How iconic gestures enhance communication: an ERP study

EEG was recorded as adults watched short segments of spontaneous discourse in which the speaker's gestures and utterances contained complementary information. Videos were followed by one of four types of picture probes: cross-modal related probes were congruent with both speech and gestures; speech-only related probes were congruent with information in the speech, but not the gesture; and two sorts of unrelated probes were created by pairing each related probe with a different discourse prime. Event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by picture probes were measured within the time windows of the N300 (250-350 ms post-stimulus) and N400 (350-550 ms post-stimulus). Cross-modal related probes elicited smaller N300 and N400 than speech-only related ones, indicating that pictures were easier to interpret when they corresponded with gestures. N300 and N400 effects were not due to differences in the visual complexity of each probe type, since the same cross-modal and speech-only picture probes elicited N300 and N400 with similar amplitudes when they appeared as unrelated items. These findings extend previous research on gesture comprehension by revealing how iconic co-speech gestures modulate conceptualization, enabling listeners to better represent visuo-spatial aspects of the speaker's meaning.     

Investigating the dynamics of affect: Psychological mechanisms of affective habituation to pleasurable stimuli

Affective habituation (i.e., reductions in stimulus-evoked affective reactions as a result of previous exposure) may serve a functional purpose. However, little is know about the psychological mechanisms underlying this process. To elucidate the characteristics of affective habituation, two experiments that examined affective reactions to repeated exposures of pleasurable stimuli were conducted. Results of these experiments indicated that habituation trajectories are characterized by linear decreases in affect. Results also demonstrated that habituation can be slowed by the introduction of novel stimuli (i.e., “novelty effects”), effects that are dimensional (rather than taxonic) in nature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that habituation is mediated by conceptual rather than perceptual processes. Depressed and anhedonic individuals were not more susceptible to habituation in either experiment. The current findings and previous theorizing suggest that habituation may be an important component of an adaptive affective processing system that promotes effective responses to salient stimuli and prevents compulsive reward-seeking behavior.

Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality. Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.

Causal relations drive young children's induction, naming, and categorization

A number of recent models and experiments have suggested that evidence of early category-based induction is an artifact of perceptual cues provided by experimenters. We tested these accounts against the prediction that different relations (causal versus non-causal) determine the types of perceptual similarity by which children generalize. Young children were asked to label, to infer novel properties, and to project future appearances of a novel animal that varied in two opposite respects: (1) how much it looked like another animal whose name and properties were known, and (2) how much its parents looked like parents of another animal whose name and properties were known. When exemplar origins were known, children generalized to exemplars with similar origins rather than with similar appearances; when origins were unknown, children generalized to exemplars with similar appearances. Results indicate even young children possess the cognitive control to choose the similarities that best predict accurate generalizations.     

心理时间的分割与整合

在心理时间的研究中存在两种观点。一种观点认为,心理时间是以整合的方式呈现,心理时间的整合是对各种实验结果所得出的时间经验的概括与综合。另一种观点将心理时间进行分割,时序信息加工通过知觉重组和外部计数操作反映出来,这些活动受一个目标间隔内发生的事件结构的层次性所支配,分割心理时间的观点强调时距估计中期望的作用,但它不能解释非时序信息加工路径的影响。     

Challenges in the Evaluation of Nanoscale Research: Ethical Aspects

The purpose of the present paper is: (1) to outline a conceptual framework useful for the analysis of ethical issues raised by goal-directed activities, (2) to apply this framework to nanoscale research, (3) identify some of the main challenges in the evaluation of such research, and (4) exemplify what is needed for a positive answer to the question “How can nanoscale research improve the quality of life?” A basic idea of the paper is that nanoscale research can improve the conditions and quality of life of large groups in society, provided that: (a) this research is directed at certain generally accepted goals, (b) at least some of the opportunities are exploited for the good of mankind, (c) the key obstacles on the road are eliminated, reduced or circumvented, and (d) this is done in ethically acceptable ways.     

