Exploring the benefits of conversing with a digital voice assistant during automated driving: A parametric duration model of takeover time

Vehicle automation allows drivers to disengage from driving causing a potential decline in their alertness. One of the major challenges of highly automated vehicles is to ensure a timely (with respect to safety and situation awareness) takeover in such conditions. For this purpose, the current study investigated the role of an in-vehicle digital voice-assistant (VA) in conditionally automated vehicles, offering spoken discourse relating specifically to contextual factors, such as the traffic situation and road environment. The study involved twenty-four participants, each taking two drives (counterbalanced): with VA and without VA, in a driving simulator. Participants were required to takeover vehicle control following the issuance of a takeover request (TOR) near the end of each drive. A parametric duration model was adopted to find the key factors determining takeover time (TOT). Paired comparisons showed higher alertness and higher active workload (mean NASA-TLX rating) during automation when accompanied by the VA. Paired t-test comparison of gaze behavior prior to takeover showed significantly higher instances of checking traffic signal, roadside objects, and the roadway during the drive with VA, indicating higher situation awareness. The parametric model indicated that the VA increased the likelihood of making a timely takeover by 39%. There was also some evidence suggesting that male drivers are likely to resume control 1.21 times earlier than female drivers. The study findings highlight the benefits of adopting a digital voice assistant to keep the drivers alert and aware about the recent traffic environment in partially automated vehicles.     

Ambiguous probabilities: when does p=0.3 reflect a possibility,and when does it express a doubt?

Verbal phrases denoting uncertainty are usually held to be more vague than numerical probability statements. They are, however, directionally more precise, in the sense that they are either positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target outcome, or negative, drawing attention to its non‐occurrence. A numerical probability will, in contrast, sometimes be perceived as positive and sometimes as negative. When asked to complete sentences such as ‘The operation has a 30% chance of success, because’ some people will give reasons for success (‘the doctors are expert surgeons’), whereas others will give reasons for failure (‘it is a difficult operation’). It is shown in two experiments that positive reasons are given more often than negative ones, even for p values below 0.5, especially when the probability is higher than expected, and the target outcome is non‐normal, undesirable, and phrased as a negation. We conclude that the directionality of numerical probabilities (as opposed to verbal phrases) is context‐dependent, but biased towards a positive interpretation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs

On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of conditional beliefs are studied, and it is explained how the failure of not distinguishing conditional beliefs from beliefs in conditionals can lead philosophical and empirical theories astray.

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals

We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, “if she watered the plants they bloomed,” when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, “if the sun shone they bloomed” decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from “the plants did not bloom” to “therefore she did not water them”). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, “if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed,” when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, “she did not water the plants and they did not bloom” increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from “she did not water the plants” to “therefore they did not bloom”) is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new “switched-suppression” effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, “if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed”: modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning.     

On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

In standard treatments of probability, is defined as the ratio of to , provided that . This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of arise in the mind via implicit calculation of . We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by . Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that arises from the ratio fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.     

Octopuses (Octopus bimaculoides) and cuttlefishes (Sepia pharaonis, S. officinalis) can conditionally discriminate

In complex navigation using landmarks, an animal must discriminate between potential cues and show context (condition) sensitivity. Such conditional discrimination is considered a form of complex learning and has been associated primarily with vertebrates. We tested the hypothesis that octopuses and cuttlefish are capable of conditional discrimination. Subjects were trained in two maze configurations (the conditions) in which they were required to select one of two particular escape routes within each maze (the discrimination). Conditional discrimination could be demonstrated by selecting the correct escape route in each maze. Six of ten mud-flat octopuses (Octopus bimaculoides), 6 of 13 pharaoh cuttlefish (Sepia pharaonis), and one of four common cuttlefish (S. officinalis) demonstrated conditional discrimination by successfully solving both mazes. These experiments demonstrate that cephalopods are capable of conditional discrimination and extend the limits of invertebrate complex learning.     

An Applied Study Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process to Translate Common Verbal Phrases to Numerical Probabilities

This is an applied study of how to develop a standardized set of useful verbal probability phrases for communication purposes within an expert community. The analysis extends the previous research in two ways. First, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to assess the relative weights associated with the verbal phrases employed by a group of thirty financial strategy experts at a major Wall Street firm. Second, a quadratic least-squares technique is used to map these relative weights onto a subjective probability scale. The result was a consistent scaling of probabilistic phrases that the analysts prefer and actually use. This methodology can be used to minimize the problems associated with the use of probabilistic phrases by a group of experts who interact daily and who share assumptions, working knowledge and values. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Combinations of tense and deontic modality: On the approach to temporal logic with historical necessity and conditional obligation

We consider three infinite hierarchies of what I call “two-dimensional temporal logics with explicit realization operators”, viz. (i) one without historical or deontic modalities, (ii) one with historical but without deontic modalities, and (iii) one with historical and with dyadic deontic modalities for conditional obligation and permission. Sound and complete axiomatizations are obtained for all three hierarchies relative to a simplified version of the finite co-ordinate-system semantics given for so-called T × W logic of historical necessity in [L. Åqvist, The logic of historical necessity as founded on two-dimensional modal tense logic, J. Philos. Logic 28 (1999) 329–369].     

Communicative functions of directional verbal probabilities: Speaker’s choice,listener’s inference,and reference points

Verbal probabilities have directional communicative functions, and most can be categorized as positive (e.g., “it is likely”) or negative (e.g., “it is doubtful”). We examined the communicative functions of verbal probabilities based on the reference point hypothesis According to this hypothesis, listeners are sensitive to and can infer a speaker’s reference points based on the speaker’s selected directionality. In four experiments (two of which examined speakers’ choice of directionality and two of which examined listeners’ inferences about a speaker’s reference point), we found that listeners could make inferences about speakers’ reference points based on the stated directionality of verbal probability. Thus, the directionality of verbal probabilities serves the communicative function of conveying information about a speaker’s reference point.     

The nanoeconomics of concurrent choice behavior

We introduce to behavior analysis a way of analyzing choice behavior that exploits recent developments in nanoeconomics, financial economics, and econometrics. A response return, modeled on an economic return, is the log differenced count of responses allocated to each of two alternatives during a short time window, compared with that in the immediately preceding window. The response return is a new dependent variable which offers a novel and useful way of looking at operant behavior, especially at the molecular level of analysis. The response–return series is a near‐instantaneous measure of an organism's dynamic preferences for each of two alternatives. Analyzing such a series requires time‐analytic techniques, including Auto‐Regressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (ARCH) models. We illustrate these techniques by analyzing choices between combinations of arithmetic and exponential variable‐interval schedules with pigeon subjects. All response–return series were well‐fitted by one of three ARCH‐family models. The fitted models were differentially sensitive to transition versus steady‐state data samples. The particular insights that the ARCH analyses offer are improved understanding of the effects of the instantaneous effects of reinforcers and their absence, of how the distribution of reinforcers in time affects choice, and of the differences between choice in transition and at steady state.