Value-based choice: An integrative,neuroscience-informed model of health goals

Objective: Traditional models of health behaviour focus on the roles of cognitive, personality and social-cognitive constructs (e.g. executive function, grit, self-efficacy), and give less attention to the process by which these constructs interact in the moment that a health-relevant choice is made. Health psychology needs a process-focused account of how various factors are integrated to produce the decisions that determine health behaviour.

Design: I present an integrative value-based choice model of health behaviour, which characterises the mechanism by which a variety of factors come together to determine behaviour. This model imports knowledge from research on behavioural economics and neuroscience about how choices are made to the study of health behaviour, and uses that knowledge to generate novel predictions about how to change health behaviour. I describe anomalies in value-based choice that can be exploited for health promotion, and review neuroimaging evidence about the involvement of midline dopamine structures in tracking and integrating value-related information during choice. I highlight how this knowledge can bring insights to health psychology using illustrative case of healthy eating.

Conclusion: Value-based choice is a viable model for health behaviour and opens new avenues for mechanism-focused intervention.     

Marr,Mayr, and MR: What functionalism should now be about

In this review essay on The Multiple Realization Book by Polger and Shapiro, I consider the prospects for a biologically grounded notion of multiple realization (MR) which has been given too little consideration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Thinking about MR in the context of biological notions of function and robustness leads to a rethink of what would count as a viable functionalist theory of mind. I also discuss points of tension between Polger and Shapiro’s definition of MR and current explanatory practice in neuroscience.     

An integrated model of eye movements and visual encoding

Recent computational models of cognition have made good progress in accounting for the visual processes needed to encode external stimuli. However, these models typically incorporate simplified models of visual processing that assume a constant encoding time for all visual objects and do not distinguish between eye movements and shifts of attention. This paper presents a domain-independent computational model, EMMA, that provides a more rigorous account of eye movements and visual encoding and their interaction with a cognitive processor. The visual-encoding component of the model describes the effects of frequency and foveal eccentricity when encoding visual objects as internal representations. The eye-movement component describes the temporal and spatial characteristics of eye movements as they arise from shifts of visual attention. When integrated with a cognitive model, EMMA generates quantitative predictions concerning when and where the eyes move, thus serving to relate higher-level cognitive processes and attention shifts with lower-level eye-movement behavior. The paper evaluates EMMA in three illustrative domains — equation solving, reading, and visual search — and demonstrates how the model accounts for aspects of behavior that simpler models of cognitive and visual processing fail to explain.     

Of BOLD Claims and Excessive Fears: A Call for Caution and Patience Regarding Political Neuroscience

Published and informal assessments of the prospects for neuroimaging in political science have tended to range from overexuberant to reflexively dismissive. We seek to present a cautious but fair middle ground in considering this new methodology, primarily from an epistemological perspective. Our examination centers on the relationship between two levels of analysis, focusing on the potential for connection between behavior‐based theories of political psychology and cognition and the neural processes and systems involved in generating behaviors and states of mind. We explore the place of each level of analysis on its own, as well as the potential for the fruitful interaction of the two. This analysis brings together opinions and ideas presented by others in various forums and across multiple disciplines, offers a discussion of the the promises and perils of neuroimaging in its application to social science, as well as some practical thoughts regarding its early‐stage incorporation into political psychology. We argue in favor of proceeding with more substantial incorporation of neuroimaging into political psychology's methodological arsenal, but note that this will initially require both (1) greater acceptance of work more focused on presenting empirical results than on providing dispositive evidence in broader theoretical debates and (2) a commitment on the part of those conducting this research to refrain from overstating the definitiveness of its theoretical implications.     

A constructive neural-network approach to modeling psychological development

This article reviews a particular computational modeling approach to the study of psychological development – that of constructive neural networks. This approach is applied to a variety of developmental domains and issues, including Piagetian tasks, shift learning, language acquisition, number comparison, habituation of visual attention, concept learning, and theory of mind. Implications of this modeling for theoretical understanding of psychological development are considered.     

Reducing self‐control depletion effects through enhanced sensitivity to implementation: Evidence from fMRI and behavioral studies

Research suggests self-control relies on a limited set of resources that can be diminished by use. Recent theories posit that there are two stages of self-control: recognizing the need for control and implementing controlled responses. We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment and an intervention experiment to investigate whether one or both stages were affected by the prior exercise of self-control. Results from both experiments indicated that only the implementation stage was affected. Further, we demonstrate that self-control can be increased by an intervention designed to boost implementation, as opposed to the recognition of the need to control one's responses.     

Responding to framed health messages: Different strokes for different (handedness) folks

Research has shown that strength of handedness – a proxy variable for the degree of interaction between the left and right brain hemispheres – predicts differences in a variety of cognitive domains. The present paper extends this work to message (or goal) framing effects in which persuasive health communications emphasise positive vs. negative outcomes. One hundred fifty-six participants read pamphlets containing statements emphasising either the gains of using or the losses of not using sunscreen. Replicating previous research, non-users of sunscreen were more affected by framed messages than users. However, we found a loss- rather than gain-framed advantage, and mixed (inconsistent)-handers seemed to drive these effects more so than strong (consistent)-handers. These results suggest that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach may be inadequate in crafting effective educational messages about health behaviours, and that theories centring around one’s regulatory focus orientation as well as new methods in laterality research may be useful in reaching the widest range of individuals.     

The neuropsychology of religious experience. A review of different scientific approaches to the phenomenon / Neuropsicología de la experiencia religiosa. Una revisión de distintas aproximaciones científicas al fenómeno

Abstract

The current article is a critical review of the neuropsychological study of religious experience. First, we analyse the philosophical and theological roots of the term and its characterization as a sui generis and unique phenomenon. We subsequently describe the adoption of the concept in psychology, as well as the emergence of alternative approaches that emphasize the role of categorization of experiences as religious. We then move on to explore how both approaches have influenced the neuropsychological study of religious experience, consequently producing different models: sui generis, attributional and others that consider the variety of factors and the heterogeneity of experiences associated with religious practices.     

The brain/body-in-the-world system is cognitive science’s study object for the twenty-first century / El sistema cerebro/cuerpo-en-el-mundo es el objeto de estudio de la ciencia cognitiva en el siglo XXI

Abstract

Modern cognitive science is the outcome of a transdisciplinary effort constituting the largest body of work about the mind in human history. These advancements have guided our understanding of the functional role of the agent’s body and context when producing adaptive behaviour and interactions. Thus, cognition is embodied, embedded, extended and enacted within inward- and outward-directed interactions, which is where the brain/body-in-the-world system emerges. We suggest that the goal of the new cognitive science is to understand the multi-level dynamic mechanisms underlying cognition-in-the-world and review the implications for the relationship between psychology and the social sciences.     

Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition

We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous signals; digital computation requires strings of digits. But current neuroscientific evidence indicates that typical neural signals, such as spike trains, are graded like continuous signals but are constituted by discrete functional elements (spikes); thus, typical neural signals are neither continuous signals nor strings of digits. It follows that neural computation is sui generis. Finally, we highlight three important consequences of a proper understanding of neural computation for the theory of cognition. First, understanding neural computation requires a specially designed mathematical theory (or theories) rather than the mathematical theories of analog or digital computation. Second, several popular views about neural computation turn out to be incorrect. Third, computational theories of cognition that rely on non‐neural notions of computation ought to be replaced or reinterpreted in terms of neural computation.