Communicating the reasons for social rejection

Two studies examined the pattern of reasons given for rejecting dates and how they reflect concerns of the rejector. Study One examined retrospective accounts of rejection. Rejectors often reported withholding the reason for rejection from the rejected person. A content analysis of the reasons communicated to rejected persons was performed using Weiner's (Journal of Educational Psychology, 1979, 71, 3–25) attributional dimensions of locus, controllability, and stability. The stated reasons were found to be primarily impersonal, uncontrollable, and unstable. Study Two examined rejectors' willingness to communicate certain types of reasons. The true, privately held reasons for turning down dates were systematically varied as to locus, controllability, and stability. The types of reasons subjects offered to rejected persons were consistent with Study One. Reasons for refusal were less likely to be revealed when they related to the appearance or personality of the rejected person, particularly when the personal reasons were uncontrollable and stable. Rejectors were not as forthright when they controlled the reason for rejection as when they lacked control. The rejectors' actions were interpreted as being self-presentational, reflecting concerns about rejected persons' emotional reactions, expectancies for the future of the relationship, and blame for rejection.     

A negativity bias in interpersonal evaluation

Two studies were conducted to demonstrate a bias toward negativity in evaluations of persons or their work in particular social circumstances. In Study 1, subjects evaluated materials written by peers. Those working under conditions that placed them in low status relative to the audience for their evaluations, or conditions that made their intellectual position within a group insecure, showed a clear bias toward negativity in those evaluations. Only individuals who believed their audience to be of relatively low status and at the same time believed their intellectual position to be secure did not show this bias. In Study 2, subjects viewed a videotape of a stimulus person and rated him on several intellectual and social dimensions. Again, subjects believed their audience to be of either relatively high or relatively low status. As a cross dimension, they were given instructions to focus on either the intellectual or the social abilities of the stimulus person while viewing the videotape. A strong main effect of audience status was demonstrated, but only in ratings of intellectual traits; subjects who believed their audience to be of relatively high status rated the stimulus person's intellectual qualities significantly more negatively. Moreover, this effect was independent of the instructional focus subjects had been given. The negativity bias is discussed in the context of previous demonstrations of biases toward weighting negative information more heavily than positive information, as well as previous demonstrations of seemingly pervasive positivity biases in memory and judgment.     

The salience of the self in responses to inequity

Previous research has shown that people strive to conform with the standards of significant others in distributive justice. The present research was concerned with the role of attention to the self in the same paradigm. If people are motivated to personally evaluate their own behavior as fair, then self-focus should result in heightened attempts to redress an overpayment inequity. After the subject's criterion of a fair wage was assessed, they were paid either that amount or double it. Orthogonal to this manipulation, subjects were either made objectively self-aware (OSA) or not, by the presence or absence of a mirror. Consistent with the hypothesis, overpaid OSA subjects did more work, but of a poorer quality, than overpaid not-OSA subjects. This was taken as evidence of more zealous attempts to restore a sense of equity, implicating a greater personal need to eliminate the injustice when the discrepancy between pay level and a personal standard of fairness was made more prominent to the self.     

The generality of overselectivity in developmentally disabled children

A growing body of research suggests that low Mental Age (MA) autistic and retarded children show a unique stimulus control deficit, one that may cause many or most of their behavioral deficiencies. This problem, stimulus overselectivity, is evidenced when a child responds only to a restricted portion of the stimulus environment when compared with normal children. The purpose of this study was to assess whether this overselectivity is general across situations or whether it is restricted to certain stimulus/task conditions. Eight autistic children, who evidenced overselectivity on a preassessment task, and 8 normal children with similar MA levels participated. All children were trained on 3 tasks to determine if overselectivity varied as a function of different stimulus conditions. Each of the 3 tasks involved training a child to respond to (i.e., touch) a card containing a circle (S +) and to avoid a blank (S ?) card. In each case, the circle comprised a series of dots. The difference between the 3 circles (tasks) was the distance between the successive dots making up each circle. Also, in the minimal separation condition the dots were smaller in size and greater in number than in the larger separation conditions. Of concern was whether autistic children learned about the gestalt (i.e., the circle), which required attention to multiple cues, or whether children would overselect and respond to the dots. The results showed that (1) stimulus overselectivity was found not to be a generalized deficit in autistic subjects; instead, it varied as a function of the stimulus variables; and (2) the stimulus variables manipulated in this study similarly influenced the responding of both normal and autistic children. The implications of these data for a theory of overselectivity are discussed.     

