问题解决的表征态理论

问题解决的表征态理论(简称RST)认为问题解决就是问题的表征态连续、非线性的变化的过程,其中存在数据驱动和概念驱动两种方式。在问题表征态变化的过程中,问题解决者所掌握的专业知识起着重要的作用,它是问题解决者对问题情境信息进行同化的基础,也是对问题结构进行心理建构的基础。RST的假设及其推论在中学生物理问题解决过程中得到检验。     

Knowledge, expectations, and inductive reasoning within conceptual hierarchies

Previous research (e.g. Cognition 64 (1997) 73) suggests that the privileged level for inductive inference in a folk biological conceptual hierarchy does not correspond to the “basic” level (i.e. the level at which concepts are both informative and distinct). To further explore inductive inference within conceptual hierarchies, we examine relations between knowledge of concepts at different hierarchical levels, expectations about conceptual coherence, and inductive inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 8-year-olds and adults listed features of living kind (Experiments 1 and 2) and artifact (Experiment 2) concepts at different hierarchical levels (e.g. plant, tree, oak, desert oak), and also rated the strength of generalizations to the same concepts. For living kinds, the level that showed a relative advantage on these two tasks differed; the greatest increase in features listed tended to occur at the life-form level (e.g. tree), whereas the greatest increase in inductive strength tended to occur at the folk-generic level (e.g. oak). Knowledge and induction also showed different developmental trajectories. For artifact concepts, the levels at which the greatest gains in knowledge and induction occurred were more varied, and corresponded more closely across tasks. In Experiment 3, adults reported beliefs about within-category similarity for concepts at different levels of animal, plant and artifact hierarchies, and rated inductive strength as before. For living kind concepts, expectations about category coherence predicted patterns of inductions; knowledge did not. For artifact concepts, both knowledge and expectations predicted patterns of induction. Results suggest that beliefs about conceptual coherence play an important role in guiding inductive inference, that this role may be largely independent of specific knowledge of concepts, and that such beliefs are especially important in reasoning about living kinds.     

Intuitive physics and cognitive algebra: A review

IntroductionIntuitive physics explores how people without a formal instruction in physics intuitively understand physical phenomena. After a general overview of the topics of current research in intuitive physics and a discussion of current debates, this paper provides an introduction to Information Integration Theory (IIT).ObjectiveBy means of examples, it is shown how IIT can be used to directly compare the algebraic structure of physical laws and the algebraic structure of cognitive representations of these laws.MethodThe review considers about 40 years of research on the application of IIT in the field of intuitive physics. Occasionally, reference is also made to intuitive physics studies outside this theoretical framework.ResultsThe reviewed studies highlight four main factors that affect the degree of consistency between physical laws and cognitive algebraic laws: the participants’ age, their familiarity with the event under study, the type of task, and possible learning processes.ConclusionThe last part of the article discusses the implications of the results of the reviewed studies for the two main current hypotheses on the nature of intuitive physics, namely, that intuitive physics may be based on sub-optimal heuristics or may be based on the internalization of physical laws.     

The Formal Structure of Kind Representations

Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations—the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic-supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic-supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., “It has fur because it is a blick”) led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., “There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur”) for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., “Almost all blicks have fur”) did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic-supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations.     

Spatializing Emotion: No Evidence for a Domain‐General Magnitude System

People implicitly associate different emotions with different locations in left‐right space. Which aspects of emotion do they spatialize, and why? Across many studies people spatialize emotional valence, mapping positive emotions onto their dominant side of space and negative emotions onto their non‐dominant side, consistent with theories of metaphorical mental representation. Yet other results suggest a conflicting mapping of emotional intensity (a.k.a., emotional magnitude), according to which people associate more intense emotions with the right and less intense emotions with the left — regardless of their valence; this pattern has been interpreted as support for a domain‐general system for representing magnitudes. To resolve the apparent contradiction between these mappings, we first tested whether people implicitly map either valence or intensity onto left‐right space, depending on which dimension of emotion they attend to (Experiments 1a, b). When asked to judge emotional valence, participants showed the predicted valence mapping. However, when asked to judge emotional intensity, participants showed no systematic intensity mapping. We then tested an alternative explanation of findings previously interpreted as evidence for an intensity mapping (Experiments 2a, b). These results suggest that previous findings may reflect a left‐right mapping of spatial magnitude (i.e., the size of a salient feature of the stimuli) rather than emotion. People implicitly spatialize emotional valence, but, at present, there is no clear evidence for an implicit lateral mapping of emotional intensity. These findings support metaphor theory and challenge the proposal that mental magnitudes are represented by a domain‐general metric that extends to the domain of emotion.     

