E-Science and the data deluge

This paper attempts to show how the “big data” paradigm is changing science through offering access to millions of database elements in real time and the computational power to rapidly process those data in ways that are not initially obvious. In order to gain a proper understanding of these changes and their implications, we propose applying an extended cognition model to the novel scenario.     

Towards classifying propositional probabilistic logics

This paper examines two aspects of propositional probabilistic logics: the nesting of probabilistic operators, and the expressivity of probabilistic assessments. We show that nesting can be eliminated when the semantics is based on a single probability measure over valuations; we then introduce a classification for probabilistic assessments, and present novel results on their expressivity. Logics in the literature are categorized using our results on nesting and on probabilistic expressivity.     

From commonsense to science,and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.     

Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience

In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the use of intentional predicates in mechanistic explanations sometimes leads to explanatorily inert claims, intentional predicates can also successfully feature in mechanistic explanations as tools for the functional analysis of the explanandum phenomenon. Despite the similarities between my account and Daniel Dennett's intentional-stance approach, I argue that intentional stance should not be understood as a theory of subpersonal causal explanation, and therefore cannot be used to assess the explanatory role of intentional predicates in neuroscience. Finally, I outline a general strategy for answering the question of what kind of language can be employed in mechanistic explanations.     

Skills and Knowledge - Nothing but Memory?

The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills.     

‘Feeling for’ and ‘feeling with’: developmental and neuroscientific perspectives on intersubjectivity and empathy

This paper discusses research by Beatrice Beebe, Bessel van der Kolk and others, exploring the interpersonal processes that underpin early relational trauma and how this contributes to adult psychopathology. An essential feature of early relational trauma, the infant's experience of being unable to evoke an empathic response from the caregiver and the feelings of shame this gives rise to, is discussed and its implications for psychotherapy are considered. The neuroscience that underpins two forms of empathy in the therapeutic relationship, of ‘feeling for’ and ‘feeling with’ the patient is discussed and explored in relation to the concordant and complementary countertransference. I argue that when therapists respond to the projection on to them of the abuser by an increasingly determined adherence to analytic technique, this may become a complementary countertransference identification with the abuser and an enactment of the abusive relationship.     

A New Book by N. A. Bernstein: “On Dexterity and Its Development”

A book, ‘On Dexterity and its Development,’ written by N. A. Bernstein in the 1940s has recently been published in Moscow. We describe briefly the amazing fate of this miraculously saved book and of its famous author. The book is unique in its reader-friendly handling of the most complicated issues of motor control, motor development, motor skill acquisition, and more general aspects of brain activity. It presents the basis for what is now called motor control and for some of the more fundamental issues of theoretical neuroscience. Bernstein described his views on multilevel control of movements, the role of sensory feedback, preprogramming, feedback and feedforward components in motor control, the role of exercise, and other subjects. Despite the fact that the book was written nearly half a century ago, its deep philosophical content remains beyond any competition.     

A note on Rodinson's Mohammed

Smith, D. Howard, Confucius (makers of new world sseries), London, Temple Smith, 1973, pp. 240, £3.20.

Christian, William A., Jnr., Person and God in a Spanish Valley, New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. xiii+215, £4.25.

Spiro, M. E. Buddhism and society. London: Allen &; Unwin, 1971, pp. xiv + 519, £7.25.     

Dreams in Child Psychoanalysis

More than six decades after Freud's death, psychoanalysts are certainly not more unified in their view of the concept of the unconscious—its structure and its way of working—than in ‘the good old days’. Challenges are facing psychoanalysis from many perspectives, urging psychoanalysts to continuously reconsider their theoretical grounds. This paper pursues three lines of argumentation concerning the Unconscious. The first line concerns the relation to neuroscience and this paper suggests the concept of background feelings (Damasio) as a contribution to another understanding of deficits in the psychoanalytic relationship. The second line concerns the relation to cognitive semiotics, and here, the paper stresses the concept of basic image sehemata as a possible link between the subject's pre-reflective awareness of the other and the internal world of phantasy. The third line pursues a concept of the analytic interpretation which is close to the Freudian idea that psychoanalysis is the communication between two Unconscious, and, consequently, that the psycho-analytic interpretation is not per se a conscious act.