Affect and delay of gratification

Three experiments investigated the influence of positive and negative affect manipulations on children's preferences for small immediate versus large delayed rewards. Positive and negative affect were induced via verbal instructions to imagine happy and sad experiences. Elementary school children were randomly assigned to a control condition or to one of several treatment conditions consisting of two affect manipulations: a positive followed by a negative, the reverse, and (in the third experiment) two positives or two negatives. In some conditions (in the second and third experiments) measurement of delayed reward preference followed the first and second affect inductions whereas in other conditions (in the second and third experiments) measurement followed only the second affect manipulation. As predicted, negative affect subjects chose fewer large delayed rewards than did positive affect subjects during the first assessment (p < .02). At the second assessment, comparison among treatment and control conditions revealed the influence of a prior commitment effect which negated the potential influence of a second affect manipulation on preference for delayed rewards.     

The sausage machine: A new two-stage parsing model

It is proposed that the human sentence parsing device assigns phrase structure to word strings in two steps. The first stage parser assigns lexical and phrasal nodes to substrings of roughly six words. The second stage parser then adds higher nodes to link these phrasal packages together into a complete phrase marker.This model of the parser is compared with ATN models, and with the two-stage models of Kimball (1973) and Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974). Our assumption that the units which are shunted from the first stage to the second stage are defined by their length, rather than by their syntactic type, explains the effects of constituent length on perceptual complexity in center embedded sentences and in sentences of the kind that fall under Kimball's principle of Right Association. The particular division of labor between the two parsing units allows us to explain, without appeal to any ad hoc parsing strategies, why the parser makes certain ‘shortsighted’ errors even though, in general, it is able to make intelligent use of all the information that is available to it.     

Intelligence research at the interface between differential and cognitive psychology: Prospects and proposals

There seems to be widespread agreement among theoreticians and methodologists alike that new approaches to studying intelligence should somehow combine the differential and cognitive (information-processing) approaches that have been used in the past, and that the combination should somehow enable the investigator to isolate components of intelligence that are elementary (at some level of analysis). Researchers disagree, however, as to how the differential and cognitive approaches should be combined, and consequently, in how elementary components of intelligence should be isolated and in what they are. How does an investigator choose from among the multiple paths available for theory and research? In this article, I propose some guidelines that may help investigators make informed choices. The article is divided into three major parts. In the first, I propose guidelines for choosing from among various methodologies for studying intelligence, and then describe briefly at least some of the methods that meet (or come close to meeting) these guidelines. In the second part, I propose guidelines for the specification of subtheories (and eventually, full-fledged theories) of intelligence, and illustrate how these guidelines can be met. Finally, I describe the direction in which I believe our subtheories and methods should lead us.     

Some effects of gaze on subjects motivated to seek or to avoid social comparison

In a conceptual replication and extension of Sarnoff and Zimbardo's study (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 356–363), subjects were motivated to seek (Fear Arousal) or avoid (Embarrassment Arousal) social comparison. They were then required to affiliate with another person who either encouraged social comparison by gazing directly at the subject or discouraged it by averting his gaze. This other person was either an appropriate reference person (similar saate) or irrelevant for social comparison purposes. As predicted, Fear subjects liked a companion who looked at them and felt less tense in his presence, while Embarrassed subjects preferred the person who looked away. This interaction occurred only in the Appropriate Reference Person condition, a result consistent with an explanation based on social comparison processes.     

The miscommunication of deception: An adaptive perspective

Undergraduates were videotaped as they told lies and truths about their last job. Later, these undergraduates viewed the videotape and tried to guess which of their fellow subject were lying. Monetary incentives had been offered for successful lying and lie detection. Our subjects showed a “demeanor bias”—some looked honest even when they were lying; others looked dishonest even when they were telling the truth. These differences in apparent honesty were the primary determinant of deception judgments; perceivers' detection skills played a lesser role. Honest-looking subjects were predisposed to perceive others as dishonest. In general, our liars used hand gestures, maintained eye contact, and refrained from smiling. Perceivers misconstrued these behaviors as signs of honesty and could not often detect deceit—unless the lie was being told by a subject who had earlier told the truth. We draw on sociobiological concepts and offer an adaptive perspective on human deceit.     