Representing,Running, and Revising Mental Models: A Computational Model

People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence (AC) theory of human conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber , a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human‐like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then (a) scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, (b) identifies a low‐cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then (c) greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber ; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory.     

Effects of perceptual and conceptual similarities on consumers' evaluations of copycat brand names

Copycats often choose brand names that mimic perceptual, conceptual, or both elements of leading brand names. Yet little is known about how perceptual and conceptual similarities of a copycat interact to affect consumers' evaluations, especially in logographic language systems (e.g., Chinese). Three laboratory experiments demonstrate that perceptual similarity alone leads to negative evaluations of copycat brand names; this negative effect, however, can be mitigated when conceptual similarity is added. The underlying mechanism for this effect can be traced to consumers' persuasion knowledge. Perceptual (vs. conceptual) similarity activates consumers' persuasion knowledge about the insincere motives of the copycat brand, which in turn shapes their brand evaluations. However, this effect can become less prominent when conceptual similarity is added because it alleviates use of persuasion knowledge, or when a consumer is in a happy mood because it neutralizes persuasion knowledge. These findings shed light on how different types of copycat strategies interact to affect copycat brand name evaluations and offer important implications for marketing practice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Freedom and the psychoanalytic ontology of quantum physics

Jung's paper ‘Synchronicity – an acausal connecting principle’, defining the phenomenon as a ‘meaningful’ coincidence depending on archetypal activation, was published in 1952, together with a conceptually related piece by physicist and Nobel Laureate Wolfgang Pauli entitled, ‘The influence of archetypal ideas on the scientific theories of Kepler’. Slavoj ?i?ek, in The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, suggests that, in contrast to any notion of a ‘pre‐modern Jungian harmony’, the main lesson of quantum physics was that not only was the psychoanalytic, empty subject of the signifier constitutively out‐of‐joint with respect to the world, but that the Real in itself was already incomplete, out‐of‐joint, ‘not‐all’. Yet while ?i?ek frequently tries to separate Jung from his own ontology, this paper shows that his ontology is not as different as he suggests. Consistent with our earlier publications on Jung and Zizek, a closer investigation reveals an underlying congruence of both of their approaches. In this paper we show that this affinity lies in the rejection by both Jung and ?i?ek of the ideology of reductive materialism, a rejection that demonstrably draws on quantum physics in similar ways. While Jung posits an inherently meaningful universe, ?i?ek attempts to salvage the freedom of human subjectivity by opposing his Lacanian ‘dialectical materialism’ to reductive materialism.     

Insight in frontotemporal dementia: conceptual analysis and empirical evaluation of the consensus criterion "loss of insight" in frontotemporal dementia

The objective of this study was to suggest a new formulation of the core research diagnostic consensus criterion "loss of insight" in frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Eight patients with FTD (diagnoses made by interviews, medical and neuropsychological examination, CT scan, and regional cerebral glucose metabolism measured by positron emission tomography (PET) participated in the study). The results indicated that insight was present in three out of eight patients, and that insight appears to be a heterogeneous concept. Two types of insight emerged: Emotional insight associated with frontotemporal functions, and cognitive insight, related to posterior cognitive functions. These results suggest that loss of insight should not serve as a core criterion on FTD, but serves well as a supportive criterion of the disease.     

Typicality, graded membership, and vagueness

This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address arguments advanced by Osherson and Smith (1997), and Kamp and Partee (1995), that the two notions of degree of membership and typicality must relate to fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations. A version of prototype theory-the Threshold Model-is proposed to counter these arguments and three possible solutions to the problems of logical selfcontradiction and tautology for vague categorizations are outlined. In the final section graded membership is related to the social construction of conceptual boundaries maintained through language use.