The Eye of the Beholder: Romantic Goals and Impression Biases

Four experiments investigated the effects of romantic goals on task and social impression formation. The clouded judgment hypothesis holds that romantic goals encourage positive biases on less relationship-relevant dimensions (e.g., task competence). The default positivity hypothesis holds that romantic goals encourage positivity biases on relationship-relevant dimensions in the absence of relevant information. The selective accuracy hypothesis posits that romantic goals encourage accuracy regarding relationship-relevant attributes (e.g., social competence) when relevant information is available. In four studies, male and female perceivers evaluated opposite-sex targets whom they expected to date (romantic goals) or to meet for nonromantic interaction (baseline). Videotaped targets displayed competence or incompetence on task (Experiments 1 and 2) or social (Experiments 3 and 4) dimensions. All three hypotheses were supported.     

Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions

It is typically assumed that while we know other people's mental states by observing and interpreting their behavior, we know our own mental states by introspection, i.e., without interpreting ourselves. In his latest book, The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge, Peter Carruthers [2011. The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues against this assumption. He holds that findings from across the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that self-knowledge of conscious propositional attitudes such as intentions, judgments, and decisions involves a swift and unconscious process of self-interpretation that utilizes the same sensory channels that we employ when working out other people's mental states. I provide an overview of Carruthers’ book before discussing a pathological case that challenges his account of self-knowledge and mentioning empirical evidence that undermines his use of a particular kind of data in his case against introspection of conscious attitudes.     

Reinvestment: Examining convergent,discriminant, and criterion validity using psychometric and behavioral measures

Given scarce external validity available to date concerning the reinvestment construct, the aim of this four-study research project was to further explore the validity of the Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale and the Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale, using psychometric and behavioral measures. Study 1 showed that deliberative participants had a higher reinvestment tendency than intuitive participants. Study 2 showed that reinvestment was linked to self-consciousness, rumination, perfectionism, and had satisfactory test–retest reliability. Moreover, it provided some potential insights on the development of reinvestment due to parental criticisms. Study 3 indicated that high decision reinvestors performed worse than their low decision reinvestor counterparts in a visual search task under pressure. Study 4 showed that older participants had a lower reinvestment score, and that reinvestment was associated with higher motor imagery ability, challenging the idea that reinvestment can only be seen as detrimental to performance.     

Age-related similarities and differences in first impressions of trustworthiness

Trust is a particularly under-studied aspect of social relationships in older age. In the current study, young (n = 35) and older adults (n = 35) completed a series of one-shot social economic trust games in which they invested real money with trustees. There were potential gains with each investment and also a risk of losing everything if the trustee was untrustworthy. The reputation and facial appearance of each trustee were manipulated to make them appear more or less trustworthy. Results revealed that young and older adults invest more money with trustees whose facial appearance and reputation indicate that they are trustworthy rather than untrustworthy. However, older adults were more likely than young to invest with trustees who had a reputation for being untrustworthy. We discuss whether age-related differences in responding to negative information may account for an age-related increase in trust, particularly when trusting someone with a reputation for being uncooperative.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

Judging trustworthiness from faces: Emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments in young children

By adulthood, people judge trustworthiness from appearances rapidly and reliably. However, we know little about these judgments in children. This novel study investigates the developmental trajectory of explicit trust judgments from faces, and the contribution made by emotion cues across age groups. Five‐, 7‐, 10‐year‐olds, and adults rated the trustworthiness of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces with neutral expressions. The same participants also rated faces displaying overt happy and angry expressions, allowing us to investigate whether emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments similarly in children and adults. Results revealed that the ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of faces emerges in childhood, but may not be adult like until 10 years of age. Moreover, we show that emotion cues modulate trust judgments in young children, as well as adults. Anger cues diminished the appearance of trustworthiness for participants from 5 years of age and happy cues increased it, although this effect did not consistently emerge until later in childhood, that is, 10 years of age. These associations also extended to more subtle emotion cues present in neutral faces. Our results indicate that young children are sensitive to facial trustworthiness, and suggest that similar expression cues modulate these judgments in children and adults.     

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.     

Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics

We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.     

Accuracy and assumed similarity in first impressions of personality: Differing associations at different levels of analysis

How are accuracy and assumed similarity associated in first impressions of personality? In a large-scale video perception study, accuracy and assumed similarity were strongly negatively associated across traits, consistent with past research (e.g., Beer & Watson, 2008). However, across perceivers and perceiver-target dyads, the ability to perceive others accurately was independent of the tendency to assume similarity with others. Thus, viewing others in general or specific others as overly similar to the self does not imply viewing them inaccurately. In sum, accuracy and assumed similarity are inversely related when examined across traits but are independent across perceivers and dyads.