Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for covariation detection in causal induction: model comparison and rational analysis

In this article, 41 models of covariation detection from 2 × 2 contingency tables were evaluated against past data in the literature and against data from new experiments. A new model was also included based on a limiting case of the normative phi-coefficient under an extreme rarity assumption, which has been shown to be an important factor in covariation detection (McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2007) and data selection (Hattori, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2003). The results were supportive of the new model. To investigate its explanatory adequacy, a rational analysis using two computer simulations was conducted. These simulations revealed the environmental conditions and the memory restrictions under which the new model best approximates the normative model of covariation detection in these tasks. They thus demonstrated the adaptive rationality of the new model.     

特征概率影响多维和少维类别的分类学习和特征学习

探讨了特征概率对多维和少维类别的分类学习和特征学习的效果及策略的影响。结果表明高特征概率条件下,多维比少维类别的分类学习更容易,而且学到更多的特征知识,多维条件下人们更倾向于整体性加工策略,而少维条件下人们倾向于分析性加工策略。低特征概率条件下,多维比少维类别的分类学习和特征学习都困难,且两种条件下人们都倾向于采取分析性加工策略。     

Waiting for the bus: when base-rates refuse to be neglected

The paper reports the results from 16 versions of a simple probability estimation task, where probability estimates derived from base-rate information have to be modified by case knowledge. In the bus problem [adapted from Falk, R., Lipson, A., & Konold, C. (1994). The ups and downs of the hope function in a fruitless search. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 353-377). Chichester, UK: Wiley], a passenger waits for a bus that departs before schedule in 10% of the cases, and is more than 10 min delayed in another 10%. What are Fred's chances of catching the bus on a day when he arrives on time and waits for 10 min? Most respondents think his probability is 10%, or 90%, instead of 50%, which is the correct answer. The experiments demonstrate the difficulties people have in replacing the original three-category 1/8/1 partitioning with a normalized, binary partitioning, where the middle category is discarded. In contrast with typical studies of "base-rate neglect", or under-weighing of base-rates, this task demonstrates a reversed base-rate fallacy, where frequentistic information is overextended and case information ignored. Possible explanations for this robust phenomenon are briefly discussed.     

Defending a possibilist insight in consequentialist thought

There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle:

Note on lexicographic‐order preservation and stochastic dominance

This note concerns two issues left unresolved in our study of lexicographic‐order preservation and stochastic dominance in settings where preferences are represented by utility vectors, ordered lexicographically, and judgements emerge as matrices that premultiply utility vectors in expected utility sums. First, a generalization of the ‘Conjecture Σ’, which implied transitivity of a stochastic dominance relation under non‐vacuous resolution‐level information, is proved. Second, this paper comments on using resolution‐level information in higher as well as in first degree stochastic dominance analysis. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probability judgment accuracy for general knowledge. Cross-national differences and assessment methods

In this study we compare the probability judgment accuracy of subjects from the United States and Turkey. Three different response modes were employed — numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. The questions employed in the study were restricted to two-alternative, general-knowledge items. The observed pattern of differences in the components of probability judgment accuracy paralleled those of studies that have compared Western and Asian subjects. In particular, Turkish subjects exhibited better discrimination but worse calibration than their US counterparts. This result persisted across all three response modes. These findings lend support to previous assertions that observed cross-national differences arise from socioeconomic rather than Asian versus Western cultural differences. However, the consistency of the observed differences across response modes refutes a previous assertion that observed cultural differences are merely the result of response bias.     

The effects of source trustworthiness and inference type on human belief revision

We investigated whether people revise their beliefs as a function of inference type or source trustworthiness. By doing so we aimed to find out if belief revision is better explained by mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002 Johnson-Laird, P. N. and Byrne, R. M. J. 2002. Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109: 211–228. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) or by a conditional probability view (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003 Over, D. E. and Evans, J. St. B. T. 2003. The probability of conditionals: The psychological evidence. Mind & Language, 18: 340–358. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Oaksford & Chater, 2001 Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. 2001. The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Science, 5: 349–357. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We used modified modes ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT) problems in which the first two premises were uttered by persons with varying degrees of trustworthiness. A third statement was presented as a fact and established inconsistency in the set of propositions. The participants' task was to indicate which of the first two premises they believed more after receiving the fact. We found that the belief in the conditional premise dropped significantly when this premise was stated by a low- rather than a high-trustworthy source. Moreover we found that the conditional premise was believed more in MT than in MP problems. Both findings are best explained by the conditional probability hypothesis (e.g., Evans et al., 2003 Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J. and Over, D. E. 2003. Conditionals and conditional probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, : 321–335. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]).     

Intelligence and negation biases on the Conditional Inference Task: A dual-processes analysis

We examined a large set of conditional inference data compiled from several previous studies and asked three questions: How is normative performance related to intelligence? Does negative conclusion bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Does implicit negation bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Our analysis demonstrated that rejecting denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent inferences was positively correlated with intelligence, while endorsing modus tollens inferences was not; that the occurrence of negative conclusion bias was related to the extent of Type 2 processing; and that the occurrence of implicit negation bias was not related to the extent of Type 2 processing. We conclude that negative conclusion bias is, at least in part, a product of Type 2 processing, while implicit negation bias is not.     

The compatibility heuristic in non-categorical hypothetical reasoning: Inferences between conditionals and disjunctions

A new theory explains how people make hypothetical inferences from a premise consistent with several alternatives to a conclusion consistent with several alternatives. The key proposal is that people rely on a heuristic that identifies compatible possibilities. It is tested in 7 experiments that examine inferences between conditionals and disjunctions. Participants accepted inferences between conditionals and inclusive disjunctions when a compatible possibility was immediately available, in their binary judgments that a conclusion followed or not (Experiment 1a) and ternary judgments that included it was not possible to know (Experiment 1b). The compatibility effect was amplified when compatible possibilities were more readily available, e.g., for ‘A only if B’ conditionals (Experiment 2). It was eliminated when compatible possibilities were not available, e.g., for ‘if and only if A B’ bi-conditionals and exclusive disjunctions (Experiment 3). The compatibility heuristic occurs even for inferences based on implicit negation e.g., ‘A or B, therefore if C D’ (Experiment 4), and between universals ‘All A’s are B’s’ and disjunctions (Experiment 5a) and universals and conditionals (Experiment 5b). The implications of the results for alternative theories of the cognitive processes underlying hypothetical deductions are discussed.     

Conditional estimation of exponential random graph models from snowball sampling designs

A complete survey of a network in a large population may be prohibitively difficult and costly. So it is important to estimate models for networks using data from various network sampling designs, such as link-tracing designs. We focus here on snowball sampling designs, designs in which the members of an initial sample of network members are asked to nominate their network partners, their network partners are then traced and asked to nominate their network partners, and so on. We assume an exponential random graph model (ERGM) of a particular parametric form and outline a conditional maximum likelihood estimation procedure for obtaining estimates of ERGM parameters. This procedure is intended to complement the likelihood approach developed by  Handcock and Gile (2010) by providing a practical means of estimation when the size of the complete network is unknown and/or the complete network is very large. We report the outcome of a simulation study with a known model designed to assess the impact of initial sample size, population size, and number of sampling waves on properties of the estimates. We conclude with a discussion of the potential applications and further developments of the approach.