A Psychometric Analysis of the “Divide and Conquer” Principle in Multicriteria Decision Making

The principle of “Divide and Conquer” (DAC) suggests that: (1) complex decision problems should be decomposed into smaller, more manageable parts and (2) these smaller parts should be logically aggregated to derive an overall value for each alternative. Typically, decompositional procedures have been compared to holistic evaluations that require decision makers to simultaneously consider all of the relevant attributes in the evaluation of the objects under consideration. These comparisons between decompositional and holistic judgments have primarily used a variant of Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT).We presented a general experimental framework that allows for a more extensive assessment of the DAC principle, as well as the effects of decision complexity on both holistic and decompositional procedures. We illustrate this approach with a study that uses the Simple Multiattribute Rating Technique with Swing Weights (SMARTS; Edwards & Barron, 1994) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP; Saaty, 1980). We report data comparing the convergent validity (e.g the agreement between decompositional and holistic strategies) and the temporal stability for decompositional and holistic judgments on a variety of dependent measures. Decision complexity did not significantly affect the correspondence between decompositional and holistic judgments for both SMARTS and AHP judgments. Results from an ordinal measure of temporal stability indicated the DAC principle was violated for the AHP judgments. For a linear measure of temporal stability, trends in the data indicated that the predicted effects of decision complexity on the DAC principle was violated for the SMARTS judgments.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

加工流畅性和提取流畅性与学习不良儿童学习判断的关系

流畅性是个体做学习判断（Judgements of Learning, JOLs）时的重要线索,主要包括加工流畅性和提取流畅性。实验采用联想字对作为实验材料,把做JOLs的时间分为即刻JOLs (Immediate:I)（学习完一个项目立即判断）,短时延迟JOLs（Delay condition: D1）和长时延迟JOLs（D2）,考察不同JOLs时间条件下,流畅性线索对学习不良儿童和一般儿童的JOLs的不同预测模式。被试为普通小学五年级学习不良和一般儿童各20名,结果发现,一般儿童在I条件下主要利用加工流畅性,在D条件下主要利用提取流畅性做JOLs,而学习不良儿童无论在I还是D条件下均主要利用提取流畅性线索做JOLs。加工流畅性在I条件下效度较高,提取流畅性在D条件下效度较高     

个体解决三项系列问题的心理模型

该研究设计了2种实验条件,对360名6-19岁个体解决三项系列问题的能力发展进行了研究,旨在讨论个体解决三项系列问题的心理模型的发展问题,结果表明：(1)6-19岁个体对三项系列问题中有必然逻辑答案的题目的判断能力的发展速度比较平稳;(2)个体对三项系列问题中有必然逻辑答案的题目的判断能力先于对没有逻辑答案的题目,6-9岁个体对三项系列问题中没有必然逻辑答案的题目的判断能力的发展速度低于10岁以后的个体;(3)空间模型、语义模型、语义一空间混合模型和枢纽项比较模型是相互补充的,是在不同认知发展阶段依一定次序,按一定的阶段逐渐形成的,经历了5个不同的发展阶段,最终形成以枢纽项比较模型为核心、四种心理模型并存于个体的心理结构之中的复合模型。     

When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action: How Believing in Torture's Effectiveness Shapes the Endorsement of Its Use

Does believing in torture's effectiveness shape the endorsements of its use? Using a multimethod approach across six studies, we provide converging evidence that efficacy beliefs can help increase understanding of individual differences and situational influences on torture support. Studies 1a and 1b found that torture opinions contained more efficacy‐based language than other types of harm and that people relied more on torture efficacy than torture's inherent morality when conveying their views. Study 2 assessed predictors of torture favorability including effectiveness and other key covariates, revealing that efficacy beliefs strongly predicted torture favorability—an association that retained its predictive validity above and beyond individual differences known to influence torture support. Mediation analyses further showed that efficacy beliefs explained key associations with torture support. Studies 3 and 4 used moral dilemmas requiring decisions about torture versus other harm. Results showed that individuals who believed harm would be effective were more likely to endorse its use; this was especially evident for torture judgments. Study 5 replicated the torture‐efficacy effect while also revealing efficacy effects for other interrogation techniques, thus suggesting the effect is driven more by the instrumental objective of torture than harm or moral violations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Scrutinizing the Emotional Nature of Intuitive Coherence Judgments

Dual‐system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence‐arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind—manifested in low sympathetic activity—could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

道德概念净脏隐喻及其对道德判断的影响

通过3个实验考察道德概念净脏隐喻的心理现实性以及道德概念净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻对道德判断的影响及其差异。结果表明：（1）道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,即被试在洁净背景上判断道德词的反应时更快,在肮脏背景上判断不道德词的反应时更快。（2）当将道德两难故事呈现在肮脏背景上时,相比于呈现在洁净背景上,被试更容易将故事主人公的行为判断为不道德,表现出隐喻一致性效应。（3）相比于肮脏自身启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事主人公的行为判断为更加不道德,表现出隐喻补偿性效应。（4）相比于洁净背景启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加严厉;相比于肮脏背景启动,被试在肮脏自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加宽松。研究结果证明,道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻均影响个体的道德判断,并且二者对道德判断的影响不同。