The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference

We report a large study in which participants are invited to draw inferences from causal conditional sentences with varying degrees of believability. General intelligence was measured, and participants were split into groups of high and low ability. Under strict deductive-reasoning instructions, it was observed that higher ability participants were significantly less influenced by prior belief than were those of lower ability. This effect disappeared, however, when pragmatic reasoning instructions were employed in a separate group. These findings are in accord with dual-process theories of reasoning. We also took detailed measures of beliefs in the conditional sentences used for the reasoning tasks. Statistical modelling showed that it is not belief in the conditional statement per se that is the causal factor, but rather correlates of it. Two different models of belief-based reasoning were found to fit the data according to the kind of instructions and the type of inference under consideration.     

Extreme elemental processing in a high schizotypy population: Relation to cognitive deficits

The cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia have been characterized as a failure to utilize task-setting information to guide behaviour, especially in situations in which there is response conflict. Recently, we have provided support for this account; high schizotypy individuals demonstrated inferior biconditional discrimination performance compared to low scorers, but were not impaired on a simple discrimination that did not require the use of task-setting cues. These results may, however, also be explained by the way in which individuals with high schizotypy process stimulus compounds. Here, we examine the initial approaches to solving biconditional and control discrimination tasks of participants with high and low schizotypy scores. In particular, we focus on performance during the first block of training trials to capture processing style before the acquisition of the discrimination tasks. Participants scoring highly on the introvertive anhedonia subscale (which has been allied to the negative and cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia) demonstrated better biconditional performance during the first block of training trials than did low-schizotypy individuals, consistent with a highly elemental approach to stimulus processing. Subsequent recognition tests confirmed this analysis demonstrating that the pattern of performance observed in participants with high schizotypy was associated with a failure to discriminate conjunctions of items that had been seen before from those that had not. These results suggest that the negative/cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia may reflect an extreme bias towards elemental, as opposed to configural, processing of stimulus conjunctions.     

Priming effect on the exceptive conditional ‘except if’

Here we report the results of one priming experiment that examines the comprehension of exceptive conditionals—for example, ‘Mary will go out tonight except if she has an exam tomorrow’—and indicative conditionals—for example, ‘Mary will not go out tonight if she has an exam tomorrow’. The experiment showed that participants read the true possibility ‘Mary is not going out tonight and she has an exam tomorrow’ faster when it was primed by an exceptive conditional than when it was primed by an indicative; other possibilities (‘Mary is going out tonight and she does not have an exam tomorrow’, ‘Mary is going out tonight and she has an exam tomorrow’ and ‘Mary is not going out tonight and she does not have an exam tomorrow’) were primed equally by both connectives. The experiments showed that (1) when people understand ‘B except if A’, they access the true possibilities ‘not-A & B’ and ‘A & not-B’, and (2) when they understand ‘B, if not-A’ they access ‘not-A & B’, but they do not access ‘A & not-B’. We discuss the implications of this for current theories of reasoning.     

Probabilistic dynamic belief revision

We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief over conditional probabilistic models. We develop a theory of probabilistic dynamic belief revision, introducing probabilistic “action models” and proposing a notion of probabilistic update product, that comes together with appropriate reduction laws.