Cognitive and motivational determinants of children's humor responses

Cognitive and motivational influences on children's humor responses were examined. Forty-eight Caucasian children from three economically heterogeneous schools were tested. Equal numbers of middle SES and lower SES boys and girls from kindergarten and third grade were shown 12 aggression and dependency cartoons of different difficulty levels. Three responses to each cartoon were recorded: mirth, funniness rating, and comprehension score. Results support aspects of both psychodynamic and cognitive theories of humor response. All children preferred aggressive themes to dependency themes, and third graders especially showed attenuated response to dependency cartoons. Funniness ratings decreased as difficulty levels increased. IQ, as assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-R, was positively related to humor. Mirth responses and funniness ratings increased as comprehension increased.     

A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood

A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood is proposed. The theory comprises three parts: a contextual part that emphasizes the role of intelligence in successful adaptation to the environment; a componential part that specifies the mental mechanisms and processes underlying intelligent behavior; and an experiential part that indicates that intelligence is best manifested in instances in which the task or situation requiring the application of these processes is relatively novel or is becoming automatized. A selective and brief review of the literature on adult intellectual development is provided as evidence for the triarchic theory. The triarchic theory is then compared with four other theoretical approaches to adult intellectual development. It is argued that the triarchic theory provides new insights regarding the ways in which intelligence changes from early to middle to late adulthood and suggests certain properties of tasks and situations that make them more or less useful as measures of intelligence at various points in adult intellectual development.     

Aptness in metaphor

We propose that in understanding a metaphor, an individual sees a concept from one class or domain in terms of its similarity in two different respects to a concept from another class or domain. The two kinds of similarity are within-domain similarity, or the degree to which two concepts occupy similar positions with respect to their own class or domain; and between-domain similarity, or the degree to which the classes or domains occupied by the concepts are themselves similar. To test this dual notion of similarity, we obtained ratings of the aptness of 64 metaphors from one group of subjects and ratings of their comprehensibility from another group of subjects. The terms of the metaphors had been scaled (based on the ratings of pretest subjects) to give measures of distance both within and between domains. Aptness of metaphors related positively to betweendomain distance, negatively to within-domain distance, and not at all to overall distance. Metaphors are thus perceived as more apt to the extent that their terms occupy similar positions within domains that are not very similar to each other. Comprehensibility also related to aptness. In a second experiment, subjects ranked a set of terms as possible completions for metaphors. For both groups of subjects in this experiment, the rank of an alternative's within-domain distance correlated with its relative popularity. Quantitative models, patterned after a model proposed by D. Rumelhart and A. A. Abrahamson (Cognitive Psychology, 1973, 5, 1–28) for analogical reasoning, afforded significant prediction of the choices of the group of subjects in which all the possible completions of a metaphor were from a single domain. The same models did not predict the choices of a group of subjects in which the possible completions of the metaphors were from different domains.     

A transitive-chain theory of syllogistic reasoning

A new theory of syllogistic reasoning, called the transitive-chain theory, is presented. The transitive-chain theory proposes that information about set relations is represented in memory by pairs of informational components. The theory further proposes that information about set relations is integrated by applying a small set of rules to transitive chains of these set relations. The rules that are applied to these chains are specified in detail. The theory is cast in terms of information-processing models for variants of the syllogistic reasoning task, and then mathematical models that quantify each of these information-processing models are presented. In a series of five experiments, the transitive-chain theory provides a good account of the response-choice data for syllogisms with various types of content, quantifiers, and logical relations (categorical and conditional). The results of these experiments offer tentative answers to four issues in the theory of syllogistic reasoning: (a) representation of premise information; (b) combination of premise information; (c) sources of difficulty in syllogistic reasoning; and (d) generality of the processes used in syllogistic reasoning.     

Novelty-seeking,novelty-finding,and the developmental continuity of intelligence

This article suggests that novelty-seeking and novelty-finding, as well as the ability to learn and reason with novel kinds of concepts, are critical aspects of intelligence at all ages from infancy, onward. The results of studies by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn and by Fagan and McGrath regarding intelligence in infancy are reviewed, and these results are found to be compatible with some of my own results regarding intelligence in adulthood. It is suggested that a major aspect of intelligence, attitude toward and performance with novel kinds of concepts, is continuous in nature throughout the life span, although by necessity, they must be measured in different ways at different times of life.