Revisiting preschoolers' living things concept: a microgenetic analysis of conceptual change in basic biology

Many preschoolers know that plants and animals share basic biological properties, but this knowledge does not usually lead them to conclude that plants, like animals, are living things. To resolve this seeming paradox, we hypothesized that preschoolers largely base their judgments of life status on a biological property, capacity for teleological action, but that few preschoolers realize that plants possess this capacity. To test the hypothesis, we taught 5-year-olds one of four biological facts and examined the children's subsequent categorization of life status for numerous animals, plants, and artifacts. As predicted, a large majority of 5-year-olds who learned that both plants and animals, but not artifacts, move in goal-directed ways inferred that both plants and animals, but not artifacts, are alive. These children were considerably more likely to draw this inference than peers who learned that the same plants and animals grow or need water and almost as likely to do so as children who were explicitly told that animals and plants are living things and that artifacts are not. Results also indicated that not all biological properties are extended from familiar animals to plants; some biological properties are first attributed to plants and then extended to animals.     

The mind beyond our immediate awareness: Freudian, Jungian, and cognitive models of the unconscious

Abstract: Several branches of cognitive science now focus on the nature of the unconscious. This paper explores some of the findings and models from this research. By introducing formulations based on non‐clinical data, the cognitive scientists—in neural linguistics, computational modelling, and neuroscience—may depart from the older psychoanalytic formulations. An understanding of unconscious neural processes is nevertheless emerging showing how synapses are modified by experience and how learning, conscious and unconscious, is due to this important aspect of brain plasticity. Freud and Jung's formulations about the unconscious psyche, representing the main tenets of depth psychology, are also based on a conception of the mind as extending beyond immediate awareness. However, their models are more hypothetical in that their data, almost exclusively, come from treatments of psychotherapy patients and their verbal accounts. So how do these two conceptions of the unconscious match, where do they differ? And how does the neural understanding in the present research support theories and practices of analytic treatments?     

Naming analog clocks conceptually facilitates naming digital clocks

This study investigates how speakers of Dutch compute and produce relative time expressions. Naming digital clocks (e.g., 2:45, say "quarter to three") requires conceptual operations on the minute and hour information for the correct relative time expression. The interplay of these conceptual operations was investigated using a repetition priming paradigm. Participants named analog clocks (the primes) directly before naming digital clocks (the targets). The targets referred to the hour (e.g., 2:00), half past the hour (e.g., 2:30), or the coming hour (e.g., 2:45). The primes differed from the target in one or two hour and in five or ten minutes. Digital clock naming latencies were shorter with a five- than with a ten-min difference between prime and target, but the difference in hour had no effect. Moreover, the distance in minutes had only an effect for half past the hour and the coming hour, but not for the hour. These findings suggest that conceptual facilitation occurs when conceptual transformations are shared between prime and target in telling time.     

Qualitative differences between naïve and scientific theories of evolution

Philosophers of biology have long argued that Darwin's theory of evolution was qualitatively different from all earlier theories of evolution. Whereas Darwin's predecessors and contemporaries explained adaptation as the transformation of a species' "essence," Darwin explained adaptation as the selective propagation of randomly occurring mutations within a population. The present study explored the possibility of a parallel between early "transformational" theories of evolution and modern na?ve theories. Forty-two high school and college students and three evolutionary biologists were tested on their understanding of six evolutionary phenomena: variation, inheritance, adaptation, domestication, speciation, and extinction. As predicted, a plurality of participants demonstrated transformational reasoning inconsistent with natural selection. Correlational analyses revealed that participants who demonstrated transformational reasoning were as internally consistent as participants who demonstrated an understanding of natural selection, with the exception of one group of participants who appeared to have assimilated two heuristics--"survival of the fittest" and "acquired traits are not inherited"--into an otherwise transformational framework. These findings suggest that the widespread and early-developing tendency to essentialize biological kinds precludes students from conceptualizing species as populations of individuals differentially affected by the environment.