Bilingual infants excel at foreign‐language talker recognition

Bilingual and monolingual infants differ in how they process linguistic aspects of the speech signal. But do they also differ in how they process non‐linguistic aspects of speech, such as who is talking? Here, we addressed this question by testing Canadian monolingual and bilingual 9‐month‐olds on their ability to learn to identify native Spanish‐speaking females in a face‐voice matching task. Importantly, neither group was familiar with Spanish prior to participating in the study. In line with our predictions, bilinguals succeeded in learning the face‐voice pairings, whereas monolinguals did not. We consider multiple explanations for this finding, including the possibility that simultaneous bilingualism enhances perceptual attentiveness to talker‐specific speech cues in infancy (even in unfamiliar languages), and that early bilingualism delays perceptual narrowing to language‐specific talker recognition cues. This work represents the first evidence that multilingualism in infancy affects the processing of non‐linguistic aspects of the speech signal, such as talker identity.     

Word recognition in Alzheimer's disease: Effects of semantic degeneration

Impairments of word recognition in Alzheimer's disease (AD) have been less widely investigated than impairments affecting word retrieval and production. In particular, we know little about what makes individual words easier or harder for patients with AD to recognize. We used a lexical selection task in which participants were shown sets of four items, each set consisting of one word and three non‐words. The task was simply to point to the word on each trial. Forty patients with mild‐to‐moderate AD were significantly impaired on this task relative to matched controls who made very few errors. The number of patients with AD able to recognize each word correctly was predicted by the frequency, age of acquisition, and imageability of the words, but not by their length or number of orthographic neighbours. Patient Mini‐Mental State Examination and phonological fluency scores also predicted the number of words recognized. We propose that progressive degradation of central semantic representations in AD differentially affects the ability to recognize low‐imageability, low‐frequency, late‐acquired words, with the same factors affecting word recognition as affecting word retrieval.     

More evidence of the linkage between face processing and language processing

This review of the literature on the emergence of language describes two opposing views of phonological development, the sound‐based versus the whole‐word‐based accounts. An integrative model is proposed which claims that learning sublexical speech sounds and producing wordlike vocalizations are in fact parallel processes that feed each other during language development. We argue that this model might find unexpected support from the face processing literature.     

Central neuronal motor behaviour in skilled and less skilled novices – Approaching sports-specific movement techniques

Research on motor behavioural processes preceding voluntary movements often refers to analysing the readiness potential (RP). For this, decades of studies used laboratory setups with controlled sports-related actions. Further, recent applied approaches focus on athlete-non-athlete comparisons, omitting possible effects of training history on RP. However, RP preceding real sport-specific movements in accordance to skill acquisition remains to be elucidated.Therefore, after familiarization 16 right-handed males with no experience in archery volunteered to perform repeated sports-specific movements, i.e. 40 arrow-releasing shots at 60 s rest on a 15 m distant standard target. Continuous, synchronised EEG and right limb EMG recordings during arrow-releasing served to detect movement onsets for RP analyses over distinct cortical motor areas. Based on attained scores on target, archery novices were, a posteriori, subdivided into a skilled and less skilled group. EMG results for mean values revealed no significant changes (all p > 0.05), whereas RP amplitudes and onsets differed between groups but not between motor areas. Arrow-releasing preceded larger RP amplitudes (p < 0.05) and later RP onsets (p < 0.05) in skilled compared to less skilled novices. We suggest this to reflect attentional orienting and greater effort that accompanies central neuronal preparatory states of a sports-specific movement.     

An artificial intelligent counter

This article, using a counter as an example, explores a novel approach in constructing a cognitive system. The system is a paired memory system of “left and right brain” consisting of a number of memory units. The “left brain” is dedicated to the cognitive process of symbols, and the “right brain” to the representation of the symbols. The left and right subsystems are connected by bundles of internal communication signals. The paired memory system can learn facts and generalize concepts. Its cognitive capability is realized through the communication among these memory units at different cognitive levels within the system. The key claims in this paper are supported by empirical findings and theoretical principles. An AI counter is built and demonstrated in terms of concept learning and responding.     

