Typicality and Graded Membership in Dimensional Adjectives

This paper concerns an investigation of the manner in which typicality constrains graded membership in antonymous dimensional adjectives such as short/tall and cheap/expensive using the conceptual spaces framework. In this framework, items are organized in a space comprised of one or more dimensions along which they can be compared. The items’ graded membership is established by their relative proximity in this space to the prototypical instances of contrasting concepts. Because dimensional adjectives can be applied to an indefinite variety of things and grammatically have no upper bound to serve as cognitive reference point, they have been argued to lack prototypes. We present the results of an empirical study showing that the conceptual spaces framework can nevertheless be extended successfully to dimensional adjectives by complementing them with a comparison class argument (such as short/tall for an adult man and cheap/expensive for a smartphone), allowing participants to retrieve meaningful prototypical instances, which can be used to establish membership degree. Since dimensional adjectives are subjective, we investigate how the framework can accommodate interindividual variability in membership degree judgments. We find that the predictions of the framework significantly improve if prototypical instances themselves are assumed to come with a gradient instead of being considered equally typical, thereby providing a more fine‐grained account of typicality and furthering the development of the conceptual spaces framework.     

Hand Position and Response Assignment Modulate the Activation of the Valence‐Space Conceptual Metaphor

Conceptual metaphor is ubiquitous in language and thought, as we usually reason and talk about abstract concepts in terms of more concrete ones via metaphorical mappings that are hypothesized to arise from our embodied experience. One pervasive example is the conceptual projection of valence onto space, which flexibly recruits the vertical and lateral spatial frames to gain structure (e.g., good is up ‐bad is down and good is right ‐bad is left ). In the current study, we used a valence judgment task to explore the role that exogenous bodily cues (namely response hand positions) play in the allocation of spatial attention and the modulation of conceptual congruency effects. Experiment 1 showed that congruency effects along the vertical axis are weakened when task conditions (i.e., the use of vertical visual cues, on the one hand, and the horizontal alignment of responses, on the other) draw attention to both the vertical and lateral axes making them simultaneously salient. Experiment 2 evidenced that the vertical alignment of participants’ hands while responding to the task—regardless of the location of their dominant hand—facilitates the judgment of positive and negative‐valence words, as long as participants respond in a metaphor–congruent manner (i.e., up responses are good and down responses are bad). Overall, these results support the claim that source domain representations are dynamically activated in response to the context and that bodily states are an integral part of that context.     

中学力学问题表征体系的动态特征

基于McDenott和Larkin的基本假设,该文提出了力学问题的表征体系,并用口语报告分析法实证研究了力学问题表征体系的动态特征。结果表明：问题解决者在解决力学问题过程中一般将建立4个不同层次的表征,并且在物理和数学表征层次所占时间显著多于在文字和朴素表征层次的时间。     

Children’s understanding of addition and subtraction concepts

After the onset of formal schooling, little is known about the development of children’s understanding of the arithmetic concepts of inversion and associativity. On problems of the form a + b − b (e.g., 3 + 26 − 26), if children understand the inversion concept (i.e., that addition and subtraction are inverse operations), then no calculations are needed to solve the problem. On problems of the form a + b − c (e.g., 3 + 27 − 23), if children understand the associativity concept (i.e., that the addition and subtraction can be solved in any order), then the second part of the problem can be solved first. Children in Grades 2, 3, and 4 solved both types of problems and then were given a demonstration of how to apply both concepts. Approval of each concept and preference of a conceptual approach versus an algorithmic approach were measured. Few grade differences were found on either task. Conceptual understanding was greater for inversion than for associativity on both tasks. Clusters of participants in all grades showed that some had strong understanding of both concepts, some had strong understanding of the inversion concept only, and others had weak understanding of both concepts. The findings highlight the lack of developmental increases and the large individual differences in conceptual understanding on two arithmetic concepts during the early school years.     

An Eliminativist Theory of Religion

A philosophical theory of religion ought to meet four criteria: it should be extensionally accurate, neutral, phenomenological, and non-circular. I argue that none of the popular theories of religion meet all these criteria, and that, in particular, the extensional accuracy criterion and the non-circularity criterion can’t be met without sacrificing extensional accuracy. I conclude that, therefore, religions do not form a kind, and so, there is no such thing as religion.

