Modeling,Truth, and Philosophy

Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth.     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.     

Confucian Dynamism,the Role of Money and Consumer Ethical Beliefs: An Exploratory Study in Taiwan

Consumer ethics is the moral principles and standards that guide consumers to determine the certain consumption behaviors are ethically right or wrong. Whereas cultural and personal dimensions are crucial constructs affecting individual ethical attitudes and behaviors, few studies consider Confucian dynamism and the role of money in consumer ethics. Confucian dynamism, a cultural dimension based on Confucianism, has played a central role in guiding moral obligations and ethics in human relations in several East Asian countries. Thus, this study tested its hypotheses using a sample of 521 respondents obtained via a systematic random sampling technique. The authors find that individuals with a higher tendency to Confucian dynamism are less tolerant of unethical practices. These findings also show that the role of money partially influences consumer ethical beliefs. Finally, we examine the impact of demographic variables and find age and education affect consideration of ethical values.     

Skepticism,naturalism, pyrrhonism

Skepticism and naturalism bear important connections with one another. Do they conflict or are they different sides of the same coin? In this paper, by considering the ways in which Sextus and Hume have examined these issues, I offer a Pyrrhonian response to Penelope Maddy's attempt to reject skepticism within the form of naturalism that she calls “second philosophy” (Maddy, 2007, 2017) and to Timothy Williamson's attempt to avoid skepticism from emerging within his knowledge-first approach (Williamson, 2000). Some lessons about Pyrrhonism result.     

Reflective,Critical, and Reconstructing Contemporary Chinese Ethics

Contemporary Chinese ethics faces two theoretical tasks: expansion in breadth and exploration in depth. The former refers to the opening of the problem area, and the latter refers to the deepening of ethics itself. To get out of the dilemma that academic results in the area are abundant in quantity but low in quality, contemporary Chinese ethics should expand and deepen in the three dimensions, namely, “no longer,” “being” and “not yet.” Within the framework of “no longer,” efforts should be made to deepen the studies of the history of moral concept and practice, and the ethics of culture from the perspective of genetics; with regard to the perspective of “being,” the ethical reflection on public crisis, system and Lnstitutional ethics, the dilemma of virtue theory and normative theory, and the conflicts and generalization between different moral paradigms will become the difficulties that require in-depth analysis and demonstration. As for the contemporary Chinese ethics towards “not yet,” attention must be paid to the duality of modern technology, the origin of human ethics based on building a community with a shared future for mankind and the moral philosophy that goes deep into people’s minds. To complete the above theoretical tasks, one must have judgment, thinking, and willingness, which can only be cultivated in the experience and thinking of “practical” life.     

From Copenhagen to the consulting room: Pauli and Jung in Copenhagen

In this paper the city of Copenhagen is used as a starting point to highlight some critical historical events, both concerning the exchange of ideas between the physicist Wolfgang Pauli and C.G. Jung and the history of psychotherapy in Scandinavia. Pauli's years in Copenhagen under the influence of Niels Bohr and his philosophy prepared him mentally to receiveC.G. Jung's ideas. The paper also recounts the one occasion that Jung was in Scandinavia, attending the 9th conference of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy in Copenhagen, just before going to New York in 1937 to give his final seminars on Pauli's dreams. The reason for focusing on these particular events is that they also constitute part of the history of the reception of psychodynamic psychology in Sweden and Scandinavia.     

Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference

Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the properties which identify a term's referent are the subject of an implicit agreement. Recently, survey versions of the experiments have been thought to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent. Proposing a revisionary interpretation, this article argues, first, that Kripke's Cicero/Feynman experiment reveals that every name user knows enough to be capable of identifying the same individual as the name's most informed users. Second, the article shows that Kripke's presentation of the Gödel/Jonah experiment is ambiguous with respect to the properties attributed to the referent. Disambiguated, the experiment fails to reveal that name users may be mistaken in every unique property they attribute. Since the experiment's ambiguity is replicated in survey presentations, cross‐cultural variation in survey response fails to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent.     

Normative Ethics after Pragmatic Naturalism

Philip Kitcher presents an ambitious account of pragmatic naturalism that incorporates an explanatory story of the emergence and development of ethics, a metaethical perspective on progress, and a normative stance for moral theorizing. This article contends that Kitcher's normative stance is incompatible with the explanatory and metaethical components of his project. Instead, pragmatic naturalists should endorse a normative ethics that is experimental, grounded in practice, and acutely aware of cognitive and informational limitations. In particular, the ethical project would benefit from endorsing empirical work on participatory democracy for the identification of mechanisms to guide us on deep moral conflicts.     

RELIGION IS EASY,BUT SCIENCE IS HARD … UNDERSTANDING McCAULEY'S THESIS

Robert N. McCauley's new book Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (2011) presents a new paradigm for investigating the relationship between science and religion by exploring the cognitive foundations of religious belief and scientific knowledge. McCauley's contention is that many of the differences and disagreements regarding religion and science are the product of distinct features of human cognition that process these two domains of knowledge very differently. McCauley's thesis provides valuable insights into this relationship while not necessarily leading to a dismissive view of theology or religious belief. His paradigm allows the research lens to focus on cognitive differences in processing scientific versus religious information and the important role of automatic, unconscious, and intuitive cognitive processes in understanding both the natural and supernatural worlds.