The mind reduced to molecules?

According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.     

THINKING ABOUT RELIGION AND EXPERIENCING THE BRAIN: EUGENE D'AQUILI'S BIOGENETIC STRUCTURAL THEORY OF ABSOLUTE UNITARY BEING

Abstract. Religious experiences, including mystical states and experience of the divine, are the ultimate reality of human existence that demand an account. Eugene d'Aquili weaves together that account using paradigms of thought which historically have made mutually exclusive claims about the nature of religious experience. While pointing out the deficiencies of the theory from a narrowly scientific point of view, this paper recognizes that neuroscience, or any other solitary discipline, is incompetent to explain religion. This paper emphasizes the significance and truth of d'Aquili's holistic theory, a religious vision which itself explains science and philosophy.     

Area activation: a computational model of saccadic selectivity in visual search

The Area Activation Model (Pomplun, Reingold, Shen, & Williams, 2000) is a computational model predicting the statistical distribution of saccadic endpoints in visual search tasks. Its basic assumption is that saccades in visual search tend to foveate display areas that provide a maximum amount of task‐relevant information for processing during the subsequent fixation. In the present study, a counterintuitive prediction by the model is empirically tested, namely that saccadic selectivity towards stimulus features depends on the spatial arrangement of search items. We find good correspondence between simulated and empirically observed selectivity patterns, providing strong support for the Area Activation Model.     

The Effect of Prominence and Cue Association on Retrieval Processes: A Computational Account

We present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the ACT‐R–based model of sentence processing developed by Lewis and Vasishth (2005) (LV05). The predictions of the model are compared with the results of a recent meta‐analysis of published reading studies on retrieval interference in reflexive‐/reciprocal‐antecedent and subject–verb dependencies (Jäger, Engelmann, & Vasishth, 2017). The comparison shows that the model has only partial success in explaining the data; and we propose that its prediction space is restricted by oversimplifying assumptions. We then implement a revised model that takes into account differences between individual experimental designs in terms of the prominence of the target and the distractor in memory‐ and context‐dependent cue‐feature associations. The predictions of the original and the revised model are quantitatively compared with the results of the meta‐analysis. Our simulations show that, compared to the original LV05 model, the revised model accounts for the data better. The results suggest that effects of prominence and variable cue‐feature associations need to be considered in the interpretation of existing empirical results and in the design and planning of future experiments. With regard to retrieval interference in sentence processing and to the broader field of psycholinguistic studies, we conclude that well‐specified models in tandem with high‐powered experiments are needed in order to uncover the underlying cognitive processes.     

A neuro-cognitive defense of the unified self

The topic of the self remains one of considerable controversy, and many arguments have been put forth suggesting the intuitive concept of self must be in some way mistaken – in part based on results in the cognitive and neural sciences. In this article I offer the alternative positive proposal that “the self” may indeed refer to a physical/computational system within the brain. To do this, I draw on empirical work regarding the neural basis of consciousness and decision-making, and on philosophical work regarding ecological control, unified group perspectives, and functional/mechanistic explanation. The work I review jointly supports the conclusion that a “core-circuit” of interacting cortical regions – the global workspace network – can be understood as a unified system for consciously perceiving and deciding, and thus fulfills many of the roles intuitively assigned to the self. I conclude that this self-concept need not be mistaken given current empirical knowledge.     

社会认知神经科学——一个很有前途的交叉学科

该文介绍了近年兴起的一门交叉学科——社会认知神经科学,着重阐述了它强调在社会、认知与脑神经等三个层面的交互作用上去理解心理现象。作者指出,东方亚洲人与西方人在知觉、注意、认知和人格上的差别都是十分成熟的,可以立即开展社会认知神经科学探索的问题。     

Neuroscientific Measures of Covert Behavior

In radical behaviorism, the difference between overt and covert responses does not depend on properties of the behavior but on the sensitivity of the measurement tools employed by the experimenter. Current neuroscientific research utilizes technologies that allow measurement of variables that are undetected by the tools typically used by behavior analysts. Data from a specific neuroscientific technique, event-related potential (ERP), suggest that emission of otherwise covert responses can be indexed and that such covert responses are sensitive to stimulus control and selection by consequences. The P3 ERP effect is proposed as indicative of emission. Moreover, ERP results in semantic priming experiments suggest that operants are sensitive to changes in stimulus control even when they are not emitted (latent responses). Changes in response strength of latent responses as a function of stimulus control can in fact be measured by reaction time data and an ERP dependent variable called the N400 effect. If the interpretations provided in this paper are accurate, an index of covertly emitted operants (P3 effect) constitutes experimental evidence suggesting the validity of a Skinnerian radical behaviorist perspective on behavior. Moreover, in a Skinnerian paradigm, measured fluctuations in the response strength of latent operants as a function of environmental changes (N400 effect) would validate Palmer's (2009) concept of the repertoire.     

The past,present, and future of computational models of cognitive development

Does modeling matter? We address this question by providing a broad survey of the computational models of cognitive development that have been proposed and studied over the last three decades. We begin by noting the advantages and limitations of computational models. We then describe four key dimensions across which models of development can be organized and classified. With this taxonomy in hand, we focus on how the modeling enterprise has evolved over time. In particular, we separate the timeline into three overlapping historical waves and highlight how each wave of models has not only been shaped by developmental theory and behavioral research, but in return also provided valuable insights and innovations to the study of cognitive development.     

BUDDHISM,COMPARATIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY,AND HUMAN FLOURISHING

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross‐cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states in question reflect the embodied patterns of moral conduct that characterize the Buddhist way of being‐in‐the‐world, an account of their intentional and normative status becomes indispensable. It is precisely this synthesis of normativity and causal explanation that makes Buddhism special, and opens new avenues for enhancing, refining, and expanding the range of arguments and possibilities that comparative neurophilosophy can entertain.     

EXAMINING THE BODHISATTVA'S BRAIN

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular‐minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist version of eudaimonia is a common core conception shared by all Buddhists. I argue that this view is not only a rational reconstruction in need of argumentation but is in tension with competing Buddhist metaphysical theories of self, including the one Flanagan himself endorses.