A Model for Predicting Computer Experience from Attitudes Toward Computers

This study examined the relationship between locus of control, two sets of beliefs about computers as electronic performance monitors, general computer attitudes, and computer experience. Results support a model in which computer attitudes mediate the relationship between an individual's locus of control and computer experience and between monitoring beliefs about computers and computer experience.     

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view.     

Comparing Computational Power

It is common practice to compare the computational power ofdifferent models of computation. For example, the recursivefunctions are strictly more powerful than the primitive recursivefunctions, because the latter are a proper subset of the former(which includes Ackermann's function). Side-by-side with this"containment" method of measuring power, it is also standardto base comparisons on "simulation". For example, one says thatthe (untyped) lambda calculus is as powerful—computationallyspeaking—as the partial recursive functions, because thelambda calculus can simulate all partial recursive functionsby encoding the natural numbers as Church numerals. The problem is that unbridled use of these two distinct waysof comparing power allows one to show that some computationalmodels (sets of partial functions) are strictly stronger thanthemselves! We argue that a better definition is that modelA is strictly stronger than B if A can simulate B via some encoding,whereas B cannot simulate A under any encoding. We show thatwith this definition, too, the recursive functions are strictlystronger than the primitive recursive. We also prove that therecursive functions, partial recursive functions, and Turingmachines are "complete", in the sense that no injective encodingcan make them equivalent to any "hypercomputational" model.¹     

A model of plausibility

Plausibility has been implicated as playing a critical role in many cognitive phenomena from comprehension to problem solving. Yet, across cognitive science, plausibility is usually treated as an operationalized variable or metric rather than being explained or studied in itself. This article describes a new cognitive model of plausibility, the Plausibility Analysis Model (PAM), which is aimed at modeling human plausibility judgment. This model uses commonsense knowledge of concept-coherence to determine the degree of plausibility of a target scenario. In essence, a highly plausible scenario is one that fits prior knowledge well: with many different sources of corroboration, without complexity of explanation, and with minimal conjecture. A detailed simulation of empirical plausibility findings is reported, which shows a close correspondence between the model and human judgments. In addition, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates that PAM is robust in its operations.     

Uncertainty about the rest of the sentence

A word-by-word human sentence processing complexity metric is presented. This metric formalizes the intuition that comprehenders have more trouble on words contributing larger amounts of information about the syntactic structure of the sentence as a whole. The formalization is in terms of the conditional entropy of grammatical continuations, given the words that have been heard so far. To calculate the predictions of this metric, Wilson and Carroll's (1954) original entropy reduction idea is extended to infinite languages. This is demonstrated with a mildly context-sensitive language that includes relative clauses formed on a variety of grammatical relations across the Accessibility Hierarchy of Keenan and Comrie (1977). Predictions are derived that correlate significantly with repetition accuracy results obtained in a sentence-memory experiment (Keenan & Hawkins, 1987).     

TEACHING SELF-ADMINSTRATION OF NASOGASTRIC TUBE INSERTION TO AN ADOLESCENT WITH CROHN DISEASE

We examined the effectiveness of simulation training to teach an adolescent male with Crohn disease to self-administer nasogastric tube insertion. Nasogastric tube insertion was taught using simulation training, after which self-insertion skills were assessed. Results across skill components indicated that this subject was able to self-administer insertion of the nasogastric tube.     

Blind ethics: Closing one's eyes polarizes moral judgments and discourages dishonest behavior

Four experiments demonstrate that closing one’s eyes affects ethical judgment and behavior because it induces people to mentally simulate events more extensively. People who considered situations with their eyes closed rather than open judged immoral behaviors as more unethical and moral behaviors as more ethical. In addition, considering potential decisions with closed eyes decreased stated intentions to behave ethically and actual self-interested behavior. This relationship was mediated by the more extensive mental simulation that occurred with eyes closed rather than open, which, in turn, intensified emotional reactions to the ethical situation. We discuss the implications of these findings for moral psychology and ethical decision making.