Identification and integration of sensory modalities: Neural basis and relation to consciousness

A key question in studying consciousness is how neural operations in the brain can identify streams of sensory input as belonging to distinct modalities, which contributes to the representation of qualitatively different experiences. The basis for identification of modalities is proposed to be constituted by self-organized comparative operations across a network of unimodal and multimodal sensory areas. However, such network interactions alone cannot answer the question how sensory feature detectors collectively account for an integrated, yet phenomenally differentiated experiential content. This problem turns out to be different from, although related to, the binding problem. It is proposed that the neural correlate of an enriched, multimodal experience is constituted by the attractor state of a dynamic associative network. Within this network, unimodal and multimodal sensory maps continuously interact to influence each other’s attractor state, so that a feature change in one modality results in a fast re-coding of feature information in another modality. In this scheme, feature detection is coded by firing-rate, whereas firing phase codes relational aspects.     

Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks

Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and implicit memory for fixated but ignored words using a selective-attention task in which overlapping picture/word stimuli were presented at fixation. No explicit awareness of the unattended words was apparent on a recognition memory test. Analysis of an implicit memory task, however, indicated that unattended words were perceived at a perceptual level. Thus, the selective-attention task did not result in perfect filtering as suggested by Rees et al. While there was no evidence of conscious perception, subjects were not blind to the implicit perceptual properties of fixated but ignored words.     

Mental models and other misconceptions in children’s understanding of the earth

This study investigated the claim (e.g., Vosniadou & Brewer’s, 1992) that children have naive “mental models” of the earth and believe, for example, that the earth is flat or hollow. It tested the proposal that children appear to have these misconceptions because they find the researchers’ tasks and questions to be confusing and ambiguous. Participants were 6- and 7-year-olds (N = 127) who were given either the mental model theorists’ original drawing task or a new version in which the same instructions and questions were rephrased to minimize ambiguity and, thus, possible misinterpretation. In response to the new version, children gave substantially more indication of having scientific understanding and less of having naive mental models, suggesting that the misconceptions reported by the mental model theorists are largely methodological artifacts. There were also differences between the responses to the original version and those reported by Vosniadou and Brewer, indicating that other factors, such as cohort and cultural effects, are also likely to help explain the discrepant findings of previous research.     

Orientation perception in Williams Syndrome: Discrimination and integration

Williams Syndrome (WS) is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder, which stems from a genetic deletion on chromosome 7 and causes a profound weakness in visuospatial cognition. Our current study explores how orientation perception may contribute to the visuospatial deficits in WS. In Experiment 1, we found that WS individuals and normal 3–4 year olds had similar orientation discrimination thresholds and had similar prevalence of mirror-reversal errors for diagonal targets (±45 deg). In Experiment 2, we asked whether this immaturity in orientation discrimination would also be reflected in a task requiring integration of oriented elements. We found that sensitivities of WS individuals for detecting orientation-defined contours were higher than sensitivities of normal 3–4 year olds, and were not significantly different from sensitivities of normal adults. Together, these results suggest that orientation discrimination and orientation integration have different maturational trajectories in normal development and different susceptibilities to damage in WS. These may reflect largely separate visuospatial mechanisms.     

The influence of perceptual and semantic categorization on inhibitory processing as measured by the N2–P3 response

In daily activities, humans must attend and respond to a range of important items and inhibit and not respond to unimportant distractions. Our current understanding of these processes is largely based on perceptually simple stimuli. This study investigates the interaction of conceptual-semantic categorization and inhibitory processing using Event Related Potentials (ERPs). Participants completed three Go–NoGo tasks that increased systematically in the degree of conceptual-semantic information necessary to respond correctly (from single items to categories of objects and animals). Findings indicate that the N2 response reflects inhibitory processing but does not change significantly with task difficulty. The P3 NoGo amplitude, on the other hand, is attenuated by task difficulty. Further, the latency of the peak of the P3 NoGo response elicited by the most difficult task is significantly later than are the peaks detected during performance of the other two tasks. Thus, the level of complexity of conceptual-semantic representations influences inhibitory processing in a systematic way. This inhibition paradigm may be a key for investigating inhibitory dysfunction in patient populations.     

