Rivals without a cause? Relative performance feedback creates destructive competition despite aligned incentives

Whether people compete or cooperate with each other has consequences for their own performance and that of organizations. To explain why people compete or cooperate, previous research has focused on two main factors: situational outcome structures and personality types. Here, we propose that—above and beyond these two factors—situational cues, such as the format in which people receive feedback, strongly affect whether they act competitively, cooperatively, or individualistically. Results of a laboratory experiment support our theorizing: After receiving ranking feedback, both students and experienced managers treated group situations with cooperative outcome structures as competitive and were in consequence willing to forgo guaranteed financial gains to pursue a—financially irrelevant—better rank. Conversely, in dilemma situations, feedback based on the joint group outcome led to more cooperation than ranking feedback. Our study contributes to research on competition, cooperation, interdependence theory, forced ranking, and the design of information environments.     

公平--精神道德观念还是互利合作机制?

公平概念一直都是儿童道德发展研究的一个重要课题。传统上认为公平作为一个道德概念,属于人类精神层面,指导人类行为,是高于社会物质生活的。然而进一步研究关注,公平,作为人类生活中的一个重要而普遍的现象,是如何产生的,又为何能保持在人类社会生活中的。结果表明,公平在是人们在互利的目的下表现出来的一种策略,受到社会信息透明度的影响。一个社会中信息越透明,个体的名声越容易形成,则公平越成为一种最优的策略。     

The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes.     

变革型领导力和交易型领导力：团队绩效的预测指标

在高不确定,高度竞争,高度挑战的任务情景下,领导力在团队中将扮演怎样的角色？变革型领导力与交易型领导力又是如何预测团队任务绩效的？为了回答这些问题,该研究对130名学生被试,31个团队,用ERP沙盘模拟游戏来进行模拟实验。通过高度模拟现实中企业经营的情景,从而提高实验结果的外部效度。实验结果表明,变革型领导力与交易型领导力都能够积极地预测团队任务绩效,消极领导力与任务绩效呈负相关,虽然并没有达到统计学显著水平,但研究结果的方向都支持了实验假设。     

胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管的博弈思考

规范化的胃癌根治术是我国胃癌治疗的发展方向,本文回顾性分析胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管和术后早期肠内营养在胃癌规范化治疗中的作用。结果表明空肠营养管置入和对照组术后并发症率无显著性差异（P=0.501）,早期联合肠内营养可有效缩短住院时间（P=0.0115）。结合博弈论的观点分析,胃癌根治术中放置空肠营养管在并发症预防和治疗中有重要作用,可能避免不必要的二次开腹手术,因此是一种对于医患双方都最为有利的策略选择。     

A Bayesian-optimal principle for learner-friendly adaptation in learning games

Adaptive learning games should provide opportunities for the student to learn as well as motivate playing until goals have been reached. In this paper, we give a mathematically rigorous treatment of the problem in the framework of Bayesian decision theory. To quantify the opportunities for learning, we assume that the learning tasks that yield the most information about the current skills of the student, while being desirable for measurement in their own right, would also be among those that are efficient for learning. Indeed, optimization of the expected information gain appears to naturally avoid tasks that are exceedingly demanding or exceedingly easy as their results are predictable and thus uninformative. Still, tasks that are efficient for learning may be experienced as too challenging, and the resulting failures can lower motivation. Therefore, in addition to quantifying the expected informational benefit for learning of any prospective task to be presented next, we also model the expected motivational cost of its presentation, measured simply as the estimated probability of failure in our example model. We propose a “learner-friendly” adaptation algorithm that chooses the learning tasks by optimizing the expected benefit divided by the expected cost. We apply this algorithm to a Rasch-like student model implemented within a real-world application and present initial results of a pilot experiment.