Methodological Considerations in the Neuropsychological Study of Central Nervous System Underarousal with a Specific Emphasis on Coma

Several obstacles exist that impede the scientific study of pathological underarousal (stupor and coma). For instance, there is a lack of a clear, rational, standardized taxonomy with which to describe the phenomenon. Moreover, there is considerable confusion of the construct of arousal with other neurobehavioral constructs. The field also suffers from a general lack of acceptably reliable and valid instruments, especially measures of long-term outcome. Additionally, current treatments for chronic pathological underarousal are frequently presumptive and applied haphazardly, and thus do little to elucidate the process of recovery. It is suggested that biomedical and neuropsychological approaches to the study and treatment of pathological underarousal are complementary and that it is useful to view pathological underarousal as a behavioral, as well as a medical, phenomenon.     

Culture,Contexts, and Directions in Russian Post-Soviet Philosophy

Studies in East European Thought - The author examines, historically and theoretically, issues related to the state and current tendencies of post-Soviet Russian philosophy. The accent falls on the...     

New Philosophies of Science in North America – Twenty Years Later

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Consequences and antecedents of debilitative precompetitive emotions

The consequences and antecedents of debilitative precompetitive emotions were examined in two studies. Study 1 explored the relationship between debilitative precompetitive emotions and coping effectiveness. Thirteen players from a semi-professional women's handball team filled out a diary concerning stress, emotion, and coping before and after eight competitions. Debilitative precompetitive emotions were linked negatively with coping effectiveness, as well as with subjective individual performance and objective team performance. Study 2 sought to understand the noncompetitive antecedents of debilitative precompetitive emotions. We interviewed nine players from those who participated in study 1. The main themes that emerged were the coach and the transition to elite status. According to this multi-methodological, in depth analysis, issues related to the coach and the transition to elite status lead athletes to experience precompetitive emotions that they appraise as debilitative to performance. These emotions were then linked to lowered coping effectiveness and decreased performance.     

Translating close-up research into action: a critical reflection

This paper argues that simple dissemination models do not work. One of the strengths of close-up research, with its emphasis on depth and understanding, is that it can identify why things are as they are and, by extension, when we identify wrongs seek to challenge them. The paper suggests, however, that making a difference is fraught with contradictions and that the translation from research to action is far from straightforward. We illustrate these tensions by reflecting on our experiences of conducting two projects for the UK Higher Education Academy. At the same time as exploring the slippages of translation and loss of criticality, however, we want to defend notion of praxis as theoretically informed change for critical social purposes. This involves a view of making a difference and research that moves beyond thinking of research as a discrete act and invokes the significance of corporate agency and the possibilities of acting collectively.     

PHILOSOPHER OF PRECISION AND SOUL: INTRODUCING WALKER PERCY

This article introduces the work of philosopher‐novelist Walker Percy to the Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science readership. After some biographical and contextual preliminaries, I suggest that the conceptual collecting feature to Percy's work is his critique of abstractionism manifest in a tripartite congruence of Cartesianism, derivatively misapplied science, and social atomism.     

两种医学模式的方法论问题评价

生物医学模式和生物心理社会医学模式是对医学发展具有重要意义的两种医学模式,它们在对疾病和健康的看法上形成不同的思维方式;且这种思维方式在人们进行医学科研中具有不同的方法论作用。     

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness

In this paper two philosophical issues are discussed that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that 'happiness', as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods.     

Theology, Science, and Postmodernism: Responding to Stanley Grenz

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values.