Reconsidering research on self-humanizing: The importance of mean comparative judgments

Self-humanization is defined as the tendency to view oneself as more essentially human than others. Researchers have claimed that people attribute human nature traits more strongly to themselves than to others, but not uniquely human traits. In this article we suggest that such claims are based on the misinterpretation of results. Most studies have not presented mean comparative judgments, making it impossible to determine whether people thought they possessed characteristics less strongly or more strongly than the average person. We found that people (N = 256) in Poland, Italy, and Korea perceived themselves as possessing desirable human nature and uniquely human characteristics more than others, as possessing undesirable uniquely human traits less than others, and as similar to others in terms of undesirable human nature characteristics. It seems that being more human than others means possessing some traits more than others and possessing some traits less than others.     

Testing four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect: Single- and multi-item entities as comparison targets and referents

In six experiments, we tested four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect (B/WTA) by manipulating the number of items comprising the target or referent of direct comparison. A single-item target tended to be rated more extremely than a single-item or a multi-item referent (Experiments 1–3). No B/WTA was obtained, however, when a multi-item target was compared with either a single- or multi-item referent (Experiments 4 and 5). A bias favoring a multi-item target was found only if cohesiveness among the items was increased through instructions (Experiment 6). The Unique-Attributes Hypothesis generally provided the best explanation the findings; the focalism explanation also demonstrated some empirical viability. The results suggest that important preferential decision-making outcomes can be affected by both the number of items and whether items are strategically manipulated to serve as targets or referents of comparison.     

Semantic coherence and fallacies in estimating joint probabilities

In three experiments on joint probability estimation, gist representations were manipulated with analogies, and the suboptimal strategy of ignoring relevant denominators was counteracted with training in using 2 × 2 tables to clarify joint probability estimates. The estimated probabilities of two events, as well as their conjunctive and disjunctive probabilities, were assessed against two benchmarks, logical fallacies and semantic coherence—a constellation of estimates consistent with the relationship among sets. Fuzzy‐trace theory (FTT) predicts that analogies will increase semantic coherence, and a table intervention affecting denominator neglect will both increase semantic coherence and reduce fallacies. In all three experiments, analogies increased semantic coherence. In both experiments training participants to use 2 × 2 tables, such tables reduced fallacies and increased semantic coherence. As the relations among sets in the problem materials progressed in cognitive complexity from identical sets, mutually exclusive sets, and subsets to overlapping sets, fallacies generally increased, and semantic coherence generally decreased. These findings indicate that denominator neglect is pervasive, but that it can be remedied with a straightforward intervention that clarifies relations among sets. Further, intuitive gist‐based probability estimation can be improved through the use of simple analogies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Illusion of confirmation from exposure to another's hypothesis

We examine the influence of exposure to an advisor's hypothesis, in the form of a point estimate of an uncertain quantity, on subsequent point estimates and confidence judgments made by advisees. In three experiments, a group of unexposed advisees produced their own estimates before being presented with that of the advisor, while a group of exposed advisees were presented with the advisor's estimate before making their own. Not surprisingly, exposed advisees deliberately incorporated the information conveyed by the advisor's estimate in producing their own estimates. But the exposure manipulation also had a contaminating influence that shifted what the advisees viewed as their own, independent estimates toward those of the advisor. Seemingly unaware of this influence, exposed advisees were subject to an illusion of confirmation in which they expressed greater confidence in the accuracy of the advisor's estimate than did unexposed advisees. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个体关于加工流畅性的信念对字体大小效应的影响

本研究考察个体关于加工流畅性的信念对学习判断(Judgment of learning, 简称JOL)的影响, 探讨字体大小效应的产生机制。研究通过两个实验分别考察个体关于“字体大小影响加工流畅性” (实验1)以及“加工流畅性影响记忆效果” (实验2)等信念对字体大小效应的影响。结果发现: 1)当人们相信大字体更流畅(实验1)或者越流畅越好记(实验2)时, 他们在大字体项目上的JOL值显著高于小字体项目上的JOL值; 2)当人们相信小字体更流畅(实验1)或者流畅性与记忆无关(实验2)时, 他们在大字体和小字体项目上的JOL值无显著差异, 字体大小效应消失。上述结果表明, 个体关于加工流畅性的信念是字体大小效应产生的重要原因, 是人们进行学习判断的重要线索。     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

The Monkey as a Psychological Subject

Many species in long-term captivity have tried to kill time by playing friendly games with their warders. In the end, only rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) could tolerate the tedious hide-and-seek games that their human jailers prefer to play. In this article, written many years before the Stockholm syndrome was first described, the author relates how it was eventually discovered which species is most willing to contribute to the development of a genuinely scientific human psychology. Harry F. Harlow died in 1981 and Dr. Frank C.P. van der Horst (fhorst@fsw.leidenuniv.nl) of Leiden University stands as the person to addess correspondence to.

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Gender Differences in the Self-Assessment of Accuracy on Cognitive Tasks

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of the accuracy of visual perceptual judgments produces underconfidence. The possible effect of gender differences on these robust findings appears to be underinvestigated. In this paper, I report two studies that take a step toward redressing this shortcoming. In Study 1, a group of young adults (N =185) were presented with a test of General Knowledge and a visual perceptual task. The results indicated the typical over/underconfidence phenomena noted above, but, when analyzed by sex, indicated statistically significant differences; men were more confident than women on both tasks. In Study 2, participants (N =303) with a wider age range completed 4 tests of cognitive ability, which were drawn from the theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence. Results indicated that the tendency for men to express higher levels of confidence than women in the accuracy of their work appears to remain constant across the life-span. These findings are discussed in relation to self-concept and gender stereotyping.     

Verbal probabilities: a question of frame?

Verbal expressions of probability and uncertainty are of two kinds: positive (‘probable’, ‘possible’) and negative (‘not certain’, ‘doubtful’). Choice of term has implications for predictions and decisions. The present studies show that positive phrases are rated to be more optimistic (when the target outcome is positive), and more correct, when the target outcome actually occurs, even in cases where positive and negative phrases are perceived to convey the same probabilities (Experiments 1 and 2). Selection of phrase can be determined by linguistic frame. Positive quantifiers (‘some’, ‘several’) support positive probability phrases, whereas negative quantifiers (‘not all’) suggest negative phrases (Experiment 3). Positive frames induced by numeric frequencies (e.g. the number of students to be admitted) imply positive probability phrases, whereas negative frames (e.g. the number of students to be rejected) call for negative probability phrases (Experiment 4). It is concluded that choice of verbal phrase is based not only on level of probability, but also on situational and linguistic cues. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.