Reaffirming the poverty of the stimulus argument: a reply to the replies

Lidz, Waxman, and Freedman [Lidz, J., Waxman, S., & Freedman, J. (2003). What infants know about syntax but couldn’t have learned: Evidence for syntactic structure at 18-months. Cognition, 89, B65-B73.] argue that acquisition of the syntactic and semantic properties of anaphoric one in English relies on innate knowledge within the learner. Several commentaries have now been published questioning this finding. We defend the original finding by identifying both empirical and logical flaws in the critiques.     

Children's understanding of teaching: the role of knowledge and belief

The relation between preschoolers’ concept of teaching and theory of mind was explored to determine if there is a developmental change in understanding how teaching depends on knowledge and belief. The study tested whether 3- to 6-year-olds thought the awareness of a knowledge difference is necessary for teaching. The 3- and 4-year-olds understood teaching stories with clear knowledge differences and could correctly use that information to specify the teacher and learner. The 5- and 6-year-olds, who performed well on a standard false belief task, further understood that it was the teacher's belief about the knowledge difference that would actually govern teaching. The conceptual link to teaching suggests that theory of mind is critical for understanding other forms of knowledge acquisition besides perceptual access.     

Japanese Sound‐Symbolism Facilitates Word Learning in English‐Speaking Children

Sound‐symbolism is the nonarbitrary link between the sound and meaning of a word. Japanese‐speaking children performed better in a verb generalization task when they were taught novel sound‐symbolic verbs, created based on existing Japanese sound‐symbolic words, than novel nonsound‐symbolic verbs ( Imai, Kita, Nagumo, & Okada, 2008 ). A question remained as to whether the Japanese children had picked up regularities in the Japanese sound‐symbolic lexicon or were sensitive to universal sound‐symbolism. The present study aimed to provide support for the latter. In a verb generalization task, English‐speaking 3‐year‐olds were taught novel sound‐symbolic verbs, created based on Japanese sound‐symbolism, or novel nonsound‐symbolic verbs. English‐speaking children performed better with the sound‐symbolic verbs, just like Japanese‐speaking children. We concluded that children are sensitive to universal sound‐symbolism and can utilize it in word learning and generalization, regardless of their native language.     

"Frequent frames" in German child-directed speech: a limited cue to grammatical categories

Mintz (2003) found that in English child-directed speech, frequently occurring frames formed by linking the preceding (A) and succeeding (B) word (A_x_B) could accurately predict the syntactic category of the intervening word (x). This has been successfully extended to French (Chemla, Mintz, Bernal, & Christophe, 2009). In this paper, we show that, as for Dutch (Erkelens, 2009), frequent frames in German do not enable such accurate lexical categorization. This can be explained by the characteristics of German including a less restricted word order compared to English or French and the frequent use of some forms as both determiner and pronoun in colloquial German. Finally, we explore the relationship between the accuracy of frames and their potential utility and find that even some of those frames showing high token-based accuracy are of limited value because they are in fact set phrases with little or no variability in the slot position.     

Towards a computational theory of experience

A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must satisfy for it to constitute not just a sufficient but a necessary, and therefore naturalistic and intrinsic, explanation of qualia. We show that a common assumption behind many neurocomputational theories of the mind, according to which mind states can be formalized solely in terms of instantaneous vectors of activities of representational units such as neurons, does not meet the requisite conditions, in part because it relies on inactive units to shape presently experienced qualia and implies a homogeneous representation space, which is devoid of intrinsic structure. We then sketch a naturalistic computational theory of qualia, which posits that experience is realized by dynamical activity-space trajectories (rather than points) and that its richness is measured by the representational capacity of the trajectory space in which it unfolds.