The Ethics of NIMBY Conflicts

NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) refers to an oppositional attitude from local residents against some risk generating facility that they have been chosen to host either by government or industry. The attitude is claimed to be characteristic of someone who is positive to a facility but who wants someone else to be its host. Since siting cannot be provided if everyone has this attitude, society ends up in a worse situation. The attitude is claimed to be egoistic and irrational. Here it is argued that the NIMBY critique rests on questionable assumptions about the rightness of weighing total benefit against total cost. This weighing-principle will sometimes have to yield so that the rights of individuals can be acknowledged.

Ethical Problems Inherent in Psychological Research based on Internet Communication as Stored Information

This paper deals with certain ethical problems inherent in psychological research based on internet communication as stored information. Section 1 contains an analysis of research on Internet debates. In particular, it takes into account a famous example of deception for psychology research purposes. In section 2, the focus is on research on personal data in texts published on the Internet. Section 3 includes an attempt to formulate some ethical principles and guidelines, which should be regarded as fundamental in research on stored information.     

If Not Him, It Would Have Been His Brother

The Arab-Muslim countries have remained pre-modern as opposed to other countries that have been able to find a balance between their local culture and a universal culture. Arab-Muslims have remained tied to their cultural specificity, a fact which, in my opinion, is related to a complex based on the defensiveness of the former colonized. This complex drives them to remain closed to any cultural communication and therefore to any opening capable of allowing the emergence of a sensibility to their rights as human beings, or even the development of a will to bring about a democratic environment in their countries.     

Political Intolerance,Right and Left

Research recently published in Political Psychology suggested that political intolerance is more strongly predicted by political conservatism than liberalism. Our findings challenge that conclusion. Participants provided intolerance judgments of several targets and the political objective of these targets (left‐wing vs. right‐wing) was varied between subjects. Across seven judgments, conservatism predicted intolerance of left‐wing targets, while liberalism predicted intolerance of right‐wing targets. These relationships were fully mediated by perceived threat from targets. Moreover, participants were biased against directly opposing political targets: conservatives were more intolerant of a left‐wing target than the opposing right‐wing target (e.g., pro‐gay vs. anti‐gay rights activists), while liberals were more intolerant of a right‐wing target than the opposing left‐wing target. These findings are discussed within the context of the existing political intolerance and motivated reasoning literatures.     

WILLIAM AMES'S CALVINIST AMBIGUITY OVER FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Reformed Christianity's qualified embrace of freedom of conscience is perhaps best represented by William Ames (1576–1633). This essay explores Ames's interpretation of conscience, his understanding of its relationship to natural law, Scripture, and civil authority, and his vacillation on the subject of conscientious freedom. By rooting his interpretation of conscience in natural law, Ames provided a foundation for conscience as an authority whose convictions are binding and worthy of some civil respect and freedom. At the same time, his Puritan worldview ultimately required the deference of conscience to the superior manifestations of divine law in Scripture and civil institutions. As a result, Ames provided raw ingredients for a theological doctrine of freedom of conscience despite his unwillingness to commend the idea himself consistently. In this way, Ames symbolizes an ambiguity on freedom of conscience characteristic of the broader Reformed tradition.     

Moral Emotions

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi‐dimensional and relative to human realities. The “axiological” position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.     

构建病人自主择医的现代医学伦理观

“病人选择医生”这一重大改革举措可以得到病人自主择医权和改革实践的有力辩护与支持,同时,为使其形成有序合理格局,并进入可持续发展的正常轨道,也亟需以解决现实重大问题为基础,着力的构建病人自主择医权的现代医学伦理观。这个医学伦理观应由现代的伦理理念框架1管理伦理框架、程序伦理框架构筑成主体框架。     

Relationships,not boundaries

The authors find it more useful to payattention to relationships than to boundaries.By focusing attention on bounded, individualpsychological issues, the metaphor ofboundaries can distract helping professionalsfrom thinking about inequities of power. Itoversimplifies a complex issue, inviting us toignore discourses around gender, race, class,culture, and the like that support injustice,abuse, and exploitation. Making boundaries acentral metaphor for ethical practice can keepus from critically examining the effects ofdistance, withdrawal, and non-participation.The authors describe how it is possible toexamine the practical, moral, and ethicaleffects of our participation in relationshipsby focusing on just relationships rather thanon boundaries. They give illustrations andclinical examples of relationally-focusedethical practices that derive from a narrativeapproach to therapy.     

Traversing boundaries: clinical ethics,moral experience,and the withdrawal of life supports

While many have suggested that to withdraw medical interventions is ethically equivalent to withholding them, the moral complexity of actually withdrawing life supportive interventions from a patient cannot be ignored. Utilizing interplay between expository and narrative styles, and drawing upon our experiences with patients, families, nurses, and physicians when life supports have been withdrawn, we explore the changeable character of boundaries in end-of-life situations. We consider ways in which boundaries imply differences – for example, between cognition and performance – and how the encounter with boundaries can generate altered meanings important for understanding decisions and actions in these contexts. We conclude that the reliance on mere roles to support the moral weight of withdrawing medical interventions is inadequate. Roles that lead us to such moments are exceeded by the responsibility encountered in such moments. And here, we suggest, is the momentous character of withdrawal: it presents the grave astonishment, the trembling awe, in the not-being-there of the other in death.