Argumentation and Explanation in Conceptual Change: Indications From Protocol Analyses of Peer-to-Peer Dialog

In this paper we attempt to identify which peer collaboration characteristics may be accountable for conceptual change through interaction. We focus on different socio-cognitive aspects of the peer dialog and relate these with learning gains on the dyadic as well as the individual level. The scientific topic that was used for this study concerns natural selection, a topic for which students' intuitive conceptions have been shown to be particularly robust. Learning tasks were designed according to the socio-cognitive conflict instructional paradigm. After receiving a short instructional intervention on natural selection, paired students were asked to collaboratively construct explanations for certain evolutionary phenomena while engaging in dialectical argumentation. Two quantitative coding schemes were developed, each with a different granularity. The first assessed discrete dialog moves that pertained to dialectical argumentation and to consensual explanation development. The second scheme characterized the dialog as a whole on a number of socio-cognitive dimensions. Results from analyses on the dyadic as well as the individual level revealed that the engagement in dialectical argumentation predicted conceptual learning gains, whereas consensual explanation development did not. These findings open up new venues for research on the mechanisms of learning in and from peer collaboration.     

MINDING QUANTA AND COSMOLOGY

The revolution in science inaugurated by quantum physics has made us aware of the role of observation in the construction of data. Eugene Wigner remarked that in quantum physics we no longer have observables (invariants), only observations. Tongue in cheek, I asked him whether that meant that quantum physics is really psychology, expecting a gruff reply to my sassiness. Instead, Wigner beamed understanding and replied "Yes, yes, that's exactly correct." David Bohm pointed out that were we to look at the cosmos without the lenses of our telescopes we would see a hologram. I extend Bohm's insight to the lens in the optics of the eye. The receptor processes of the ear and skin work in a similar fashion. Without these lenses and lenslike operations all of our perceptions would be entangled as in a hologram. Furthermore, the retina absorbs quanta of radiation so that quantum physics uses the very perceptions that become formed by it. In turn, higher-order brain systems send signals to the sensory receptors so that what we perceive is often as much a result of earlier rather than just immediate experience. This influence from inside out becomes especially relevant to our interpretation of how we experience the contents and bounds of cosmology that come to us by way of radiation.     

类别表征与策略的脑科学研究及对思维教学的启示

脑科学研究表明,分类中对物体的知觉表征激活颞下叶皮层和颞中区等区域;语义表征激活前额皮层等。语义加工和知觉表征相互作用的脑机制表现为额区与视觉区域间信息的传递、提取。分类策略主要有规则策略和相似性策略两种。规则策略激活额区等广泛区域;相似性策略与视觉区域相关,包含着对个别样例的记忆过程。基于以上研究结果,本文从学习材料的表征和对材料进行表征时的策略两个方面为思维教学提出了一些建议。     

Why did Leibniz fail to complete his dynamics?

Leibniz’s ‘new science of dynamics’ is typically taken to have been completed in the late monadological metaphysics. On this view, stemming from Martial Gueroult and continuing in the recent interpretations of Robert Adams and Pauline Phemister, Leibniz accomplished his dynamics in his later account of physical forces as merely phenomenal modifications of monadic, metaphysical forces. This paper argues, by contrast, that Leibniz considered the dynamics to be an unfinished project: this is evident in statements from throughout his mature period until his final months. Two possible reasons for the non-completion of the dynamics are discussed. The first is that his encounter with the superior physics of Newton’s Principia caused Leibniz to continually defer his own contribution. I argue, however, in favour of a second reason: that there are philosophical difficulties inherent in the science of dynamics that prevented its completion. These difficulties are found in the relation of dynamics to metaphysics, and in the more fundamental split within dynamics, into the doctrine of primitive and derivative forces. Through three late exchanges with de Volder, Wolff and Des Bosses, I show that the relation of primitive and derivative forces remained an unsolved – although not in principle unsolvable – problem for Leibniz.