Delay or rate of food delivery as determiners of response rate

Pigeons were confronted with two keys: a green food key and a white changeover key. Food became available for a peck to the green key after variable intervals of time (mean = 113 seconds). A single peck on the changeover key changed the color of the food key to red for a fixed period of time during which the timing of the variable-interval schedule in green was suspended and the switching option eliminated and after which the conditions associated with green were reinstated. In Experiment 1 a single food presentation was obtainable during each red-key period after a minimum delay timed from the switch. This delay and the duration of the red-key period were held constant during a condition but varied between conditions (delay = 2.5, 7.5, 15, or 30 seconds; red-period duration = 30, 60, 120, 240, or 480 seconds). In Experiment 2 additional food presentations were scheduled during a 240-second red-key period with the delay to the first food delivery held constant at 30 seconds, and the delays to later food deliveries varied over conditions. Considering the data from both experiments, the rate of switching to red was a decreasing function of the delay to the first food, the delay to the second food, and perhaps the delay to the third food after a switch. There was no clear evidence that the rate of food in the red-key period made an independent contribution. The ordering of response rates among conditions was consistent with the view that each food presentation after a response adds an incremental effect to the rate of the response and that each food presentation's contribution is a decreasing function of its delay timed from the response.     

Context, categorization, and recall: The “change-of-standard” effect

A psycholinguistically based conception of the relation among context, categorization, and memory is tested by examining what happens to people's memory of an object when the object is initially categorized in terms of the context in which it appears, but, when the object is later recalled, this context is no longer salient. Subjects read about the sentencing decisions of a target trial judge in the context of other trial judges who consistently gave either higher sentences or lower sentences than the target judge. As predicted, subjects tended to categorize the target judge as “lenient” in the former, harsh context condition, and as “harsh” in the latter, lenient context condition. A week later, subjects read about the sentencing decisions of some additional judges, and then recalled the sentencing decisions of the target judge they had read about the week before. Across the two sessions, either a harsh, moderate, or lenient category norm for judges' sentencing decisions was established by having subjects read about decisions that involved either high, medium, or low sentences, respectively. The results indicated that subjects recalled the target judge's decisions by interpreting their prior categorization of his behavior in terms of the category norm established across the two sessions rather than the original context. Thus, subjects who were exposed to the same target in the same circumstances, and initially categorized the target in the same way, nevertheless remembered his behavior differently if their category norm was different at the moment of recall. Other types of “change of standard” and their implications for human judgment and memory are discussed.     

Some theory and results for metrics for bounded response scales

In an earlier note, a new metric for bounded response scales (MBR) was introduced which resembles the city-block metric but is bounded above. It was suggested the MBR may be more appropriate than minkowski metrics for data obtained with bounded response scales. In this article, some formal properties of the MBR are investigated and it is shown that it is indeed a metric. Empirical predictions are then derived from the MBR and contrasted with those of a “monotonicity hypothesis,” which holds that dissimilarity judgements tend to be biased towards overestimation of larger distances, and with the predictions of the minkowski metrics, which imply additivity of collinear segments. Some empirical results are presented which contradict the monotonicity hypothesis and the minkowski metrics, and favor the MBR. Finally, the logic used to motivate the MBR is invoked to define a subadditive concatenation for bounded norms in the one-dimensional case, which may be useful in psychophysical work where the upper bounds are often real, rather than due to the response scale. This concatenation predicts understimation for doubling and overestimation for halving and middling tasks.     

A characterization of stochastic independence by association,with an application to random utility theory

A characterization of stochastic independence in terms of association of random variables is given. The result is applied to yield a simple proof of the Sattath-Tversky inequality without continuity assumptions.     

Some deterministic models of concept identification

It is shown that deterministic models can compete effectively with stochastic models in summarizing concept identification behavior. Three groups of deterministic models are examined. Examination of individual learners' trial by trial behavior in a concept experiment shows: (1) One person exhibited behavior consistent with a Hypothesis Permutation (HP) model despite being a nonlearner who showed no evidence of improvement over a period of 24 trials. However, when all 50 persons studied in each of two treatment groups were examined, only 22 members of one group and 10 of the other showed no inconsistencies with deterministic local consistency assumptions. (2) Certain deterministic computer programs could find at least one satisfactory order for predicting all responses by 18 of the 22 consistent solvers and 6 of the 10 consistent solvers, respectively, in the two groups just mentioned. For these 24 persons, then, a less restrictive deterministic model is adequate than for the others. (3) Those 38 original members of the first treatment group who met a stringent learning criterion were compared with respect to predictions generated by stochastic and mathematized deterministic models. One deterministic model (RSS-U 9-state) is in some respects the best of the models examined, but this success is a partial reflection of estimating eight parameters from the data.     

