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71.
John E. Fisk Dean A. Marshall Paul Rogers Rosemary Stock 《Scandinavian journal of psychology》2019,60(5):405-420
Probability judgment is a vital part of many aspects of everyday life. In the present paper, we present a new theory of the way in which individuals produce probability estimates for joint events: conjunctive and disjunctive. We propose that a majority of individuals produce conjunctive (disjunctive) estimates by making a quasi‐random adjustment, positive or negative, from the less (more) likely component probability with the other component playing no obvious role. In two studies, we produce evidence supporting propositions that follow from our theory. First, the component probabilities do appear to play the distinct roles we propose in determining the joint event probabilities. Second, contrary to probability theory and other accounts of probability judgment, we show that the conjunctive‐less likely probability difference is unrelated to the more likely disjunctive probability difference (in normative theory these quantities are identical). In conclusion, while violating the norms of probability judgment, we argue that estimates produced in the manner we propose will be close enough to the normative values especially given the changing nature of the external environment and the incomplete nature of available information. 相似文献
72.
The general assumption that people fail to notice discrepancy between their answer and the normative answer in the conjunction fallacy task has been challenged by the theory of Logical Intuition. This theory suggests that people can detect the conflict between the heuristic and normative answers even if they do not always manage to inhibit their intuitive choice. This theory gained support from the finding that people report lower levels of confidence in their choice after they commit the conjunction fallacy compared to when their answer is not in conflict with logic. In four experiments we asked the participants to give probability estimations to the options of the conflict and no-conflict versions of the tasks in the original set-up of the experiment or in a three-option design. We found that participants perceive probabilities for the options of the conflict version less similar than for the no-conflict version. As people are less confident when choosing between more similar options, this similarity difference is proposed to serve as a mediator in the task in a way that the conflict and no-conflict conditions have their effects on confidence ratings through manipulating the similarity of the answer options. 相似文献
73.
The claim that moral philosophers have something to learn from recent neo-Darwinian theory cannot be sustained – at least,
not in the case of the three theses characteristic of the latter on which I concentrate. The first thesis, reductionism, is
open to some serious, and familiar, objections. Neo-Darwinism can escape those objections only by weakening its position to
a point at which it can no longer be described as distinctively reductionist. The second, atavism, mistakenly attempts to
generalise from the apparent persistence of` ‘vestigial’ behaviour patterns. Third, neo-Darwinists are frequently guilty of
a number of confusions over the relation between fact and value. In conclusion, I point out that neo-Darwinism derives a certain
ideological dynamic from the misleading supposition that patterns of explanation which succeed in one area necessarily apply
in others.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
74.
大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman(1983)使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li(1994,2004)提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释 相似文献
75.
Louise Cummings 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):171-188
The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious
diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action
various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially
uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty.
I will argue that this framework should have reasoning at its center and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction
and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles,
I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument
that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this article, I want to extend that
analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions
of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices
of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging
infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UK’s BSE crisis, a crisis that posed
a significant threat to both human and animal health.
相似文献
Louise CummingsEmail: |
76.
William A. Rottschaefer 《Zygon》2000,35(2):253-286
Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency. 相似文献
77.
Scott Jacobs 《Argumentation》2006,20(4):421-442
The traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy cannot be readily reconciled. Doing so requires
escaping the following argument: All argumentation involves rhetorical strategies. All rhetorical strategies are violations
of logical or dialectical ideals. All violations of logical or dialectical ideals are fallacies. Normative pragmatics provides
a perspective in which rhetorical strategies can be seen to have the potential for constructive contributions to argumentation
and in which fallacies are not simply violations of ideals. One kind of constructive contribution, framing moves, is illustrated
with the case of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 TV campaign commercial known as the Daisy ad. 相似文献
78.
Nicholas Shackel 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(3):295-320
Abstract: Many of the philosophical doctrines purveyed by postmodernists have been roundly refuted, yet people continue to be taken in by the dishonest devices used in proselytizing for postmodernism. I exhibit, name, and analyse five favourite rhetorical manoeuvres: Troll's Truisms, Motte and Bailey Doctrines, Equivocating Fulcra, the Postmodernist Fox Trot, and Rankly Relativising Fields. Anyone familiar with postmodernist writing will recognise their pervasive hold on the dialectic of postmodernism and come to judge that dialectic as it ought to be judged. 相似文献
79.
Harry Weger Jr. 《Argumentation》2001,15(3):313-330
The purpose of this research review is to examine the usefulness of reconstructing problematic interpersonal conflict behavior as violations of rules for critical discussions. Dialectical reconstruction of interpersonal conflict behavior sheds light on the ways in which dialectical fallacies influence not only the course of a critical discussion, but also the personal and relationship outcomes experienced by arguers. Conflict sequences such as cross complaining and demand/withdraw are shown to be problematic, in part, because they prevent parties from resolving their difference through rational dialogue. The paper concludes by presenting some implications of the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of interpersonal conflict behavior. 相似文献
80.
Katarzyna Paprzycka 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(1):96-119
Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear. 相似文献