The Cornell Institute for Research on Children: A vision of integrated developmental science

The Cornell Institute for Research on Children (CIRC) is an intellectual infrastructure funded by the National Science Foundation under the aegis of the Children's Research Initiative, which was spearheaded by Rodney R. Cocking. Cocking's vision of integrated developmental science is an integral part of CIRC's philosophy. CIRC aims to integrate knowledge and paradigms from a variety of fields (e.g., developmental psychology, economics, neuroscience, and pediatrics), which take different perspectives on similar issues (e.g., the effects of toxins on cognitive development), making it explicitly interdisciplinary. The object of CIRC studies is to apply research findings to social policy. To accomplish this, CIRC provides resources to enable teams of scholars from diverse fields to collaborate on policy-relevant questions. CIRC's approach begins by asking policy-makers to define questions for researchers to address, then shepherds the process by which scholars from various relevant disciplines are commissioned to work as a team to answer such questions. To demonstrate the strengths of this approach we describe the six components that comprise CIRC and provide an actual example of a project that CIRC has commissioned as well as a hypothetical example of a project that CIRC could undertake. This article is a progress report, written in an effort to disseminate information about CIRC's agenda.     

Intentional Faith: An Alternative View of Faith Development

Faith was defined as the search for an integrating center of value and meaning that is cognitional in nature, developmental in process, and transcendental in its dimensions. An original psychometric measure was constructed and tested in two samples in a midwestern metropolitan area. The life span sample of Catholics (N = 509) ranged in ages 18–84, median age 49. Respondents were 40% male, 60% female. The sample of college students (N = 303) had a mode age of 19, but was ethnically and religiously diverse. The results indicated that the covariance structure of the scale was equivalent for the two samples. The scale clearly measures 4 independent aspects of faith: Self and Moral development, God and Death, Ritual, and Authority. Reliability was established for four developmental Ways of Faith, based on Bernard Lonergan's intentionality analysis: Common Sense Faith, Thoughtful Faith, Responsible Faith, and Transcendent Faith. The data suggested that faith development may be best conceived as a continuous reworking of one's faith, rather than a sequence of acquisition and abandonment of beliefs. A mixed pattern of modest gender, age, and attachment effects was found for the Ways of Faith. A measure of self-church identification was found to be a consistent correlate of faith development.     

Integrating traditional and non‐traditional approaches to treat a client with a co‐occurring addictive and mental disorder: A case study

This paper presents a case study of a male client with co‐occurring addictive and psychological problems. The aim is to describe this client's treatment within an inpatient facility that provided integrated care for those diagnosed with both mental illness and substance abuse. The course of treatment from admission to discharge and follow‐up are discussed in an effort to provide a detailed account of the treatment modalities used to best help this client. Implications for counselling clients with similar issues and concerns are discussed.     

Combined reasoning by automated cooperation

Different reasoning systems have different strengths and weaknesses, and often it is useful to combine these systems to gain as much as possible from their strengths and retain as little as possible from their weaknesses. Of particular interest is the integration of first-order and higher-order techniques. First-order reasoning systems, on the one hand, have reached considerable strength in some niches, but in many areas of mathematics they still cannot reliably solve relatively simple problems, for example, when reasoning about sets, relations, or functions. Higher-order reasoning systems, on the other hand, can solve problems of this kind automatically. But the complexity inherent in their calculi prevents them from solving a whole range of problems. However, while many problems cannot be solved by any one system alone, they can be solved by a combination of these systems.We present a general agent-based methodology for integrating different reasoning systems. It provides a generic integration framework which facilitates the cooperation between diverse reasoners, but can also be refined to enable more efficient, specialist integrations. We empirically evaluate its usefulness, effectiveness and efficiency by case studies involving the integration of first-order and higher-order automated theorem provers, computer algebra systems, and model generators.