Temporal stability and predictive validity of self-assessed hand preference with first and second graders

The test-retest reliability and predictive validity of a five-item hand preference questionnaire (writing, drawing, throwing a baseball, brushing teeth, and cutting with scissors) were investigated in a sample of 80 children attending first and second grade. After 1 month, 81% of the second choices were the same as the first choices. There were interitem differences in the reliabilities of the five items. Writing and drawing hand exhibited the greatest degree of temporal stability. Writing hand was the one task which was significantly related to visual field bias as indexed by a face perception task.     

Stimulus intensity effects on auditory and visual reaction processes.

Literature on the effect of stimulus intensity on reaction processes was reviewed. It was shown that there is no agreement as to whether intensity effects are limited to encoding or whether they are extended to later processing stages. The situation can be characterized as an asymmetry between modalities: vision is consistent with the first alternative and audition with the second.Chronometric analysis was used to bear on the question. It was shown that the effects of visual intensity and foreperiod (FP) are additive in a simple RT situation both for constant and mixed blocks FP. Auditory intensity and FP interact in both simple and two-choice situations. In a control experiment visual intensity and S-R compatibility were found to be additive. The asymmetry was accounted for by auditory alerting, previously discussed by several authors.The framework of stimulus intensity research utilizing RT measures was briefly evaluated.     

Counting eliminates the repetition effect in judgments of temporal duration.

College student subjects estimated the duration of time intervals (8–54 sec) by counting or not (N=35 per group). Counting eliminated the repetition effect (a decline in the magnitude of estimations across trials), and resulted in a truncation of the psychophysical function. The former result was interpreted as contrary to Treisman's (1963) model. The latter result was attributed to the effortfulness of counting, which was established in a subsequent experiment.     

Effects of sex of subject,sex of stimulus cue,and androgyny level on evaluations in work situations which evoke sex role stereotypes

This study examined the differential evaluation of male and female stimulus cues and the effect of subject's androgyny level on their evaluations. Male and female college students filled out the Bem Sex Role Inventory (1974) and responded to set of five in-basket tasks taken from the Rosen, Jerdee, and Prestwich (1975) study of male managers. Sex of subject, sex of stimulus cue in the in-basket tasks, and androgyny level were varied in a series of 2 X 2 X 3 analyses of variance. On some tasks, male and/or female subjects responded in a sex role stereotyped manner. There were no effects for androgyny level. The discussion focused on circumstances under which stereotyping occurs and implications of the study.     

Sex-role aspects in the development of children's vocational knowledge

Recent research suggests important age and sex differences in the sex-typing of children's vocational interests. The present study adds to this area by examining several dimensions of job choices in children of four age groups (early and late preschool, second and fourth grade). The 120 children interviewed were asked three fixed-choice questions regarding nine jobs, along with open-ended job choice items. Analysis of age effects on several predetermined dimensions showed that older children were more selective in personal job choice, especially in regard to jobs attributed to the opposite sex. Avoidance of choices associated with the other sex was stronger in boys, but other sex differences were dependent on mode of inquiry rather than on sex. Girls were less limited than boys in job interests when asked about specific jobs but expressed more restricted choices on open-ended items. Implications of these findings both for further research and educational practices are considered.     

Controllability and human stress: method, evidence and theory.

Concepts are defined and evidence reviewed on whether control reduces stress in man. Individuals seem to prefer instrumental control over an aversive event, seem to prefer to administer it to themselves, and are less aroused when waiting for a controllable event. When groups without control have equal predictability, having control is still less arousing; as potential (but unexercised) control seems to be. The evidence also suggests that controllable events may hurt less. Methodological weaknesses and empirical gaps in these data are pointed out. These data are grossly inconsistent with Relevant Feedback theory and rather inconsistent with Information-seeking theory and Safety Signal theory. A Minimax hypothesis is proposed: When individuals control aversive events, they believe relief to be caused by a stable source—their own response. This belief entails that maximum future danger will be minimized. When they have no control, they believe relief to be less stable, which entails no guarantee that maximum future danger will be minimized. The data are largely consistent with the Minimax hypothesis and wholly consistent when Minimax is supplemented by the premise that aversive events hurt less when encountered against a background of relaxation.