On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis

In this article the standard philosophical method involving intuition‐driven conceptual analysis is challenged in a new way. This orthodox approach to philosophy takes analysanda to be the specifications of the content of concepts in the form of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Here it is argued that there is no adequate account of what necessary and sufficient conditions are. So, the targets of applications of the standard philosophical method so understood are not sufficiently well understood for this method to be dependable.     

Ernest Gellner's Words and Things: A Case Study of Empirical Philosophy

This article considers how Ernest Gellner used sociology and anthropology to attack ordinary language philosophy in Words and Things. It argues that this attack can be seen as a part of the movement to make philosophy more empirical or “naturalized,” something that has not been generally noted. It also discusses what general lessons to draw from Words and Things regarding how empirical knowledge should be used in philosophy. Among other things, the article argues that one important lesson is that empirical philosophers should make more use of “soft” social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology, and not focus exclusively on “harder” disciplines, such as physics and experimental psychology. Another upshot of the discussion is that philosophers should draw on empirical knowledge not only when they solve problems but also when they formulate them.     

Reducing the risk of bias in health behaviour change trials: Improving trial design,reporting or bias assessment criteria? A review and case study

Objective: It has been suggested that randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of health behaviour change (HBC) interventions are less rigorously designed than – for example– drug trials. This study presents an approach to clarifying whether this is due to poor trial design, incomplete trial reporting and/or the inappropriateness of commonly applied risk of bias assessment criteria.

Design: First, a framework of key sources of bias and common strategies for reducing bias risk is developed based on a literature review. Second, we describe the design of a multi-site RCT evaluating the cost-effectiveness of an HIV-treatment adherence intervention (case study). The choices made by the multidisciplinary team trying to minimise the risk of bias are compared against the risk of bias framework.

Main outcome measures: Implementation of common strategies for reducing the risk of bias in the case study; alternative or additional strategies applied; a justification for each deviation from the risk of bias framework.

Results: Most of the common strategies for reducing the risk of bias could be implemented. Alternative strategies were developed for minimising the risk of performance bias and contamination. Several additional, domain-specific risk of bias strategies were implemented.

Conclusions: The literature provides useful guidance for reducing the risk of bias in HBC trials. Yet, the case study suggests that HBC trial designers may face specific challenges that require alternative/additional measures for reducing the risk of bias. Using the risk of bias justification table (RATIONALE) could lead to better-designed HBC trials, more comprehensive trial reports and the data necessary for evaluating the appropriateness of commonly applied risk of bias assessment criteria to HBC trials.     

What Not to Multiply Without Necessity

The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.     

A “RESOLUTE” LATER WITTGENSTEIN?

Abstract: “Resolute readings” initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well—a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall's Wittgenstein's Private Language (2007) as well as by Phil Hutchinson's “What's the Point of Elucidation?” (2007) and Rom Harré's “Grammatical Therapy and the Third Wittgenstein” (2008). The present article shows that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute reading of the later Wittgenstein's work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein's philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of “substantial nonsense” or espousing the resolute readers' preferred option of nonsense austerity. If the interpretation here is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein's radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion.     

A New Methodology for Reporting the Status of Community Health Improvement in the United States

Objective To assure that Healthy Communities are achieved, a tracking methodology is proposed using four health improvement categories. Methods Counties are classified as having met or not met nine HP2010 mortality targets and as improving or not improving, creating four categories of community health improvement – static, progressing, exemplary, and maintaining. Results Exemplary counties make up 1.7%32.7% of counties, counties have both improved and met the HP2010 target during the period. Across all indicators, a large proportion remains of counties that have neither met the HP2010 target nor improved (33.572.8%). Conclusions Understanding why, how, and in what ways communities move from static to maintaining categories is necessary to guiding every local public health system to community health improvement.     

医学生临床实习应掌握的几种哲学思维方式

为适应全球卫生事业的迅猛发展,面对医学教育落后于医学发展的现状,转化医学教育迫在眉睫。在第三代“以系统为基础”的教育改革中,培养医学生的哲学思维无疑是其重要环节之一。思维方式必须在医学生步入临床时就要开始正确培养,一旦开始阶段就养成不正确的思维方式、不但会导致医疗过程中的失误,而且再想改变将会有很大难度。本文通过对医学哲学重要性的探讨,剖析医学生哲学思维的不足,阐述了医学生,临床实习过程中应掌握的几种哲学思维方式。旨在提高医学生的哲学理念,促进以岗位胜任能力为导向的医学教育转型发展。     

Strengthening Biblical Historicity vis-à-vis Minimalism, 1992–2008 and Beyond,Part 2.2: The Literature of Perspective,Critique, and Methodology,Second Half

This series of articles covers scholarly works in English which can, at least potentially, be associated with a generally positive view of biblical historicity regarding periods preceding the Israelites’ return from exile. Part 2 covers works that treat the methodological issues at the center of the maximalist–minimalist debate. Parts 3–5 will cover works on evidences.

This article completes the coverage, begun in the preceding article, of works that are neither maximalist nor minimalist, by treating select publications of Anthony J. Frendo, Nadav Na’aman, Israel Finkelstein, Andrew G. Vaughn, Baruch Halpern, Robert D. Miller II, and H. G. M. Williamson.

It then discusses works on methodology by authors who espouse biblical historicity unless it is proven wrong, who are often called maximalists. It introduces these through the comments of Craig G. Bartholomew, then treats select works by Kenneth A. Kitchen, Jens Bruun Kofoed, Richard E. Averbeck, Iain W. Provan, V. Philips Long, and James K. Hoffmeier.     

In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy

Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad conception of experimental philosophy.