10～12岁儿童在平衡秤任务上的规则使用及其复杂性

以256名10～12岁儿童为被试,采取规则评估方法探讨了儿童在平衡秤任务上的规则使用类型及其年龄特点,并尝试使用认知复杂性和控制理论对此加以分析和解释.结果表明:(1)除了Siegler所谓的四种规则和补偿规则以外,儿童还使用了规则ⅢA和距离规则,其中规则ⅢA并不特指单一的规则,而是代表儿童在掌握了规则Ⅲ之后向更高级的规则Ⅳ发展的不稳定期和过渡期;(2)10～12岁儿童中使用规则Ⅲ的人数显著多于使用补偿规则的人数,对此认知复杂性和控制理论能够提供较好的解释;(3)规则Ⅰ仍是10～12岁儿童使用的主要规则,并非Siegler认为的主要是4、5岁儿童使用此规则.     

儒家伦理与情感

The Confucian understanding of emotions and their ethical importance confirms and exemplifies the contemporary Western renewed understanding of the nature of emotions. By virtue of a systematic conceptual analysis of Confucian ethics, one can see that, according to Confucians, the ethical significance of emotions, lies in that an ethical life is also emotional and virtues are inclinational. And a further exploration shows that the reason for the ethical significance is both that emotions are heavenly-endowed and that there exists a union of emotions and reason in Confucian ethics. This will constitute a challenge to the so-called mainstream ethical theories which have been popularly engaged in seeking justifications for abstract moral rules. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2007, (3): 86–92     

身与身外:儒家的一个未决问题

Fei Xiaotong's thoughts on the Confucian system of interpersonal relationships actually indicated that the Confucian theory of social cooperation leads itself to an unsettled paradox, that is, there is a lack of universal theoretical construction in the Confucian moral system. Confucian theory does not extend beyond practical circumstances. Instead, its universal principles always disappear in specific circumstances. Because of its long established position in mainstream dialogue, Confucianism failed to reflect on its flaws, but this paradox has been revealed in the face of modern challenges. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao 中国人民大学学报 (Journal of Renmin University of China), 2007, (1): 15–21     

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Abstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called “aesthetic judgements.” Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called “secondary sense.” Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.     

Shades of disengagement: high school dropouts speak out

The purpose of this study was to describe how dropouts navigate their educational journeys. Eighty dropouts participated to individual interviews which were recorded and transcribed. The data analysis yielded three broad categories in answering the research question. Setting the stage in the family and the school, the dropouts described their teetering between in and out of school contexts and proceeded to explain how they ended their educational journey. For 20 dropouts, family turmoil represented a pervasive force negatively influencing their schooling. For 24 dropouts, problems in school set the stage for dropping out. Teetering represented juggling strategies to prolongand to sabotage the journey, while the end of the journey occurred as a result of a pivotal moment (48%) or a gradual fade out (52%) from the school context.

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

Recovering Early Modern Women Writers

Feminist work in the history of philosophy has been going on for several decades. Some scholars have focused on the ways philosophical concepts are themselves gendered. Others have recovered women writers who were well known in their own time but forgotten in ours, while still others have firmly placed into a philosophical context the works of women writers long celebrated within other disciplines in the humanities. The recovery of women writers has challenged the myth that there are no women in the history of philosophy, but it has not eradicated it. What, we may ask, is impeding our progress? This paper argues that so often we treat early modern women philosophers’ texts in ways that are different from, or inconsistent with, the explicit commitments of the analytic tradition, and in so doing, we may be triggering our audiences to reject these women as philosophers, and their texts as philosophical. Moreover, this is the case despite our intention to achieve precisely the opposite effect.     

Kant’s,Hegel’s and Cousin’s Perceptions of China and Non-European Cultures: Racialism,Historicism and Universalism,and the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to discuss some assumptions of comparative philosophy by providing a critical analysis of Hegel’s perception of China and other non-European cultures in relation to Kant’s anthropological works. The main assumption of comparative philosophy is that the temporal-cognitive distance between Plato and Diderot is irrelevant compared to the geographic-cultural distance between Plato and Confucius or Diderot and Dai Zhen. This paper will demonstrate that this culturalist assumption is also a legacy of Hegel’s history of philosophy, whose anthropological basis and historicist framework needs to be deconstructed. Finally, this paper will make reference to Victor Cousin, the French philosopher who introduced German philosophy in France, to show how this thinker’s adaptation of Hegel’s history of philosophy allows us to propose a more inclusive conception of the value of non-European cultures’ intellectual productions and to elaborate, on this basis, a radically non-culturalist framework for comparative philosophy.     

肺癌肿瘤干细胞研究的科学方法论

肺癌肿瘤干细胞研究是肺癌与肿瘤干细胞学说交叉所形成的新研究领域,将根本改变临床肺癌防治的方式。反思从肿瘤干细胞学说的提出到肺癌肿瘤干细胞研究,树立自然辨证观念,用科学方法论指导肺癌肿瘤干细胞研究。