevant were alternated to achieve three aims: determine if cost would persist in irrelevant blocks when relevant and irrelevant blocks were clearly demarcated and irrelevant stimuli were incompatible with the PM task; investigate if costs would be greatest at the start of irrelevant blocks; and determine whether costs would occur when the irrelevant block preceded any relevant blocks. Costs were found in irrelevant blocks and greater cost at the start of the irrelevant blocks suggest the cost may be due in part to participants making decisions about the engagement of conscious resources at transition points.     

Collaboration inflation: Egocentric source monitoring errors following collaborative remembering

Following collaborative remembering, people may adopt their partner's contributions as their own memory. In two studies, we asked people to study partially overlapping lists of words. During collaborative remembering, dyads either worked to include all words no matter who studied them or limited recall to only words studied by both dyad members. This differential focus on source information during collaborative recall impacted performance on a later source memory test. Nonetheless we found frequent source monitoring errors that displayed an egocentric bias. People were more likely to claim their partner's contributions as their own memories than attribute their memories to their partners. In collaborative remembering, people work to construct an agreed upon version of the past that quickly becomes each individual's memory.     

Reinvestment: Examining convergent,discriminant, and criterion validity using psychometric and behavioral measures

Given scarce external validity available to date concerning the reinvestment construct, the aim of this four-study research project was to further explore the validity of the Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale and the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale, using psychometric and behavioral measures. Study 1 showed that deliberative participants had a higher reinvestment tendency than intuitive participants. Study 2 showed that reinvestment was linked to self-consciousness, rumination, perfectionism, and had satisfactory test–retest reliability. Moreover, it provided some potential insights on the development of reinvestment due to parental criticisms. Study 3 indicated that high decision reinvestors performed worse than their low decision reinvestor counterparts in a visual search task under pressure. Study 4 showed that older participants had a lower reinvestment score, and that reinvestment was associated with higher motor imagery ability, challenging the idea that reinvestment can only be seen as detrimental to performance.     

Asymmetric transfer effects between cognitive and affective task disturbances

Task-irrelevant features of a stimulus can disturb performance on a given task, and this can occur for cognitive reasons such as irrelevant stimulus position, and affective reasons such as high stimulus valence. The human brain adapts to such disturbances in order to ensure successful task performance. Adaptations can occur in a transient manner in response to recent events, and they can also be sustained to account for overall probabilities of disturbances. Here, we study the mutual interplay between affective and cognitive task disturbances under conditions of sustained conflict adaptation. More precisely, we examined the trajectory of finger movements in a speeded classification task and investigated whether adaptation to a high probability of spatial disturbances transfers to the impact of affective disturbances (Experiment 1) and whether adaptation to a high probability of affective disturbances transfers to the impact of spatial disturbances (Experiment 2). Our observations point towards an asymmetric transfer from adaptation to affective onto the processing of cognitive disturbances, but not the other way around.     

Why misinformation is reported: evidence from a warning and a source-monitoring task

People report suggested misinformation about a previously witnessed event for manifold reasons, such as social pressure, lack of memory of the original aspect, or a firm belief to remember the misinformation from the witnessed event. In our experiments (N?=?429), which follow Loftus's paradigm, we tried to disentangle the reasons for reporting a central and a peripheral piece of misinformation in a recognition task by examining (a) the impact a warning about possible misinformation has on the error rate, and (b) whether once reported misinformation was actually attributed to the witnessed event in a later source-monitoring (SM) task. Overall, a misinformation effect was found for both items. The warning strongly reduced the misinformation effect, but only for the central item. In contrast, reports of the peripheral misinformation were correctly attributed to the misinformation source or, at least, ascribed to guesswork much more often than the central ones. As a consequence, after the SM task, the initially higher error rate for the peripheral item was even lower than that of the central item. Results convincingly show that the reasons for reporting misinformation, and correspondingly also the potential to avoid them in legal settings, depend on the centrality of the misinformation.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

Mediation and moderation of the effects of watching the angiography screen on patients

It has been reported that allowing patients to watch the coronary angiography screen during the procedure results in psychological benefits. This study aimed to investigate the roles of illness perceptions as mediators of this outcome and to examine whether individual differences in monitoring coping style moderated these effects. The experiment compared patients who were instructed to watch the monitor screen (n = 57) with those who were not (n = 51). Questionnaires were used to measure the research variables at one day and one month after the procedure. Results showed that watching the angiography screen increased patients’ personal and treatment control perceptions that mediated changes in self-assessed health, risk perceptions, negative affect, general and diet outcome expectancies, and diet and physical activity intentions. The behavior-related outcomes were moderated by monitoring coping style. These findings illustrate the significance of illness perceptions, perceived control and monitoring coping style in achieving desirable outcomes among patients undergoing coronary angiography, and reveal opportunities for interventions using medical imaging technologies.     

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.