An axiomatization of the ratio/difference representation

If ≥_r and ≥_d are two quaternary relations on an arbitrary set A, a ratio/difference representation for ≥_r and ≥_d is defined to be a function f that represents ≥_r as an ordering of numerical ratios and ≥_d as an ordering of numerical differences. Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971, Foundations of Measurement. New York, Academic Press) proposed an axiomatization of the ratio/difference representation, but their axiomatization contains an error. After describing a counterexample to their axiomatization, Theorem 1 of the present article shows that it actually implies a weaker result: if ≥_r and ≥_d are two quaternary retations satisfying the axiomatization proposed by Krantz et al. (1971), and if ≥_r′ and ≥_d′ are the relations that are inverse to ≥_r and ≥_d, respectively, then either there exists a ratio/difference representation for ≥_r and ≥_d, or there exists a ratio/difference representation for ≥_r′ and ≥_d′, but not both. Theorem 2 identifies a new condition which, when added to the axioms of Krantz et al. (1971), yields the existence of a ratio/difference representation for relations ≥_r and ≥_d.     

Brilliant but cruel: Perceptions of negative evaluators

Using edited excerpts from actual negative and positive book reviews, this research examined the hypothesis that negative evaluators of intellectual products will be perceived as more intelligent than positive evaluators. The results strongly supported the hypothesis. Negative reviewers were perceived as more intelligent, competent, and expert than positive reviewers, even when the content of the positive review was independently judged as being of higher quality and greater forcefulness. At the same time, in accord with previous research, negative reviewers were perceived as significantly less likable than positive reviewers. The results on intelligence ratings are seen as bolstering the self-presentational explanation of the tendency shown by intellectually insecure individuals to be negatively critical. The present methodology is contrasted to that of previous research which obtained apparently contradictory results.     

The effects of control on perceived fairness of procedures and outcomes

On the basis of Thibaut and Walker's theory of procedural justice, it was predicted that subjects who experienced control through choosing a trial decision rule would be more satisfied with the outcome of a dispute and the conflict resolution procedure than would yoked subjects who were not given control. Two additional conditions were added to the design in order to investigate the extent to which control had an influence on trial evaluations independent of being allowed to discuss the rules and obtaining a preferred rule in the absence of actual choice. Regardless of role in the dispute (accuser, accused, or no knowledge) and the nature of the rule adopted, those subjects who exercised control through rule choice evaluated all aspects of the trial experience more positively than subjects who did not exercise control through rule choice. The results also revealed that discussion of the rules and obtaining the preferred rule without choice contributed positively to evaluations of the trial procedure and verdict.     

The effects of distributed training on retention of operant conditioning in human infants

Long-term retention of operant footkicking acquired in the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm was assessed as a function of the distribution of training time. In the first study, 3-month-old infants were trained for either one 18-min session or for two 9-min or three 6-min sessions separated by 24-hr intervals. All infants exhibited retention during a test administered immediately after training, but only those trained in a single session continued to perform the conditioned response during cued-recall tests 7 or 14 days later. Infants trained in three sessions showed no evidence of remembering the contingency even after a week. A warm-up decrement, seen in the day-to-day performance of infants in the distributed conditions, was eliminated in the second study by the interpolation of a nonreinforcement period at the outset of daily sessions. This procedure also enhanced long-term retention such that infants trained in three 6-min session now remembered the contingency for 14 days and did not differ from infants who had received a single 18-min session. Whether distributed training facilitates or impairs long-term retention appears to depend on the opportunity for infants to acquire a sufficient number (or kind) of effective retrieval cues during original learning.     

Speaker bias in children's evaluation of the external consistency of statements

The hypothesis of this study is that an assumption of speaker credibility affects children's judgments of the external consistency of statements. In two experiments, first and third grade children (6 and 8 years of age, respectively) and college adults were read short paragraphs containing contradictory information from a contextual source and a speaker. The contextual source was described as either authoritative or nonauthoritative and discredited. The speaker was either an adult or child. Thus the contextual source was either more or less reliable than the speaker. Subjects were asked to affirm or contradict the speaker's statement, and to choose either the source or the speaker as most believable. The results showed that adult responses varied with the contextual source alone, while the responses of the first graders varied primarily with the speaker's age. The responses of the third graders varied with both factors. The results suggest young children can assess the external consistency of statements but frequently do not because of their assumptions about speakers and other performance factors.