From commonsense to science,and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.     

Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience

In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the use of intentional predicates in mechanistic explanations sometimes leads to explanatorily inert claims, intentional predicates can also successfully feature in mechanistic explanations as tools for the functional analysis of the explanandum phenomenon. Despite the similarities between my account and Daniel Dennett's intentional-stance approach, I argue that intentional stance should not be understood as a theory of subpersonal causal explanation, and therefore cannot be used to assess the explanatory role of intentional predicates in neuroscience. Finally, I outline a general strategy for answering the question of what kind of language can be employed in mechanistic explanations.     

Skills and Knowledge - Nothing but Memory?

The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills.     

A New Book by N. A. Bernstein: “On Dexterity and Its Development”

A book, ‘On Dexterity and its Development,’ written by N. A. Bernstein in the 1940s has recently been published in Moscow. We describe briefly the amazing fate of this miraculously saved book and of its famous author. The book is unique in its reader-friendly handling of the most complicated issues of motor control, motor development, motor skill acquisition, and more general aspects of brain activity. It presents the basis for what is now called motor control and for some of the more fundamental issues of theoretical neuroscience. Bernstein described his views on multilevel control of movements, the role of sensory feedback, preprogramming, feedback and feedforward components in motor control, the role of exercise, and other subjects. Despite the fact that the book was written nearly half a century ago, its deep philosophical content remains beyond any competition.     

A note on Rodinson's Mohammed

Smith, D. Howard, Confucius (makers of new world sseries), London, Temple Smith, 1973, pp. 240, £3.20.

Christian, William A., Jnr., Person and God in a Spanish Valley, New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. xiii+215, £4.25.

Spiro, M. E. Buddhism and society. London: Allen &; Unwin, 1971, pp. xiv + 519, £7.25.     

Multilevel exemplar theory

This paper presents recent research that provides an overarching model of exemplar theory capable of explaining phenomena across the phonetic and syntactic strata. The model represents a unique exemplar-based account of constituency interactions encompassing both linguistic domains. It yields simulation and experimental results in keeping with experimental findings in the literature on syllable duration variability and offers an exemplar-theoretic account of local grammaticality. In addition, it provides some insights into the nature of exemplar cloud formation and demonstrates experimentally the potential gains that can be enjoyed via the use of rich exemplar representations.     

A probabilistic computational model of cross-situational word learning

Words are the essence of communication: They are the building blocks of any language. Learning the meaning of words is thus one of the most important aspects of language acquisition: Children must first learn words before they can combine them into complex utterances. Many theories have been developed to explain the impressive efficiency of young children in acquiring the vocabulary of their language, as well as the developmental patterns observed in the course of lexical acquisition. A major source of disagreement among the different theories is whether children are equipped with special mechanisms and biases for word learning, or their general cognitive abilities are adequate for the task. We present a novel computational model of early word learning to shed light on the mechanisms that might be at work in this process. The model learns word meanings as probabilistic associations between words and semantic elements, using an incremental and probabilistic learning mechanism, and drawing only on general cognitive abilities. The results presented here demonstrate that much about word meanings can be learned from naturally occurring child-directed utterances (paired with meaning representations), without using any special biases or constraints, and without any explicit developmental changes in the underlying learning mechanism. Furthermore, our model provides explanations for the occasionally contradictory child experimental data, and offers predictions for the behavior of young word learners in novel situations.     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题。20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注。现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论。目前的研究主要集中于克里克的“视觉意识”。但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的“二元论”将对于意识的研究大有裨益。     

论神经哲学的兴起

人类心身问题的研究一直是科学界关注的热点。近年来,国外学者将神经科学与哲学研究统一起来,集合两门学科的研究方法、综合双方的研究成果,以此来共同推进人类心身问题的研究,因此诞生了一门介于神经科学和哲学之间的独立学科,它有着学科交叉的研究领域和特殊的跨学科研究方法,这门学科就是神经哲学。